The following is a conversation with Stephen Codkin, his second time in the podcast.
Stephen is one of the greatest historians of all time, specializing in 20th and 21st
century history of Russia and Eastern Europe, and he has written what is widely considered
to be the definitive biography of Stalin in three volumes, two of which have been published,
and the third focused on World War II and the years after he is in the midst of writing
now.
This conversation includes a response to my previous podcast episode with Oliver Stone
that was focused on Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine.
Stephen provides a heart-hitting criticism of Putin and the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
weighed and contextualized deeply in the complex geopolitics and history of our world, all
with an intensity and rigor, but also wit and humor that makes Stephen one of my favorite
human beings.
Please also allow me to mention something that has been apparent and has weighed heavy
on my heart and mind.
This conversation with Stephen Codkin makes it more dangerous for me to travel in Russia.
The previous conversation with Oliver Stone makes it more dangerous for me to travel in
Ukraine.
This makes me sad, but it is the way of the world.
I will nevertheless travel to both Ukraine and Russia.
I need to once again see, with my own eyes, the land of my ancestors, where they suffered
but flourished, and eventually gave birth to silly old me.
I need to hear directly the pain, anger, and hope from both Ukrainians and Russians.
I won't give details to my travel plans in terms of location and timing, but the trip
is very soon.
Whatever happens, I'm truly grateful for every day I'm alive, and I hope to spend each such
day adding a bit of love to the world.
I love you all.
This is the Lex Friedman Podcast, and now, dear friends, here's Stephen Codkin.
You are one of the great historians of our time specializing in the man, the leader,
the historical figure of Stalin.
Let me ask a challenging question.
If you can perhaps think about the echo of 80 years between Joseph Stalin and Vladimir
Putin, what are the similarities and differences between the man and the historical figure,
the historical trajectory of Stalin and Putin?
Thank you, Lex.
It's very nice to be here again with you.
It's been a while.
Good to see you.
Yeah, good to see you as well.
You're looking good.
You as well.
I see this podcast stuff is doing you right.
So we can't really put very easily Vladimir Putin in the same sentence with Joseph Stalin.
Stalin is a singular figure, and his category is really small.
Hitler, Mao, that's really about it.
And even in that category, Stalin is the dominant figure, both by how long he was in
power and also by the amount of power, the military industrial complex he helped build
and commanded.
So Putin can't be compared to that.
However, Putin's in the same building as Stalin.
He uses some of the same offices as Stalin used.
And some of those television broadcasts that we see of Putin at meetings and Putin inside
the Kremlin, Stalin used to sit in those rooms and hold meetings in those rooms.
That's the Imperial Senate built by Catherine the Great in 18th century building inside
the Kremlin.
It's a domed building, and you can see it on the panorama, the top of the building, at
least you can see it on the panorama when you look over the Kremlin wall from many sites
inside Moscow.
So if he's not comparable to Stalin, he still works, as I said, in those same buildings,
those same offices, partly.
And so therefore, he's got some of the problems that Stalin had, which was managing Russian
power in the world, from a position of weakness vis-a-vis the West, but from an ambition,
a grandiosity, in fact.
And so this combination of weakness and grandeur, of not being as strong as the West, but aspiring
to be as great or greater than the West.
That's the dilemma of Russian history for the past many centuries.
It was the dilemma for the Tsars, it was the dilemma for Peter the Great, it was the dilemma
for Alexander, it was the dilemma for Stalin, and it's the dilemma for Putin.
Russia is smaller now compared to when Stalin was in that Kremlin.
It's got pushed back to borders almost the time of Peter the Great, its father from the
main European capitals now than any time since that 18th century.
And the West has only grown stronger in that period of time.
So the dilemma is greater than ever.
The irony of being in that position, of sitting in the Kremlin, trying to manage Russian power
in the world, trying to be a providential power, a country with a special mission in
the world, a country which imagines itself to be a whole civilization, and yet not having
the capabilities to meet those aspirations, and falling father and father behind the West.
The irony of all of that is the attempted solutions put Russia in a worse place every
single time.
So you try to manage the gap with the West, you try to realize these aspirations, you
try to raise your capabilities, and you build a strong state, the quest to build a strong
state and use coercive modernization, to try somehow, if not to close the gap with the
West, at least to manage it.
And the result is different versions of personalist rule.
So they don't build a strong state, they build a personal dictatorship, they build an autocracy.
And moreover, that autocracy undertakes measures which then worsen the very geopolitical dilemma
that gave rise to this personalist rule in the first place.
And so I call this Russia's perpetual geopolitics, I've been writing about this for many, many
years.
What's important about this analysis is this is not a story of eternal Russian cultural
proclivity to aggression.
It's not something that's in the mother's milk, it's not something that can't be changed
– Russia doesn't have an innate cultural tendency to aggression.
This is a choice.
It's a strategic choice to try to match the power of the West, which from Russia's vantage
point is actually unmatchable.
But it's a choice that's made again and again, and Putin has made this choice just
as Stalin made the choice.
Stalin presided over the World War II victory, and then he lost the peace.
After he died in 1953, there was, of course, other rulers who succeeded him.
He was still the most important person in the country after he died, because they were
trying to manage that system that he built, and more importantly, manage that growing
gap with the West.
By the time the 90s rolled around, former Soviet troops, now Russian troops, withdrew
from all those advanced positions that they had achieved as a result of the World War
II victory, and it was Napoleon in reverse.
They went on the same roads, but not from Moscow back to Paris, but instead from Warsaw
and from East Berlin and from Tallinn and Riga and all the other places of former Warsaw
Pact and former Soviet republics in the Baltic region, they went back to Russia in retreat,
and so Stalin in the fullness of time lost the peace, and Putin, in his own way, inheriting
some of this, attempting to reverse it when, as I said, Russia was smaller, farther away,
weaker, the West was bigger and stronger and had absorbed those former Warsaw Pact countries
and Baltic states, because they voluntarily begged to join the West.
The West didn't impose itself on them.
It's a voluntary sphere of influence that the West conducts, and so that dilemma is
where you can put Putin and Stalin in the same sentence and the terrible outcome for
Russia in the fullness of time also has echoes.
But of course, Putin hasn't murdered 18 to 20 million people, and the scale of his abilities
to cause grief with the nuclear weapons aside is nothing like Stalin's, and so we have to
be careful, right?
Only Mao put bigger numbers on the board from a tragic point of view than Stalin.
The numbers matter here if we compare these singular figures.
Yeah, Mao killed more people in Stalin because Mao had more people to kill.
The most amazing thing about Mao is he watched Stalin do it.
He watched Stalin collectivize agriculture and famine result.
He watched Stalin impose this communist monopoly, and all of those people sent to prison or
given a bullet in the back of the neck, he watched all of that, and then he did it again
himself in China.
Do you think he saw the human cost directly, that when you say he saw, do you think he
was focused on the policies, or was he also aware distinctly as a human being of the human
cost in the lives of peasants, in the lives of the working class, in the lives of the
poor?
I think the prima facie evidence is that he didn't value human life.
Otherwise, I don't think after seeing the amount of lives that were taken in the Soviet
experiment, he would have done something similar after that.
I think the answer, Lex, is it's very hard to get inside Mao's head and figure out what
he was really thinking, but if you just look at the results that happened, the policies
that were undertaken and the consequences of them, you would have to conclude that there
was, let's say, no value or little value placed on human life.
Unfortunately, that's characteristic not only of communist dictators, of post-communist
dictators as well, but the scale of the horrors that they inflict, as horrific as they are,
just can't compare.
We're in a situation where Eurasia, that is to say, the ancient civilizations of Eurasia,
which would be Russia, Iran, China, all have some version of non-democratic, illiberal,
autocratic regimes, and they're all pushing up against the greater power of the West in
some form.
Sometimes they coordinate their actions and sometimes they don't, but this is a very long-standing
phenomenon, Lex, that predates Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping or the latest incarnation of
the supreme leader in Iran.
We'll talk about this, I think, really powerful framework of five dimensions of authoritarian
regimes that you've put together.
First, let's go to this Napoleon and reverse retreat from Warsaw back.
Putin has called, from the perspective of Putin, this retreat, this collapse of Stalin
is one of the great tragedies of that region, of Russia.
Do you think there's a sense where, as Putin sits now in power for 22-plus years, he really
dreams of a return to the power that influence the land of Stalin?
So while you said that they're not in the same place in terms of the numbers of people
that suffer due to their regime, do you think he hopes to have the same power, the same
influence for a nation that was in the 30s and the 40s and the 50s of the 20th century
under Stalin?
If he does, Lex, he's deluding himself.
We don't know for sure.
Very few people talk to him.
Very few people have access to him.
A handful of Western leaders have met with him for short periods of time.
Those inside Russia barely meet with him.
His own minions in the regime barely have face time with him.
We don't know exactly what he thinks.
It could be that he has delusions of reconquering Russian influence, if not direct control over
the territories that broke away, but it's not going to happen.
Let's talk a little bit about this guy, Nikolai Potroshev.
Nikolai Potroshev is probably not well known to your listeners.
He's the head of Russia's Security Council, and so you could probably call him the second
most important or second most powerful man in Russia.
Only inside the regime, arguably Navalny is the second most important person in the country,
and we'll talk about that later, I'm sure.
In terms of influence, yes.
But Potroshev is a version of Putin's right-hand man, and Potroshev has been giving interviews
in the press.
You probably saw the interview with Niza Vesemaya-Gazeta not that long ago.
He writes also his own blog-like interventions in the public sphere using the few channels
that are left.
What's interesting about Potroshev, and this could well reflect similar thinking to Putin's,
which is why I'm bringing this up, is that he's got this conspiratorial theory that the
West has been on a forever campaign to destroy Russia, just like it destroyed the Soviet Union,
and that everything the West does is meant to dismember Russia, and that Russia is fighting
an existential battle against the West.
So for example, the CIA and the American government wanted to bring down the Soviet Union.
Have a mind that the Bush administration, the first Bush, the father, was trying desperately
to hold the Soviet Union together because they were afraid of the chaos that might ensue
and the nukes that might get loose as a result of a Soviet collapse.
It wasn't until the very last moment where Bush decided, his administration decided to
back those Republican leaders who were breaking away from Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet
Union.
So never mind the empirics of it.
Never mind that Bill Clinton's administration, following George Bush, sent boatloads of money,
Western taxpayer money to Russia.
We don't know exactly how much because it came from different sources.
People talk about how there was no Marshall Plan.
It was tens of billions of dollars from various sources, from the IMF and other sources.
And Lexa disappeared.
It's gone.
Just like the German money that went to Gorbachev for unification disappeared even before the
Soviet collapse.
The money disappeared, but the West sent the money.
So how was that applied?
And then you could go all the way, Obama's administration, George Bush trying to do business
deals and reset the relations and Obama administration trying to reset the relations and doing nothing
after the Georgian war and slapping Putin on the wrist, following the seizure force.
And you could go on and you could go on all the way through the Trump administration telling
Putin that he's right, Trump believes Putin and doesn't believe US intelligence about
Russian efforts to interfere in American domestic politics.
So despite all the empirics of it, you have Patrushchev and likely Putin talking about
this multi-decade Western conspiracy to bring Russia down.
At the same time as that's happening, the Germans are voluntarily increasing their dependence
on Russian energy, voluntarily increasing their dependence on Russian.
So here's the conspiracy to bring Russia down.
The French, who fantasize about themselves as a diplomatic superpower, are constantly,
the French leaders are constantly running to the Kremlin to ask what Russian needs,
what concessions from the West Russian needs to feel respected again.
The British provide all manner of money laundering and reputation laundering services for the
whole Russian oligarchy, including the state officials who are looting the state and using
the West British institutions to launder their money.
So all of this is happening and yet Patrushchev imagines this conspiracy to bring Russia down
by the West.
And so that's what we've got in the Kremlin again.
Stalin had that same conspiratorial mentality of the West.
Everything that happened in the world was part of a Western conspiracy directed against
the Soviet Union and now directed against Russia.
Even though the West is trying to appease, the West is offering its services, the West
is trying to change Russia through investment in a positive way, but instead the West is
what's changing.
The West is becoming more corrupt.
Western services are being corrupted by the relationship with Russia.
So you have to ask yourself, who are these people in power in the Kremlin who imagine
that while they're availing themselves of every service and every blandishment of the
West, while they're availing themselves of this, that they're fighting a conspiracy
by the West to bring them down.
So this is what they call the Abyssinia in Russian, which is a term, as you know, that
means those who are resentful or you might call them the losers, the losers in the transition.
So when the Soviet Union fell and there was a very substantial diminution in Russian power
and influence in the world, a lot of people lost out.
They weren't able to steal the property.
They weren't able to loot the state in the 90s.
And they were on the outside.
They gradually came back in.
They were the losers in the transition domestically.
And for them, right, they wanted to reverse being on the losing side.
And so they began to expropriate, to steal the money, steal the property from those first
thieves who stole in the 90s.
And the 2000s and on have been about re-stealing, taking the losers in the transition, taking
the money from the winners, and reversing this resentment, this loser status.
Those are your Patrushevs and your Putin's.
But at the same time, this blows out to let's reverse the losses being on the losing side,
the roiling resentment at the decline of their power internationally.
Let's try to reverse that too.
So you have a profound psychological whole generation of people who are on the losing
end domestically and reverse that domestically.
That's what the Putin regime is about.
Remember Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Yukos.
Remember all the companies that are now owned by Putin cronies because they were taken away
from whoever stole them in the first place.
And now they're trying to do that on the international scale.
It's one thing to put domestic opponents in jail.
It's one thing to take away someone's property domestically.
But you're not going to reverse the power of the West with the diminished Russia that
you have.
And so that project, that Patrushev project, which we see him expressing again and again,
he speaks about it publicly.
It's not something that we need to go looking for a quest, the secret.
We can't find it.
What are they thinking?
It's right there in front of our face.
And Putin has spoken the same way for a long time.
People point to the 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference that Putin delivered and
certainly your listeners could use a snippet or two of that, just like they could use a
couple of quotes from Patrushev to contextualize what we're talking about.
But it predates the 2007 Munich speech, the reaction to Ukraine's uprising in 2004 attempt
to steal the election inside Ukraine, which the Ukrainian people rose up valiantly against
and risked their lives and overturned.
So there were public statements from Putin already back then.
The statements about Harkovsky in 2003 when he was arrested and expropriated.
This is a longstanding psychological, deeply psychological issue, which is about managing
Russian power in the world, as I was saying, the gap with the West, but has this further
dimension of feeling like losers and wanting to reverse that, that's their life experience.
Abyssinia.
So there's that resentment that fuels this narrative, fuels this geopolitics and internal
policy.
But so resentment is behind some of the worst things that have ever been done in human history.
Hitler was probably fueled by resentment.
So resentment is a really powerful force, yes.
It's to maybe not push back, but to give fuller context on the West.
He said there's a narrative from Putin's Russia that the West is somehow an enemy.
You position everything against the West, but is there a degree, and to what degree
is the West willing to feed that narrative, that it's also convenient for the West to
have an enemy?
It seems like in the place, in the span, it seems like in geopolitics, having an enemy
is useful for forming a narrative.
Now having an enemy for the basic respect of humanity is not good, but in terms of maintaining
power, if you're a leader in a game of geopolitics, it seems to be good to have an enemy.
It seems to be good to have something like a Cold War.
We can always point your finger and says, all our actions are fighting this evil, whatever
that evil is.
It could be like with George W. Bush, the war on terrorism is this evil.
You can always point that something.
So you've made it seem that the West is trying.
There's a lot of forces within the West that are trying to reach out a friendly hand, trying
to help, sending money, sending compassion, trying to sort of...
Trying to integrate Russia into global institutions.
Exactly.
Which was a long-standing multi-decade effort across multiple countries and multiple administrations
in those countries.
But is there also warmongers on the West that want to...
Of course, Lex.
Of course, you're right about that, but let's put it this way.
People talk about the Cold War and they usually looking to assign blame for the Cold War as
if it's some kind of mistake, a misunderstanding, or a search for an enemy that was convenient
to rally domestic politics.
So Lex...
There's a coup in Czechoslovakia and somebody installs a communist regime in February 1948.
No reaction to that.
That's just okay.
There's a blockade of Berlin.
Is that cool by you?
Where they try to strangle West Berlin so that they can swallow West Berlin and add it to
East Berlin.
You cool with that?
How about Korean War, invasion of North Korea, invasion of South Korea by North Korea.
You cool with that?
How about the murders and the show trials up and down Eastern Europe in the late 40s after
the imposition of the clone regimes?
You good with that?
Yeah, it's very convenient to have an enemy.
I agree with you.
But you know, there was some actions, Lex.
There was some threats to people's freedom.
There was some invasions.
There was some aggression and violence on a mass scale, like collectivization of Eastern
Europe.
We could go on, Lex, with the examples.
I'm just giving a few of them.
And so the Cold War was not a mistake.
It was not a misunderstanding.
You don't have to blame someone for the Cold War.
We have to give credit for the Cold War.
The Truman administration deserves credit for standing up to Stalin's regime, for standing
up to these actions, for saying, yeah, we're not just going to take this.
We're not going to let this go on.
We're not going to let this expand to further territories.
We're going to create the NATO alliance and we're going to rally democratic liberal regimes
to stand up to this illiberalism, this violence, and this aggression.
And so, yeah, Lex, it's always convenient to have an enemy.
But there was an enemy, Nikolai Leonov, who recently died.
He died in April, 2022, and he had a major funeral.
He was the last head analyst of the Soviet KGB.
And Leonov is one of the most important figures for understanding the Soviet collapse.
And he has the best memoir on the Soviet collapse, which is known in Russian as Liha Latia.
You will understand that, and you'll help your podcast listeners understand there's
a singularity to that kind of expression, Liha Latia.
Leonov just died.
But one of the things, and in fact, the people who were supposedly arrested by Putin as scapegoats
for the Ukraine war, the main one, Sergei Besheda, gave the eulogy at Leonov's funeral
in April, 2022, showing that it's a lie that all of these people have been arrested and
purged in another nonsense in social media.
But to get back to what Leonov said and get back to your enemy point, Leonov said, you
know, the West spent all this time blackening the image of the Soviet Union, all these resources
and propaganda and covert operations to blacken the Soviet image.
And they did, Lex.
The West did do that.
And then Leonov wrote in the next sentence, and you know what?
We gave them a lot of material to work with to blacken our image.
Yeah, so you're saying a kind of sobering reality, which it is possible to some degree
to draw line between the good guys and the bad guys.
Freedom is better than unfreedom, Lex.
It's a lot better than unfreedom, and a guy like you understands that really well.
Well, so yes, but those are all, you know, there's words like justice, freedom.
What else?
Love.
You can use a lot of words that Hitler himself used to describe why he is actually creating
a better world than those he's fighting.
So some of it is propaganda.
The question is on the ground, what is actually increasing the amount of freedom in the world?
Institution's Lex, right?
We're not talking about propaganda here.
When we use words like freedom, we're talking about rule of law.
We're talking about protection of civil liberties.
We're talking about protection of private property.
We're talking about an independent and well-funded judiciary.
We're talking about an impartial, non-corrupt, competent civil service.
We're talking about separation of powers where the executive branch's power is limited, usually
by an elected parliament.
In fact, yes, let's talk about elections.
Let's talk about freedom of speech and freedom of the public sphere.
We're not talking about freedom as a slogan here.
We're talking about a huge array of institutions and practices and norms, ultimately, right?
And if they exist, you know and you live under them.
And if they don't exist, you fully understand that as well, right?
Ukraine was a flawed democracy before Russia invaded.
It's utterly corrupt.
Many ways dysfunctional, especially the elites were dysfunctional.
The gas industry in Ukraine was absolutely terrible because of the corruption that it
generated, the oligarch problem, a handful of people stealing the state resources.
And yet Ukraine had an open public sphere and it had a parliament that functioned.
And so despite its flaws, it was still a democracy.
The regime in Moscow, you can't say that, Lex.
It's not a comparable regime to Ukraine.
You could say, oh, well, there are oligarchs in Ukraine and there are oligarchs in Russia.
There's corruption in Ukraine, there's corruption in Russia.
So really, what's the big difference?
And the answer is, well, Ukraine had the open public sphere, Ukraine had a real parliament.
Can you call Russia's Duma a real parliament?
I don't think so.
I don't think you can.
Can you say that there were any checks whatsoever on the executive branch in Russia?
Can you say that the Russian judiciary had any independence or really full level of competence,
even compared to the Ukrainian judiciary, which was nothing to brag about?
No, you can't say that, Lex.
So we can differentiate between the very flawed, corrupt oligarchic democracy in Ukraine and
the very corrupt oligarchic autocracy in Russia.
I think that's a fair distinction.
Yeah, we should say that Russia and Ukraine have the great honor of being the number one
and the number two most corrupt nations in Europe by many measures.
But there is a fundamental difference as you're highlighting.
Russia is a corrupt autocracy, Ukraine, we can say, is a corrupt democracy.
And to that level, there's a fundamental difference.
Ukraine is not murdering its own journalists in systematic fashion.
If journalists are killed in Ukraine, it's a tragedy.
If journalists are killed in Russia or Russian journalists are killed abroad, it's regime
policy.
And the degree to which a nation is authoritarian means that it's suffocating its own spirit,
its capacity to flourish.
We're not just talking about sort of the freedom of the press, those kinds of things, but basically
all industries get suffocated and you're no longer being able to, yeah, flourish as
a nation, grow the production, the GDP, the scientists, the art, the culture, all those
kinds of things.
Yes, Lex, you're absolutely right.
And so before the invasion, the full blown invasion of February 2022 into Ukraine, because
as you know, the war has been going on for many years at a lower level compared to what
it is these days, but still a tragic war with many deaths prior to February 2022.
Before this latest war, we could have said that the greatest victims of the Putin regime
are Russian domestic, that the people who are suffering the most from the Putin regime
are not sitting here in New York City, but in fact are sitting there in Russia.
Now of course, with the invasion of Ukraine and really the atrocities that have been well
documented and more are being investigated, we can't easily say anymore that Russians
are the greatest victims of the Putin regime, but in ways other than bombing and murdering
civilians, children, mothers, grandmothers, grandfathers, after you include that, then
of course the larger number of victims of the Putin regime are not Ukrainians, but ultimately
Russians and there's how many of them now that have fled?
So your powerful, precise, rigorous words are then in a stark contrast, I would say,
to my very recent conversation with Oliver Stone, and I would love you to elaborate
to this agreement you have here with his words and maybe words of people like John Miersheimer.
The idea is that Putin's hand in this invasion of 2022 was forced by the expansion of NATO,
the imperialist imperative of the United States and the NATO forces.
You disagree with this point in terms of placing the blame somehow on the invasion on forces
larger than the particular two nations involved, but more on the geopolitics of the world that's
driven by the most powerful military nation in the world, which is the United States.
Yeah, Lex, so let's imagine that a tragedy has happened here in New York and a woman
got raped.
We know the perpetrator, they go to trial and Oliver Stone gets up and says, you know
what, the woman was wearing a short skirt and there was no option but for the rapist
to rape her.
The woman was wearing lipstick or the woman was applying for NATO membership and just
had to be raped.
I mean, didn't want a raper, but was compelled because of what she was doing and what she
looked like and the clothes she was wearing and the alliances that she was under international
law signed by Moscow, all the treaties that sovereign countries get to choose whatever
alliance they belong to, treaties that the UN Charter signed by Russia, Soviet Union.
The 1975 Helsinki agreement signed by the Soviet Union, the 1990 Charter of Paris for
a new Europe signed by the Soviet Union, the 1997 NATO Russia founding act signed by the
Russian government, the post-Soviet Russia, all of those documents signed by either the
Soviet regime or the Russian regime, which is the legally recognized international inheritor,
right, successor of the Soviet state.
All of those agreements are still enforced and all of them say that countries are sovereign
and can freely choose their foreign policy and what alliances they want to join.
Let's even go farther than that.
I mean, you don't have to go farther than that, but let's go farther than that, Lex.
Is an autocratic repressive regime that invades its neighbors in the name of its own security,
being new in Russian history?
Did we not see this before?
Does this not predate NATO expansion?
Does this not predate the existence of NATO?
Would Oliver Stone sit here in this chair and say to you, you know, they had to impose
serfdom in the 17th century because NATO expanded.
They had no choice.
Their hands were tied.
They were compelled to treat their own population like slaves because, you know, NATO expanded.
I mean, I could go on through the examples of Russian history that predate the existence,
let alone the expansion of NATO, where you have behavior, policies, actions, very similar
to what we see now from the Kremlin.
And you can't explain those by NATO expansion, can you?
And so that argument doesn't wash for me because I have a pattern here that predates NATO expansion.
I have international agreements, founding documents signed by the Kremlin over many,
many decades, acknowledging the freedom of countries to choose their alliances.
And then I have this problem where when you rape somebody, it's not because they're wearing
a short skirt.
It's because you have raped them.
You've committed a criminal act, Lex.
I think there's a lot of people listening to this that will agree to the emotion, the
power and the spirit of this metaphor.
And I was struggling to think how to dance within this metaphor because it feels like
it wasn't precisely the right one, but I think that it captures the spirit.
I'm not suggesting, Lex, that everything the West has done has been honorable or intelligent.
Fortunately, we live in a democracy.
We live in liberal regimes.
We live under rule of law, liberal in the classical sense of rule of law, not liberal
in the leftist sense.
We live in places like that and we can criticize ourselves and we can criticize the mistakes
that we made or the policy choices or the inactions that were taken.
And there are a whole lot of things to answer for.
And you can now discuss the ones that are your favorites, the dishonor or the mistakes.
And I could discuss mine and we could spend the whole rest of our meeting today discussing
the West's mistakes and problems.
And we won't end up in prison for it.
Yeah, Lex, and so I'm thankful for that.
And I'm thankful that people may disagree and that people make the argument that NATO expansion
is to blame.
But you see, I'm countering two arguments here.
I'm countering one argument, which is very deeply popular, pervasive, about how Russia
has this cultural tendency to aggression.
And it can help but invade its neighbors and it does it again and again.
And it's eternal Russian imperialism and you have to watch out for it.
This very popular argument in the Baltic states, it's really popular in Warsaw.
It's really popular with the liberal interventionists and it's very, very popular with those who
are part of the Iraq war squad that got us into that mess.
So I'm against that.
And the reason I'm against it is because it's not true.
It's empirically false.
There is no cultural trait, inherent tendency for Russia to be aggressive.
It's a strategic choice that they make.
Every time it's a choice made, it's not some kind of momentum.
Every time it's a choice that we should judge for the choice that it is for the decision.
And therefore they could make different choices.
They could say, we don't have to stand up to the West.
We don't have the capabilities to do that.
We can still be a great country.
We can still be a civilization unto itself.
We can still be Russia.
We can still worship in Orthodox cathedrals or we can still be ourselves, but we don't
have to pursue this chimerical pursuit, this elusive quest to stand up to the West and
be in the first ranks of powers.
So I'm countering that argument.
I'm saying it's perpetual geopolitics.
It's a geopolitical choice rising out of this dilemma of the mismatch between aspirations
and capabilities.
It's not eternal Russian imperialism.
And I'm also countering the other argument here, Lex, which is to say that it's the West's
fault.
It's Western imperialism.
I'm very popular on the left, very popular with realist scholars, very popular with some
of the people recently on your podcast.
And so it's neither eternal Russian imperialism, nor is it Western imperialism.
The mere fact that the West is stronger than Russia is not a crime on the part of the West.
It's not a crime that countries voluntarily want to join the West that beg to get in,
either the EU or NATO or other bilateral alliances or other trade agreements.
Those are voluntarily entered into, and that's not criminal.
If the West's sphere of influence, which is open, an open sphere of influence, which as
I say, people voluntarily join, if that expands, that's not a crime, nor is that a threat to
Russia, ipso facto.
NATO is a defensive alliance, and the countries are largely pacifist who are members of NATO.
And NATO doesn't attack.
It defends members if they are attacked.
And so the idea that Ukraine, which had the legal right, might want to join NATO and the
EU, which was not going to happen in our lifetimes and was not a direct threat to the Putin regime
since the Western countries that make up the EU and NATO decided that Ukraine was not ready
for membership.
There was no consensus.
It was not going to happen, but Ukraine's free choice to express that desire.
And if your government is elected by your people, freely elected, meaning you can unelect
that government in the next election, and that government makes foreign policy choices
on the basis of its perceived interests, that's not a crime, Lex.
That's not a provocation.
That's not something that compels the leader of another country to invade you.
That is legal under international law, and it's also a realist fact of life.
The realists like to tell you that Russia here was disrespected, Russia's interests were
not taken into account, et cetera, et cetera.
But the real world works in such a way that treaties matter, that international law matters.
That's why people like me were not in favor of the US 2003 invasion of Iraq, Lex, because
it wasn't legal in addition to the fact that we thought it might backfire.
But you know, Lex, like I said, there are a lot of things about the West that we ought
to criticize as citizens, and we do criticize, but we have to be clear about where responsibility
lies in these events that we're talking about today.
So you get to trouble.
It's largely erroneous to think about both the West or the United States from an imperialist
perspective and Russia from an imperialist perspective is better clear to think about
each individual aggressive decision on its own as a choice that was made.
So let's talk about the most recent choice made by Vladimir Putin.
The choice to invade Ukraine or to escalate the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
Now we're a few months removed from that decision, initial decision.
Why do you think he did it?
What are the errors in understanding the situation and calculating the outcomes and everything
else about this decision in your view?
Yeah, Lex, when a war doesn't go well, it looks like lunacy to have launched it in the
first place.
Does it ever go well?
War never goes according to plan.
All war is based upon miscalculation, but not everybody is punished for their miscalculation.
All aggressive war we're talking about, not defensive war, is based upon miscalculation.
What you can adjust, you can recalibrate when you're driving down the road and that very
annoying voice is telling you in a thousand feet, make a right, and you fail to make a
right, it recalibrates, right?
It tells you, okay, now go turn around or you turn or make a left.
It doesn't say you're an idiot and turn around and make a U-turn, but it does recalibrate.
So you can miscalculate and the problem is not the miscalculation, usually it's the failure
to do that adjustment, right?
People I know who are hedge fund traders, I asked them, you know, what's your favorite
trade and the line from them all, and this is a cliche, is my favorite trade is when
I made a mistake, but I got out early before all the carnage.
So their favorite trade is not when they made some brilliant choice, but it's when they
miscalculated, but they reduced the consequences of their miscalculation by recalibrating quickly,
right?
So let's talk about the calculation and miscalculation of February.
Let's imagine, Lex, that you've been getting away with murder.
I don't mean murder in a figurative sense.
I mean, you've been murdering people.
You've been murdering them domestically, and you've been murdering them all across Europe,
and you've been murdering them not just with, for example, a car accident, a stage car accident,
or using a handgun.
You use Novichok, or you use some other internationally outlawed chemical weapon.
And let's imagine that you did it and nothing happened to you.
It wasn't like you were removed from power.
It wasn't like you paid a personal price.
Sure, maybe there was some sanctions on your economy, but you didn't pay the price of those
sanctions.
Little people paid the price of those sanctions.
Other people in your country paid the price.
Let's imagine not only were you murdering people literally, but you decided to entice
the idiotic ruler of Georgia into a provocation that you could then invade the country.
And you invaded the country, and you bid off these territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and what price did you pay for that?
And then you decided, you know, I think I'll now invade Crimea, and forcibly annex Crimea,
and I'll instigate an insurrection in the Donbas, in Eastern Ukraine, in Luhansk.
Let's imagine you did all that, and then you had to stick out your wrist so that, you
know, it could be slapped a couple of times.
And you said, you know, I can pretty much do what I want.
They're putting a few sanctions here and there, and they're doing this and they're doing that.
And you know what, they're more energy dependent on me than before.
I got better money laundering and reputation services than anybody has.
Maybe it's the Middle East and the Chinese would disagree with you that you have better
than them, but yours are pretty good.
And the Panama Papers get released revealing all of your off-shoring and your corruption,
and nothing happens, Lex.
So the first and most important consideration here is, in your own mind, you've been getting
away with murder, literally, as well as figuratively.
And you think, you know, I probably can do something again and get away with it.
And so the failure to respond at scale, in fact, the indulgences, the further dependencies
that are introduced, the illusion that trade is the mechanism to manage authoritarian regimes.
You know that great German cliché, a Wandel durch Handel, right, change through trade
or transformation through trade, one of Angela Merkel's favorite expressions, right?
You're going to get the other side to be better rather than confront them in a Cold War fashion,
where you stand up to their aggressions and you punish them severely in order to deter
further behavior.
So that's the first and most important part of the calculation, miscalculation.
There are a lot of other dimensions.
Can we pause on that really quick?
So this is kind of idea of it's okay to crack a few eggs to make an omelet, which is a more
generous description of what you're saying, that you don't incorporate into the calculation
the amount of human suffering that decisions cause.
But instead, you look at sort of the success based on some kind of measure for you personally
and for the nation, not in terms of in the humanitarian sense, but in some kind of economic
sense and a power, geopolitical power sense.
Yeah.
You're not sentimental, Lex.
You say to yourself, the cause of Russian greatness is greater than any individual life.
Russia being in the first rank of the great powers, Russia realizing its mission to be
a special country with a special mission in the world, a civilization unto itself, the
first rank of the great powers, maybe even the greatest power.
It's worth the price that we have to pay, especially in other people's lives.
We have a lot of literature on the Putin regime, which talks about the kleptocracy, the place
is a kleptocracy and it is a kleptocracy.
We all can see that and anybody in London live in the high life servicing this kleptocracy
can testify that it's a kleptocracy and not only in London, of course, right here in
the United States in New York, but it's not only a kleptocracy, Lex.
That was the problem of the Russian studies literature.
It wasn't just about stealing, looting the state.
It was about Russian greatness.
You see those rituals in the Kremlin, right in the Grand Kremlin Palace, in the St. George's
Hall, some of the greatest interiors in the world.
You see award ceremonies and you see marking holidays and all of these looters of the state
have their uniforms on with their medals and someone's given a speech or singing a ballad
and their eyes are moist.
Their eyes are moist because they're thieves and looters, no, Lex, because they believe
in Russian greatness.
They have a deep and fundamental, passionate commitment to the greatness of Russia, which
in unsentimental fashion, they're all sentimental to the max.
That's why their eyes are moistening, but they imagine unsentimentally that any sacrifice
is okay, a sacrifice of other people's lives, a sacrifice of their conscripts in the military,
a sacrifice of Ukrainian women and children and elderly.
What's a small price to pay for those moist eyes about Russian greatness and Russia's
position in the world?
Well, that human thing, that sentimentality is a thing that can get us in trouble in
the United States as well and lead us to wars, illegal wars and so on.
But the United States, those are precautions for breaking the law.
You're going to pay for illegal wars in the end.
You're saying that in authoritarian regimes, the sentimentality can really get out of hand
and you can, by charismatic leaders, they can take that to manipulate the populace
to make that in the span of history led to atrocities and in today's world lead to humanitarian
crises.
It's not just the kleptocracy, it's a belief system, it's passion, it's conviction.
You can call them illusions, you can call them fantasies, whatever you want to call
them, they're real.
They're real for those people.
And so, yes, they're looting that very state that they're trying to make one of the great
powers in the world.
And they resent the fact that the West doesn't acknowledge them as one of those great powers
and they resent that the West is more powerful.
People talk about how Putin doesn't understand the world and that he gets really bad information
from them.
Lex, if you're sitting there in that Kremlin and you're trying to conduct business in the
world and you're getting reports from your finance minister or your central bank governor,
your whole economy, everything that matters, somehow all your trade is denominated in dollars
and euros, do you have any illusions about who controls the international financial system?
I don't think so, Lex.
You're looking over your industrial plan for the next year and you're looking over how
many tanks you're going to get and how many cruise missiles you're going to get and how
many submarines you're going to get and fill in the blank.
And you know what?
It says right there in the paperwork where the component parts come from, where the software
comes from, comes from the West, Lex.
Your whole military industrial complex is dependent on high-end Western technology.
And let's say you're in Beijing, not just in Moscow, and you go to a meeting in your
own neighborhood.
You're the leader of China.
You go to a meeting with other Asian leaders.
Do they all speak in Chinese with you?
No, Lex.
They don't speak Chinese.
You go to an international meeting as the leader of China and guess what language is
the main language of intercourse?
Yes, the same one you and I are speaking right now.
And so you live in that world.
You live in the Western world and it's very hard to have illusions about what world you
live in when you're under that pr- you need those Western banks.
You need that foreign currency, right?
You need that high-end Western technology, that technology transfer.
You're speaking or you're forced to speak or your minions are forced to speak at international
gatherings in English.
And I could go on, all the indicators that you live in, and so Putin lives in that world.
He's no fool.
Well, to push back, isn't it possible that, as you said, the minions operate in that
world, but can't you, if you're the leader of Russia or the leader of China or the leader
of these different nations, still put up walls where actually when you think in the privacy
of your mind, you exist not in the international world, but in a world where there's this great
Russian empire or this great Chinese empire.
And then you forget that there's English.
You forget that there's technology and iPhones.
You forget that there's all this US keeps popping up on all different paperwork.
That just becomes the blurry details that dissipate because what matters is the greatness
of this dream empire that I have in my mind as a dictator.
I would put it this way, Lex, after you absorb all of that from your minions and it impresses
upon your consciousness where you live.
You live in a Western dominated world, that the multipolar world doesn't exist.
Your goal is to make that multipolar world exist.
Your goal is to bring down the West.
Your goal is for the West to weaken.
Your goal is a currency other than the dollar and the euro.
Your goal is an international financial system that you dominate.
Your goal is technological self-sufficiency made in China 2035.
Your goal is a world that you dominate, not that the West dominates, and you're going
to do everything you can to try to attain that world, which is a Russian-centric world
or a Chinese-centric world or what we could call a Eurasian-centric world.
It's not going to be easy, Lex, just for the reasons that we enumerated before, but maybe
you're going to get a helping hand.
Maybe the West is going to transfer their best technology to you.
They're going to sell you their best stuff.
And then you're going to absorb it and maybe copy it and reverse engineer it.
And if they won't sell it to you, maybe you'll just have to steal it.
Maybe the West is going to allow you to bank, even though you violate many laws that would
prohibit the West from extending those banking services to you.
Maybe the West is going to buy your energy and your palladium and your titanium and your
rare metals like lithium because you're willing to have your poor people mine that stuff and
die of disease at an early age, but Western governments, they don't want to do that.
They don't want to do that dirty mining of those very important rare earths, but you're
willing to do that because it's just people whose lives you don't care about as an autocratic
regime.
So that's the world you live in where you're trying to get to this other world.
Or at the center of the other world, you dominate the other world, but the only way to get their
legs is the West has to weaken, divide itself, maybe even collapse.
And so you're encouraging to the extent possible, Western divisions, Western disunity, a Western
lack of resolve, Western mistakes and Western invasion of the wrong country and Western
destruction of its credibility through international financial crises.
One could go on.
So if the West weakens itself through its mistakes and its own corruption, you're going
to survive and maybe even come out into that world where you're the center.
And so Russia's entire grand strategy, just like China's grand strategy, Iran, it's hard
to say they have a grand strategy because they're so profoundly weak.
But Russia's grand strategy is we're a mess.
We don't invest in our human capital.
Our human capital flees, or we actually drive it out.
It goes to MIT like you did, or it goes to fill in the blank, right?
We can't invest in our people.
Our health care is terrible.
Our education system is in decline.
We don't build infrastructure legs.
We don't improve our governance.
We don't invest in those attributes of modern power that make the West powerful.
We can't because when we try, the money is stolen.
We try these grandiose projects of national projects they're called.
We're going to invest in higher ed.
We're going to invest in high tech.
We're going to build our own Silicon Valley known as Skolkovo.
We're going to do all those things in what happens.
They can't even build an airport without the money disappearing.
The Sochi Olympic selects officially cost them $50 billion.
You look around at the infrastructure that endured from that $50 billion expense.
And you're thinking, you know, that's like the Second Avenue subway.
You get almost nothing for your money.
And so, yeah, it's corruption legs, but it's also because they don't want to do that.
They don't want to invest in their people.
They couldn't do it if they wanted to.
And when they try, it doesn't work.
But why invest in your own people?
Invest in your hardware, your military hardware, invest in your cyber capabilities, invest in
all your spoilation techniques and your hard power, and invest in further corrupting and
further weakening and further dividing the West.
Because as I said, if the West is weak, divided, lacking resolve, you don't invest in your
people.
You don't build infrastructure.
You don't improve your governance, but you'll muddle through.
That's Russian grand strategy.
So invest in the hard power, weaken the West.
Those combined together means you're going to be civilly incentivized to escalate any
military aggressive conflicts that are around you or create new ones or just...
If you can get away with murder.
But what happens, Lex, if it's a Harry Truman-like response?
What happens if somebody says, you know, we're going to stand up to this?
We're not going to allow this to happen.
We're not going to launder your money anymore.
We're not going to be dependent on you for energy in the long term.
We're going to make a transition.
We're going to punish you for that kind of behavior instead.
And the West is now switched to that only because of the courage and ingenuity of the
Ukrainian people.
The Ukrainian resistance to Russian aggression was one of the greatest gifts the West has
ever received.
The sacrifices that the Ukrainians are making right now as we speak, meaning they're fighting
a war by themselves against a major military power, their neighbor Russia.
Nobody's fighting it with them.
Yes, we are giving them weapons so they can conduct self-defense, which by the way is
legal under international law.
Unlike the Russian invasion, which is illegal under international law, Western supply of
weapons, including heavy weapons, including offensive weapons to Ukraine for its self-defense
in the invasion by Russia is actually legal under...
And so thank God the Ukrainians surprised everybody.
They surprised me.
They surprised Putin and the Kremlin.
They surprised the Biden administration.
They surprised the European Union, not with the fact that they would resist.
We knew that.
We had the Orange Revolution in 2004.
We had Maidan in 2013, 14, where they rose up against a domestic tyrant and they were
willing to die on behalf of their country then, let alone against a foreign tyrant invading
their country.
So we knew they would resist.
We didn't know just how successful, certainly I didn't know, they would be on the battlefield.
It's been breathtaking to watch.
That sacrifice, that gift enabled the West to rediscover itself, to rediscover its power,
to revive itself, to say the hell with this energy dependence in the long term, the hell
with this money laundering and reputation laundering, the hell with this running back
and forth to Moscow to try to see what Putin needs in order for him to feel respected, what
appeasement he needs, right?
So we'll see if it endures, but this shift comes from the Ukrainians.
And so it's no longer getting away with murder, Lex, and we thank the Ukrainians for that.
The people and the leadership and the separate factions that make up Ukraine uniting, it's
the unification, the uniting against the common enemy is standing up before anyone knew that
they would be backed by all of these other nations, by this money and all this kind of
stuff, standing there, especially with the president Zelensky, where it makes a total
sense to flee, he stood his ground.
Let's take that point that you just raised, which is a deep and fundamental point, and
I thank you for that.
Do you guys hear that?
I think that was a compliment.
There we go.
Let's go.
Lex.
Zelensky, your unification.
I'm sitting here in front of you.
Thank you.
It's an honor.
It's a mutual honor.
So Ukraine before the war is run by a TV production company, right?
You're one guy running this fantastic, incredible podcast.
There's 20 guys or so running a country the size of Ukraine, and one's a producer and one's
like a makeup person and one's a video editor and they're fantastically talented people.
If your country is a TV production.
So before the war, Zelensky had what, 25% approval rating, and he couldn't get much
done and it wasn't working.
He got elected with 73%, as you know, and then he was down to 20.
That's a pretty big drop.
And so you're thinking maybe having a major, large size, 40 million plus population European
country run by a TV production company is not the best choice.
And then what do we see?
We see President Zelensky decides to risk his life on behalf of his country, Ukraine.
He decides to stay in the capital.
He's not going to flee.
They're going to stay and fight.
And he could be killed.
He can die.
It's a decision where he put his life on the line.
Obviously, he's Jewish descent, Russian speaking childhood and upbringing, Russian speaking
Jewish descent puts his life on the line for the country of Ukraine.
It's a pretty big message, don't you think?
And it's crucial.
And it turns out not only that Lex, but they're good at TV.
They're good at information war.
And in a war, it's a TV production company and a TV personality.
That's exactly what you want running a country because they're crushing in the information
war.
And he's spectacular.
European Parliament, US Congress, Israeli Parliament.
There's no room on Zoom, let alone in person that he can't win over.
He's just so effective.
This is the first time reality TV has been about reality instead of fake.
Reality TV is just this completely fake nonsense.
But Zelensky, this is real reality TV.
And he means it.
And the nation is behind him.
And they're just as courageous and just as ingenious in many ways.
And it's spectacular.
And so, yeah, who saw that coming?
I didn't see that coming, Lex.
In fact, the Biden, we talk about Putin's miscalculation.
The Biden administration, as you alluded to, offered him an exit from the country.
They didn't say, you know, you want to stand and fight, we'll back you.
They said, we'll get you out.
You want to come now?
And famously, you know that quote, right?
What he said about how he doesn't need a ride.
Remember that moment?
The Biden administration was poised to do another Afghanistan moment.
That ignominious exit from Afghanistan was almost what happened in Ukraine when Biden
administration offered him that ride out of there.
And fortunately, he declined and helped rally in the people from below also rallied to stop
the invader without the presidency and without the government in Ukraine.
Including the Biden administration and the European leaders who latched on.
Fortunately, they had the presence of mind to latch on to this gift, this bravery and
ingeniousness of Zelensky and the rest of the Ukrainians, and flipped and decided to
support Ukraine's resistance, you know, first with 5,000 helmets only, as the Germans initially
promised.
And now with really heavy weapons, and so that's something that wasn't foreseen.
I certainly didn't foresee that.
I foresaw the Ukrainian society being courageous and resisting.
But I didn't foresee a television production company being exactly what you want to run
a country in a war, a president Zelensky willing to sacrifice, lay down his life and rallying
others in the country to do that.
And then the country being so effective, not just at courage, but at battlefield resistance
to the Russian invasion.
So I stand corrected by the Ukrainians, and I'm ecstatic that I was wrong, that I was
proven wrong.
And like I said, there's clear factions of the West and the East of Ukraine.
And here's a person that, like you said, was in the high 20s, low 30s percentage approval
in the country before the war, and now was able to use in the 90s.
He's in the 90% approval rating.
I mean, I think they stopped doing the polling.
Once he hit 91% of whatever it was in the previous poll, I think they all understood
that for now they didn't need any more polling, that it's pretty clear the nation.
So 25% to 90-something percent.
And just like the 25% was deserved, the 90-something percent is also deserved, fully deserved.
And the question is how that all stabilizes.
It feels like this set of events, I may be paying attention to Twitter too much, which
is a concern of mine, whether the change I see is just surface level or deep level.
But it seems like we're in a new world, that something dramatic has shifted.
That this power that's rooted, I mean, in your study of the 20th century is so deeply
rooted in history, there's this power center of the world is now going to, has been shaken
by this event.
And how that changes the world is unclear.
It's unclear what lesson China learns from watching this, what lesson India learns from
watching this.
Both nations, as far as you can get polls about Chinese population, but both nations
are largely in support of Putin.
So Russia, India, and China are still supporting of Putin quietly.
I would maybe elaborate a little bit on that point, Lex.
I think you're right, the feeling that we're in an inflection moment, an inflection point,
I think that's widespread.
And I think it's widespread for good reason, we might be.
But I also share your, let's say, modesty about where it's going and how hard it is to predict
where this might go.
It's only an inflection point if the trends continue, right, if the trends endure.
There are plenty of non-inflection points.
After 9-11, the whole world rallied around the United States after it was attacked, after
the bombing of the towers here in New York City and the hitting of the Pentagon.
And that didn't last.
It was not really an inflection point, was it?
It felt like it might be, but it wasn't.
And so this is not a comparable moment in terms of what happened, but it has the feeling
that it might be a watershed.
And maybe we'll squander it the way we squandered the post 9-11, rallying around the United
States.
Maybe we'll actually consolidate it and it'll endure or maybe it'll endure despite ourselves.
And we can't tell and we can't know yet.
And it depends in part on what we do and what we don't do.
But here's a few things that we understand already.
The idea that the West was in decline and that the rest of the world had risen and was
more powerful and that we lived in a multipolar world, that turns out to be empirically false.
It's not true.
I mean, it's just factually not true.
There are no major important multinational institutions, organizations that are run
on behalf of or led by a South African, a Nigerian person from India, even the Chinese
don't run these institutions.
They would like to and they're trying, but they don't.
And so whatever you pick, the IMF, the World Bank, the Federal Reserve, which is the most
powerful multinational institution, which is actually only a domestic institution and
doesn't have a legal mandate to act multilaterally, but does.
That's got the most power of any institution in the world, NATO, the bilateral alliances
that the US has up and down Asia.
What organizations that have tremendous leverage on the international system, on the international
order, are non-Western?
The UN is the most encompassing.
And of course, we know that the five, it has five members of the Security Council with
a veto, one of which is Russia, one of which is China, and the others are the US, Britain
and France, not India, not South Africa, not Indonesia, not all of these other countries
where the people live, the bulk of the population of the world and where the population is growing
like on the African continent.
So it's not a multipolar world.
We talked already about the international financial system.
That's the Western, not multipolar.
We talked about the US military and NATO, or we could talk about the Japanese military,
which is just very formidable, enormous number of platforms.
Even the Australian military, we could talk about.
And so it's a Western-dominated world.
And the West, remember, is not a geographic concept.
It is an institutional and values club.
The Japanese are not European, but they're Western.
Just like Russia is European, but not Western, because European is a cultural category and
Western is an institutional category, where you have rule of law and separation of powers
and free and open public sphere and dynamic open market economy.
And then we have another thing, which is pretty clear.
The West is powerfully resented, powerfully envied and admired simultaneously.
PJ O'Rourke, the comedian who died this year, fantastic, it was a big loss for the culture.
He said there are two things that are always characteristic of any American embassy abroad.
One is a political protest outside and the other is the longest line you've ever seen
for visas.
And those things are true simultaneously.
And that's the world we live in, meaning that non-Western countries envy and admire the
West, but they also resent the power of the West, Western hypocrisy, right?
The West invades countries when it wants, but when others do that, it's illegal, right?
The West arrests you for money laundering, but it's Western money laundering that is
where you go when you need to launder money, right?
So they see the hypocrisy, they see the excessive power that the West has and they resent it
and they say, who elected you to run the world?
We have a billion plus people or we have 200 plus million people and we don't have a say.
You're the self-appointed guardians of our world, who did that?
And so it's incumbent on the West not only to remember the power that it has, but also
to exercise that power legally and with restraint and also to think about how it can expand institutions
to be more encompassing so that other parts of the world are not on the outside being
dictated to, but instead are on the inside.
Too often, Western power is not consultative in a decision-making fashion, it's consultative
after the fact, okay, we got together in the EU or we got together in NATO or we got together
at the Federal Reserve and here's our decision and we're announcing it today.
And so your economy gets destroyed because the Federal Reserve decides it has to raise
interest rates or you now go into default.
You can't pay your debt because Western banks lent you money and now the West has changed
interest rates or other considerations and you're in big trouble now.
And so this is something which we fail to address.
It's very hard to address, it's very hard to reform international institutions, it's
very hard to share power, it's very hard to acknowledge that you have too much power
and that maybe having too much power is not good, not only for the rest of the world but
for yourself.
And so it's great to rediscover the West and rediscover its values and rediscover its
authority and credibility and power, but that's not sufficient.
So we know this now, we know that the rest of the world is not necessarily jumping on
the Western bandwagon to condemn Russia for its actions because the West can do things
like sanction your central bank, take away your reserves, deny you technology.
It pretty much can do whatever it wants and it can say that it's legal and it can go through
various mechanisms and it can freeze your property and you say to yourself, should anybody
have that much power and when do they come after me?
Now there's a caveat here and the caveat likes is they don't like the West having all of
that power and they didn't join in the condemnation of Russia but they also didn't join in Russia's
aggression.
So Russia's domestic civilian airspace, aircraft industry, civilian aircraft industry is in
big trouble now because of the export controls on spare parts and software.
Brazil is a major power in aircraft manufacturing.
So they rush in and say, you know, Vladimir Putin, we didn't condemn necessarily your
actions in Ukraine, okay, that's one thing.
And how about we give you all of our aircraft technology and we help you rebuild your domestic
aircraft industry and you can have the aviation that the West is, did that happen Lex?
Didn't happen and you can look at India and you can look at China and you can look at
South Africa and you can look at what they've done in practical terms.
Yes, they haven't always joined in a full-throated condemnation.
Maybe they've been neutral or maybe they've been playing both sides of the fence like
Turkey, for example.
But are they rushing in to join Russia, to join Russia's aggression, to supply and the
answer is no.
And the answer is no for two reasons.
One, they actually don't want to be party to that.
And two, they understand that Western power and they don't want to be on the receiving
end by crossing the West and then getting caught up in a sanctions regime or worse.
Can we go to the mind of Vladimir Putin because what you just said, China, India, they seem
to sit back and say, we're not going to condemn the actions of Vladimir Putin in Russia, but
we would really like for this war to be over.
So there's that kind of energy of, we don't just stop this because you're putting us in
a very, very bad position and yet Vladimir Putin is continuing the aggression.
What is he thinking?
What information is he getting?
Is it the system that you've described of authoritarian regimes that corrupts your
flow of information, your ability to make clearheaded decisions, just as a human being
when you go to sleep at night?
Is he not able to see the world clearly or is this all deliberate systematic action that
does have some reason behind it?
We got to talk a little bit about China too, but let's answer your Putin question directly.
So on Twitter, you've lost the war or as they say, there are these two Russian soldiers
having a smoke in Warsaw and they're taking a break having a smoke and they're sitting
there in Warsaw on top of their tank and one says to the other, yeah, we lost the information
war and there they are sitting in Warsaw having that smoke, right?
So yeah, on Twitter, Russia has completely lost the war.
In reality, they failed to take Kiev, they failed to capture Kiev and they failed in
phase two as they called it or plan B, which is to capture the entirety of the Donbass.
We're three months into the war.
If you had made a judgment about let's say the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, a
definitive judgment after three months, you might have got the outcome wrong there.
If you had judged the winter war, the 1939-40 Soviet invasion of Finland after three months,
you would have got that wrong too of what the outcome was going to be.
So we're early in the game here and we have to be careful about any definitive judgments.
But it is the case that so far they failed to take Kiev and they failed to capture the
entirety of the Donbass, Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, eastern Ukraine, a part of eastern
Ukraine and they've been driven out of Kharkiv and the area immediately surrounding Kharkiv.
They never captured Kharkiv but they came close but now the Ukrainians drove them back
to the Russian border in that very large and important region.
So those look like battlefield losses that are impossible to explain away if you're the
regime in Russia except by suppression of information.
And as you know from Russian history, like leaders in Russia have an easier time with
a state of siege and deprivation than they do with explaining a lost war.
But let's look at some other facts that are important to take into account.
One, the Russian army has penetrated further into Ukrainian territory since February 2022
including in Herson region, the famous Mariupol siege that just ended.
They have built a large presence in areas north of Crimea on the Sea of Azov, the Black
Sea Latoral ultimately, that they didn't previously hold.
They're still fighting in Luhansk for full control over at least half of the Donbass
and Ukrainians are resisting fiercely.
But nonetheless, you can say that they've been driven out on the contrary, farther penetration
than the beginning.
Ukraine doesn't have any economy anymore.
They have somewhere between 33 and 50% unemployment.
It's hard to measure unemployment in a war economy.
But their metallurgical industry that Azov-style steel plant in Mariupol is a ruin now.
And a lot of farmers are not planting the fields because the harvest from the previous
year still hasn't been sent, sold abroad because the ports are blockaded or destroyed.
And so you don't have any economy and you need $5 billion or $7 billion or $8 billion
a month to meet your payroll, to feed your people, to keep your army in the field, that's
a lot of money per month.
And that's indefinite.
That's as long as this blockade lasts.
And so you don't have any economy anymore, you're indigent.
And even if you take the lower number, $5 billion as opposed to Zelensky's ask for $7
billion, $5 billion is $60 billion a year.
That's $60 billion this year, that's $60 billion next year.
And so who's got that kind of money?
Which Western taxpayers are ready?
And if you use the $7 billion or $8 billion, you get up to $100 billion a year.
The Biden, the President Joe Biden just signed the bill making it law, $40 billion in aid
to Ukraine.
It's just an enormous sum.
The economic piece of that is a month and a half, two months of Ukrainians covering
Ukrainian expenditures.
That's it.
And they're asking the G7, they're asking everybody for this.
So you have no economy and no prospect of an economy until you evict the Russians from
your territory.
And then you have a Western unity, Western resolve, it lasts or it doesn't last, Lex.
So you're President Putin and you've got more territory than before.
And you've got a stranglehold over the Ukrainian economy.
And you've got a lot of the world neutral.
And you've got the Chinese propaganda supporting you to the hilt with those Oliver Stone and
Meersheimer lines about how this is really NATO's fault.
And you've got Hungary dragging its feet on the oil embargo against Russia.
And you've got Turkey dragging its feet on the recent applications of Sweden and Finland
for NATO expand.
And you're saying to yourself, Lex, maybe I can ride this out.
I got a lot of problems of my own and we can go into the details on the Russian side's
challenges.
But he's on Ukrainian territory unless he's evicted.
And he's got a stranglehold on their economy.
And he's got the possibility that the West doesn't stay resolved and doesn't continue
to pay for Ukraine's economy or supply those heavy weapons.
And so you could argue that maybe he's deluded about all of this and maybe he should go on
Twitter.
You know, I'm not on Twitter, but maybe Putin, who famously doesn't use the internet, should
go on Twitter and see he's losing the war.
Or you can argue that maybe he's calculating here that he's got a chance to still prevail.
Wow, that is darkly insightful.
If I could go to Henry Kissinger for a brief moment and people should read this op-ed he
wrote in the Washington Post in March 5th, 2014, after the start of the war between Russia
and Ukraine, but before Crimea was annexed.
There's a lot of interesting historical description about the division within Ukraine, the corruption
within Ukraine that will, if people read this article, will give context to how incredible
it is what Zelensky was able to accomplish in uniting the country.
But I just want to comment because Henry Kissinger is an interesting figure in American
history.
He opens the article with, in my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm
and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we
withdrew unilaterally.
The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.
So he's giving this cold hard truth that we get, we go into wars excited, are able to
send $40 billion financial aid, military aid, our own men and women.
But the excitement fades, Twitter outrage fades, and then a country that's willing to
wait patiently is willing to pay the cost of siege versus the cost of explaining to its
own people that the war is lost, that country just might win, outlast.
I hope not because the Ukrainians' resistance deserves to prevail here.
Russia deserves to lose.
No war of aggression like they've committed here against Ukraine should prevail if we
can do anything about it.
I support a thousand percent the continued supply of heavy weapons, including offensive
weapons to the Ukrainians, as long as they're willing to resist and it's their choice, it's
their choice when to negotiate, it's their choice how much to resist, it's their choice
what kind of sacrifices to make, and it's our responsibility to meet their requests
more quickly than we have so far and at greater scale.
But ultimately wars only have political ends, they never have military ends.
You need a political solution here.
So if the Ukrainians are able to conduct a successful counter-offensive at scale in
July or August whenever they launch, right now the heavy weapons are coming in and they're
being moved to the battlefield and more are coming, you know the dynamic, Russia bombs
a school, Russia bombs a hospital, Americans and Europeans decide to send even more heavy
weapons to Ukraine, right, that's the self-defeating dynamic from the Russian side.
They commit the atrocities, we send more heavy weapons.
Once those heavy weapons are on the battle lines, we'll see if Ukrainians cannot just
defend, which they've proven they're able to do in breathtaking fashion, not just conduct
counter-attacks, where the enemy moves forward and you cut behind the enemy's lines and
you counter-attack and push the enemy back a little bit.
But whether you can evict the Russians from your territory with a combined arms operation
where you have a massive superiority in infantry and heavy weapons, but more importantly you
coordinate your air power, your tanks, your drones, your infantry at scale, which is something
the Ukrainians have not done yet, it's something the Russians failed at in Ukraine and they
come from the same place, the Soviet military.
We hope this Ukrainian counter-offensive at scale, this combined arms operation, succeeds
and if it does succeed there's the possibility of a battlefield victory.
Whether that also includes Crimea, which as you know is not hostile on the contrary to
the Russian military, remains to be seen.
But however much they regain territorially back towards the 1991 borders, which is their
goal, their stated goal, and which we support them properly in trying to achieve, however
much they achieve of that in this counter-offensive that we're anticipating, that will set the
stage for the next phase.
And either Russia, which is to say one person, Vladimir Putin, will acknowledge that he's
lost the war because the Ukrainians won it on the battlefield, or he'll try to announce
a full-scale mobilization, conscript the whole country, go back and instead of acknowledging
defeat, try to win with a different plan, recalibrate, remains to be seen.
Will the Ukrainians negotiate any territory away or must they capture also Crimea, which
puts a very high bar on the summer counter-offensive that we're going to see, which could last through
the fall and into the winter as a result.
We don't know the answers to that.
Nobody knows the answers to that.
People are guessing.
Some people are better informed because they have inside intelligence.
People are also worried about Russian escalation to nuclear weapons or chemical weapons if
they begin to lose on the battlefield to Ukraine.
Are you worried about nuclear war, the possibility of nuclear war?
I think it's necessary to pay attention to that possibility.
That possibility existed before the February 2022 full-blown invasion of Ukraine.
The doomsday arsenal that Russia possesses is enough to destroy the world many times
over and that's been the case every year since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
And so, of course, we're concerned about that.
We do know, however, Alex, that they have a system known as dual-key.
Dual-key for the strategic nuclear weapons.
Strategic nuclear weapons means the ones fired from silos, the missiles, the ones delivered
from bombers, or the ones fired from submarines.
And they're ready to go.
They're intercontinental.
We watch that very, very closely.
We watch all the movement of that and the alerts, et cetera.
We have tremendously, let's say, tremendous inside intelligence on that.
But dual-key means that President Putin alone cannot fire them.
He has one key which he must insert.
He must then insert the codes for a command to launch.
That then goes to the head of the general staff who has his own key and separate codes
and must do the same, insert that key and codes for them to launch.
And so, will the general staff chief go along with the destruction of the world over a battlefield
loss in Ukraine?
I don't know the answer to that and I don't know if anybody knows the answer to that.
Will those people flying those bombers?
If they get the order from, if the dual-key system goes into action and both keys are
used and all the codes are implemented, will those young guys flying those bombers let
those bombs go?
Will those at the missile silos decide to engage and fire?
We don't know, but you can see that it's more than one man making the decision here in a
system of strategic nuclear weapons.
As far as the tactical, the so-called low-yield or battlefield nuclear weapons, we're not
sure the system that they have in Russia these days for their implement, for their use of
such tactical nuclear weapons.
It could well be that Putin and just himself, he alone can fire them or order them to be
fired.
In Olex, there's no tactical nuclear weapon fired at Ukraine that's not also fired simultaneously
at Russia.
If the Kremlin is 600 miles from Ukraine and if the wind changes direction or the wind
happens to be blowing northeast, the fallout hits your Kremlin, not just Ukraine.
Moreover, you have all those border regions, which are staging regions for the Russian
offensive, and they're a lot closer than 600 miles.
They're actually right there.
You fire that weapon on Ukrainian territory and you can get the fallout, just like the
Chernobyl fallout, spread to Sweden, which is how we got the Kremlin to finally, first
they denied, they said, oh, we don't know why there's a big nuclear cloud over Sweden.
We don't know where that came from, but eventually they admitted it.
Russia can't actually use a nuclear weapon tactical battlefield, one in Ukraine, without
also firing it at itself.
In addition, it's that same dynamic I alluded to earlier, which is to say, you bomb a hospital,
you bomb a school, there's more heavy weapons going to Ukraine from the west.
You can't get away with any of the, there's always going to be a response that's either
proportional or greater than proportional.
You could well have Europe signing on to NATO direct engagement, both Washington and
Brussels direct engagement of the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine.
Do you think that's possible to do that without dramatic escalation from the Russian side?
Yes, I do think it's possible, but it's very worrisome, just like you're saying.
But if Putin were to escalate like that, he's firing that weapon at himself and he's potentially
provoking a direct clash with NATO's military, not just with the Ukrainian military.
If you're sitting in the Kremlin looking at those charts, Lex, of NATO capabilities,
and you can't conquer Ukraine, which didn't really have heavy weapons before February
2022 at scale, and you're thinking, okay, now I'm going to take on NATO, that would
be a bold step on the part of a Russian leader.
And let's also remember, Lex, that there's another variable here.
Remember a despot as long as everyone implements your orders.
And so if people start to say quietly, not necessarily publicly, I may not implement
that order, because that's maybe a criminal order, or my grandma is Ukrainian, or my wife
is Ukrainian, or I don't want to go to the hog, I don't want to spend the rest of my
life in the hog, or whatever it might be, at any point along the chain of command, from
the general staff all the way down to the platoon, you're a despot provided they implement
your orders.
But who's to say that somewhere along the chain of command, people start to say, I'm
going to ignore that order, or I'm going to sabotage that order, or I'm going to flee
the battlefield, or I'm going to injure myself so that I don't have to fight, or I'm going
to join the Ukrainian side.
And so it could be that's what's left of the Russian army in the field begins to disintegrate.
Even if the Ukrainians are not able to mount that counter offensive at scale, that combined
arms operation, the Russian military in the field, which has taken horrendous casualties
as far as we understand, something like a third of the original force.
So you're talking about 50 to 60,000.
That includes both dead and wounded to the point of being unable to return to the battlefield.
Those are big numbers, those are a lot of families, a lot of families affected, their
sons or their husbands or their fathers are either missing in action or the regime won't
tell them that they're dead, as you know, from the sinking of that flagship Moskva, right,
by the Ukrainians.
And so a disintegration of the Russian military because their orders that they either can't
implement or don't want to implement is also not excluded.
And so you have these two big variables, the Ukrainian army in the field and its ability
to move from defense to offense at scale, and we're going to test that soon.
And then the Russian ability in the field to hold together in a war of conquest and aggression
where they're conscripts or they're fed dog food or they don't have any weapons anymore
because there's no resupply and so the disintegration of the army can't be excluded.
And then of course, all bets are off on the Putin regime.
More long term, there are these technology export controls.
We were talking about how the military industrial complex in Russia is dependent on foreign
component parts and software.
And so if you have export controls and you have firms voluntarily, even when they don't
fall under export controls, leaving Russian business, refusing to do business with Russia.
And we see this not just in the civilian sector like with McDonald's or many other companies.
We see this in the key areas like the oil industry with the executives fleeing.
That is the Western executives fleeing, giving up their positions.
So Russia's ability to resupply its tanks, resupply its missiles, resupply its uniforms,
resupply its food to its soldiers in the field and their boots.
We see a lot of stuff under tremendous stress and in the long term, there's no obvious way.
They can rebuild the military industrial complex to produce those weapons because they're reliant
on foreign parts that they can't get anymore and there are no domestic substitutes on the
immediate horizon.
That's at the earliest a two year proposition to have domestic substitutes.
And for some things like microelectronics, they've never had domestic substitutes going
back to the Soviet times, as you know well.
And so there's that pressure on Russia from the technology export controls, which if you're
in the security ministry or the defense ministry, if you're in that side of the regime, you're
feeling that pain as we speak and you're wondering about the strategy.
Let me ask you about, again, the echoes of history.
And it frustrates me in part when people draw these parallels, but maybe there is some deep
insight about those parallels.
So there's a song that goes, Dvatistrovii junyarovna shterechisa kiev babilinama bivireštona
šelajs vajna.
So the Operation Barbarossa, the bombing of Kiev by Hitler, there is sort of an eerie
parallel.
And you have to be extremely careful drawing such parallels and such connections to this
unexplainable war in that is World War II.
But is there elements of this that do echo in the actions of Vladimir Putin?
And more specifically, do you think that Vladimir Putin is a war criminal?
Can that label be assigned to the actions of this man?
The war criminal is a legal determination, and it requires evidence and due process and
the ability to defend oneself.
We don't just decide in the Twitter sphere or on a podcast that somebody is a war criminal.
They can be a suspected war criminal.
And we can gather evidence to try to prosecute that case.
And then the issue for us, Alex, is which court does it go to?
What's the appropriate place?
Does it happen in Ukraine because they're the victims?
Does it happen in the Hague because there's an international criminal court there?
Does it happen inside Russia because there's regime change at some point?
And some of these people become, let's say, they get arrested by their own people inside
Russia.
So those are all important questions that have to be pursued with resources and with
determination and by skilled people who are excellent at gathering that evidence.
And that process is underway.
And Ukraine has a trial underway now of one alleged war criminal who's pleaded guilty
and we'll see what the outcome of that trial inside Ukraine is of a lower level official,
not obviously Vladimir Putin, but the commander of a tank group.
So yes, the names are eerily familiar.
Izyun, Harkiv, Kyiv, those are the names we know from the Nazi invasion and the Nazi
occupation of Ukraine.
And it's very deeply troubling to think that this could happen again.
And there's a bizarre sense that the Russians claiming, as Putin says, to de-nazify Ukraine
have invaded the same places that the Nazis invaded back in 1941.
As somebody who's working on Volume 3 of your work on Stalin going through this period,
is it eerie to you?
Yes, it is, Lex.
I've written the chapters of Volume 3.
I've drafted the chapters on the war.
And as I say, the place names are very evocative, unfortunately.
But the Nazis failed ultimately.
They captured Ukraine for a time, but they were evicted from Ukraine.
There was massive partisan or guerrilla warfare resistance behind Nazi lines the whole time
that they were allegedly in control of Ukraine.
If you look at the maps on cable TV, they show you the sign of Russia.
They show you the coloring, Russian control, and they draw a line and then it's colored
in.
But the word control is misplaced.
They don't actually control it.
It's Russian claimed or extent of farthest Russian troop advancement.
Because behind the Russian lines in Ukraine, Crimea accepted, you have insurgencies.
You have the armed insurgency.
In Melitopol, for example, which is a place that you know in southeastern Ukraine.
There is a guerrilla war now underway to hurt the Russians who are in occupation of that
city and region.
And we're going to see that continue, even if the war becomes a stalemate, even if it's
stalemates more or less at the lines we're at now, which would mean that anticipated
Ukrainian counter-offensive at scale proves unsuccessful.
The Russian army doesn't disintegrate and you end up with a stalemate where there could
be a ceasefire, not a ceasefire, but neither side is attempting an offensive for the time
being.
There will be resistance behind those Russian lines and it will be fierce resistance, the
kind of resistance we saw to the Nazi occupation.
Ultimately, it took the Red Army re-invading the territory of Ukraine and succeeding at
combined arms operations at scale, a massive counter-offensive much larger than anything
we're talking about today.
Ultimately, it required that to evict the Nazis from Ukraine.
But in the meantime, they did not have an easy occupation regime there.
Russian Soviet partisans killed Nazi officials, Wehrmacht soldiers, Wehrmacht officers, blew
up the infrastructure they were using, made them pay a price for their occupation.
We could well see, if unfortunately this ends in a stalemate for the time being, we could
well see that type of insurgency gain momentum behind Russian lines and try to evict the
Russians that way and then remount the counter-offensive at scale later on in the future if the first
one doesn't succeed.
So that would be further echoes of the World War II experience.
The scale, once again, is much smaller, the size of the armies here.
They're not in the many 800,000, 700,000, a million two, a million four.
That's not what we're talking about today.
But the weapons, the cruise missiles, artillery fire, artillery fire used to be very inaccurate
and it was like saturation.
You would just fire towards the enemy lines and if you hit something, you hit something
and if you didn't, you just kept firing.
Now you have drones, Lex.
And so artillery fire is now sniper fire because you can coordinate the direction of the artillery
fire with the drones.
The drones can take a picture and show you where the enemy is precisely located.
And you can align that artillery to hit them instead of just indiscriminately bombing an
area, a territory.
And the NATO supplied artillery goes really far and you can fire into Russian positions
and yourself not be exposed to Russian fire because your artillery fires farther than theirs.
So that's coming.
And we're going to see that in action.
And so the scale is not the same, but the weapons, the precision of some of the weapons
and some of the NATO, we're not sending all of our stuff.
But as I said, the dynamic is Russia commits atrocities, Russia bombs schools, Russia bombs
hospitals, Russia kills civilians and more and heavier and more lethal Western weapons
go to Ukraine.
Their willingness to risk their lives is really so impressive.
And the reason that it's our duty, we're obliged to supply those weapons.
And so the Russians don't have that resupply and the Ukrainians do.
And so the Russians are now digging in, Lex.
They're digging in deeply in the areas that they've penetrated.
And they're trying to build unassailable positions for when the Ukrainians transition
from mostly defense to full-scale offense.
And we'll see if that now, I mean, they're digging everywhere, as they say, kapayut,
right?
They're digging everywhere behind.
Your Russian is beautiful.
Digging in, I wish, Lex, like yours.
But so there are these things that we can't predict, but there are these things we're
watching and watching closely.
And on top of that, something that's not in World War II, or for the most part, is cyber
attacks and cyber warfare, which is much less, perhaps, convertible into human words, because
it happens so quickly, such large scales, so difficult to trace and all those kinds
of things.
It's not bullets.
It's electrical signals and that.
Yeah, but those Ukrainian people, they're like you, Lex.
They're young and they're technically really proficient.
And they've been amazing.
You know, they spent those teenage years in the basement, playing video games, it's useful
after all.
It turns out it's more than useful.
You can save your country that way.
And so they're not alone.
They're getting support, and that support is important.
But really, predominantly, it's Ukrainians on the cyber battlefield, and their skills
have been very impressive, and they've been preparing for this for a number of years.
And they have a whole army of young people on the cyber side.
It's their civilian population.
These are not people conscripted into the military or volunteering wearing the uniform.
And so even in cyber warfare, the Ukrainians have been extremely impressive.
And so let's remember that all of these aspects of warfare, whether it's how far your cruise
missiles go and how accurate they are, what size your cyber capabilities are, it's really
ultimately about the people.
It's about the human capital, right?
It's about their willingness, their skill level, but also their willingness to fight
and to put their lives on the line.
And there's no substitute for that.
And so what's called morale or courage or bravery or valor, that's really the ultimately
decisive provided you have enough sufficient arms to conduct the fight.
And if you don't, you use a Molotov cocktail, right?
Grandma calls in the coordinates of the Russian tank on her iPhone, and you have a Molotov
cocktail that the people who used to work in the cafeteria are now stuffing flammable
liquid into bottles, and you carry one right up to the tank and you smash it against the
tank or you drop it in one of the hatches in the tank, right?
There's no substitute for that kind of stuff, that level of resolve, willingness to die
for your country.
That's a really big lesson that we need to absorb in our own country.
We've been going to war more frequently than we should, and like you said, without the
justification all the time, and then like Henry Kissinger said, without understanding how
this was going to end.
It's easy to start a war, it's very difficult to win a war, prevail in a war, end a war
on terms that meet your original expectations, right?
We've been fighting wars, but we haven't been fighting wars as societies.
We've been fighting wars as a small sliver of our population.
Something like 1% of our population is involved with the military because we have an all-volunteer
force.
And that means that it's easier for our politicians to go to war because they don't face conscription,
they don't have the draft which affects every family in the country, and because the number
of people in the volunteer force is such a narrow stratum of the population.
And so they've been getting away with this because the professional army is much better
than the conscript army, and an all-volunteer force is much preferable from a military point
of view, but from a societal point of view, it enables you to go to war too easily as
a politician, and it doesn't engage the society the same way that the Ukrainian society is
completely engaged from those young hackers all the way up to those grandmothers.
Let me ask you, you're a scholar of history, a scholar of geopolitics, and you're also
a human being.
That's kind of you, Lex.
I'll take that.
What's the value, what's the hope, what's the power of conversation here?
If you could sit down with Vladimir Putin and have a conversation versus bullets, human
exchange words, is there hope for those?
And if so, what would you talk about?
What would you ask him?
Well, Henry Kissinger, you alluded to his op-ed.
He's had many private meetings with President Putin over a long time, and President Biden,
the previous presidents, secretaries of state, officials below secretary of state, the head
of the CIA evidently met with President Putin in the fall when he was massing the troops
on the border before he invaded, and we sent the head of the CIA, and Putin received him.
Somebody he evidently respects or was at least willing to meet, unlike other members of the
administration.
So a lot of people are talking to him in some form or another for the 22 years he's been
in power, and I'm not sure it's had what I would call their desired effect.
Well, the nature of the conversation is interesting too, and also the timing, which is post-February
22nd is a different time, and also another aspect, which Oliver Stone mentioned interestingly,
that there's something about COVID and the pandemic that creates isolation, the distancing.
It's such a silly little nuance thing, but maybe it actually has a profound impact on
the human being, the human mind of Vladimir Putin, that there is something about an in-person
meeting, and not across a table that's far too large, but sort of the intimacy of a human-to-human
in-person conversation, that there's something distinctly powerful about that reminder that
as Putin says in the narrative, in the propaganda, that we're all one people.
There is truth to that, that this entirety of humanity is one people, and you kind of
reminded by that when you're sitting together.
People who have sat across the table from him, whether at 30 yards or at three, have
remarked upon this feeling of isolation that has affected him, the pandemic.
I think there must be something to that if several people who've been in the room with
him are remarking on it.
Everybody that I know and I've been able to talk to who's had a meeting with him in
the past 10 years, including Henry Kissinger, the former secretary of state, has said that
Putin spends a lot of time enumerating his grievances.
He goes through a monologue of his grievances, and then the West did this, and then the West
lied to us about that, and then the West cheated us on this.
It's not the conversation that you're encouraging of common humanity.
It's that roiling resentment volcano that's just exploding and exploding.
By the time he gets through the monologue of the grievances, the time of the meeting
is expired or over time.
That's a brilliant statement, but that's where the skill of conversation comes in.
When you're facing a bull with a red cloth, you have to learn how to avoid the long list
of grievances and get to the humanity.
That's a really important skill.
For sure, it's a skill, and it's the highest level skill of a diplomat to be able to reach
some type of common understanding when interests and worldviews clash so much.
But here's your challenge, Lex.
Your challenge is Russia wants to impose a closed sphere of influence on its neighbors.
It wants to dictate what its neighbors can and can't do.
It wants to exert influence not by the power of its example, not by the freedom of its
people, not by the dynamism of its diversified economy, but it wants to exert influence
just because it deserves that, just because it's a great power, just because and on and
on and on.
It's a civilization unto itself.
And it wants that, and we can't give that.
The reason that Russia was not integrated into the West was not for lack of trying.
It was because Russia ultimately spurned the integration because it was about what terms
the integration would come on.
Would you come into the West and observe Western rules and be another country, meaning just
another country?
There's Poland and there's Austria and there's little tiny Monaco and there's Russia.
And you're just one of those countries.
And Russia's answer to that was no, we're not just one of those countries.
We need special rules.
We need special conditions.
We'll integrate, but only as a special country, meaning like at the UN, where all countries
are sovereign, all countries are members, but Russia has a veto on what countries can
and can't do.
Those were the terms on which they were willing to integrate.
And those were the terms that no leader of a Western country or the United States or
the G7 or fill in the blank can grant to Russia.
It's very well known that Vladimir Putin was one of the first, maybe the first person,
first leader, foreign leader to call President Bush after the 9-11 tragedy.
They didn't connect right away.
President Bush was not in Washington, but eventually they did speak.
He condemned the terrorist attack, he offered Russian support, which he delivered on the
use of some Russian logistics for our Afghanistan operations.
And a lot of people point to that and they say, there it is, Russia wanted to cooperate
and did cooperate and we spurned them or we failed to appreciate Russia's cooperation.
And so, therefore, Russia was cheated or Russia was lied to or Russia's grievances are legitimate.
But here's the problem with that argument, Lex.
In exchange for that support, Vladimir Putin asked in return from President Bush for a
free hand in the former Soviet space that closed hierarchical sphere of influence where
Russia would exert influence coercively over countries that were sovereign.
And no American president could grant that and President Bush was right.
He said no.
And so, the attempted cooperation blew up.
But who was at fault there?
Should there be a non-voluntary sphere of influence?
Should that be granted or should you face up to attempts to do that?
Let's take a little detour here into China for a second.
China had this brilliant grand strategy, which was, sure, America is hostile because America
is hegemonic, America wants to control the world, America will never let China rise,
America will do everything it can to hold China down.
So we're going to have hostility from America.
We don't want to decouple because we need that high-end technology transfer, either
we buy it or we steal it because America and the rest of the West has all the technology
that we need.
We have some of it domestically, more than before by a lot, but we're still dependent
so we can't decouple.
So we'll have the hostility, but there'll be a line we don't cross just so that we don't
lose the technology transfer.
Till made in China 2035 is accomplished and we're self-sufficient domestically in AI and
every other area that's critical, but hostility from America.
But we have an ace in the hole.
Our ace in the hole is Europe.
Europe hates conflict.
They're all about trade.
It doesn't matter how evil you are.
They love to trade because vandal durch handel change through trade.
They have this illusion that you're going to become a better country if they trade with
you and you won't have conflict, war and hostilities if you trade.
And so we have this European ace in the hole.
We're hostile with the Americans.
We're still buying or stealing their technology and better than that, even the Europeans are
not hostile to us at all.
They love to trade with us and they want to trade more and they're our biggest trading
partner already.
And lo and behold, Xi Jinping sides with Vladimir Putin in the aggression in Ukraine.
He doesn't side with him providing military equipment.
He doesn't provide technology transfer, but he provides public support and massive pro-Russian
propaganda to the whole Chinese population.
And the Europeans say, wait a minute, this is an invasion of a sovereign country in Europe.
What do you mean?
You're not condemning Vladimir Putin's invasion.
And so that wedge that the Chinese had, that was the basis of their grand strategy, that
wedge between the US and Europe when it came to China policy, that wedge is gone now.
Xi Jinping destroyed it.
And the Europeans and the Americans are coming close together on Ukraine and Russia policy
for sure, but also more and more on China policy.
And so that was a pretty big sacrifice for the Chinese leader to make.
And what did he get in return?
He gets hydrocarbons from Russia at reduced prices.
And the Chinese get hydrocarbons from a lot of countries.
They have a completely diverse supply chain for their energy.
So what do you think Xi Jinping is thinking now?
Was it a mistake?
Or if- I'd like to know, Lex.
I'd like you to be able to sit down with him across from this table here on your podcast
and pose that same question to him because we have no idea.
There's a language barrier that's fascinating.
By the way, you as a scholar of Stalin, do you think we'll ever break through the language
barrier to China, not ever, I apologize, in the next few years?
Because there is a gigantic cultural and language barrier between the West and the China.
China's a great civilization.
China predates the United States by millennia.
China's accomplishments are breathtaking.
But China's also led by, let's be honest, a Communist Party monopoly which engages in
a lot of criminal behavior.
Lex, Tibet is Ukraine, Xinjiang is Ukraine, Hong Kong is Ukraine, let alone support for
Putin, Ukraine.
This is before we've even discussed Taiwan.
And so now the Europeans are coming to see this and the Americans are coming to understand
this, that maybe trading with a regime like that, morally, politically, criminally, Tibet,
Xinjiang, Hong Kong, how is that different from what Putin is doing in Ukraine?
I'd be hard pressed to differentiate that ultimately, even though the analogies are
not exact.
And so the Chinese, it's like that guy, Leonov, the author of Li Haletia, the great memoir
of the late Soviet period, the end of the Soviet Union, that they spend all this time
and all these resources blackening our image, but we supply them with endless material to
blacken our image.
That's where Xi Jinping's regime is right now, Lex.
And so they have a big dilemma on their side.
It's a Western world, and they've united the Western world and reawaken the Western world
to the fact that China is a threat to the values, the institutions and values of the
West.
And that trade is not transforming China quite the opposite.
We'll see if this endures.
Maybe it doesn't endure, maybe it's a fleeting moment, maybe this is not an inflection point.
Maybe the war in Ukraine ends more quickly than we think, and maybe, like you said,
the Chinese and the Indians and the rest of them, the leaders there, they get their wish
that it ends and the world moves on and forgets or says, let's try again to resume our mutual
understanding, our mutually beneficial trade and everything else.
Maybe it's a passing phase.
We can't exclude that.
I'm very poor at predicting the future.
But the moment is not a good one for the Chinese regime, let alone the fact that he's trying
to impose an unprecedented in the modern era third term for himself as president in the
fall at the next party Congress becoming president for life, a de facto, a Mao-like figure.
And he's now got to do that within this environment where he has damaged Chinese grand strategy
and damaged the reputation of China and its relationships across the world.
Maybe not permanently, but significantly, in addition to the problems they have at home,
demography, as you know, a middle income trap, and then the regulatory insanity of Chinese
communist rule that we've seen with the tech companies that you know well, where they've
destroyed all of that value, with the blow up of their property sector because it was
a massive bubble and that's still playing out.
And this time it's the same, meaning this time it's not different.
When it comes to a property blowout, it has enormous effects on middle class balance sheets
and their ability to be to remain consumers and drive the economy, which is the model
that they have to share.
So he's got a litany of challenges independent even of the fact that he sided with his pal,
Vladimir Putin, and their bromance is costing China very, very significantly.
If you close your eyes and 100 years ago, 1922, and you think about the future, I wonder
if you can hear the drums of war predicting the 30s, predicting the Great Depression and
the resentment that builds the economic resentment, the cultural resentment, the geopolitical
resentment that builds at least the World War II.
It at least to me, when I close my eyes, I can hear the drums of war that are still ahead
of us.
And it's possible that 2022 will materialize in a similar way as did 1922.
I have my eyes closed, Lex.
Do you hear anything?
And I sure hope that that's not what happens.
But I'm looking at 1922, it's an epoch I know well, and I don't see the future that unfolds.
I would not have predicted it had I been alive then.
I see the war behind us.
I see a prosperity on the horizon, yes, inflation in Germany and some many other difficult issues,
but there are more democracies now than there were before the war, and the old empires are
gone, and there's a cultural efflorescence, and there's modernism in the arts, and there's
women entering the public sphere, and there's all this fantastic new technology like automobiles,
and I'm looking at the future from 1922, and I'm not seeing the Great Depression, and
I'm not seeing World War II, and I'm not seeing the Holocaust, because I don't predict the
future, and nobody in 1922 could see that future, although I guess there were some clairvoyance
who predicted it.
But you're not one of them?
I'm not one of them, but this is what I know, Lex, from studying history.
What I know is stuff happens.
In other words, we're watching Ukraine war right now, and all of our attention is focused
on that, and it's like the economists say in their textbooks when their powerful models
are employed, and there's this line that says, all other factors held constant, comma, and
then the model works, and you get this really great result, it's very powerful predictor
and analysis the model, and the whole game is all other factors held constant.
So the Russian Ukraine war that we've been discussing, and this could happen, and that
could happen, but you know what stuff could happen, Lex?
For example, the Israeli government could decide this summer that it's going to bomb
Iran, because no Israeli government will tolerate Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and since
President Trump exited, unilaterally exited from the multi-power nuclear agreement, Iran
is now much closer to the bomb than they were when the United States was still in that agreement,
and you tell me the Israeli government that says, sure, it's fine, it's okay, Iran could
get the bomb, and so maybe that happens, and maybe that happens as early as this summer
as Iran gets closer and closer and closer.
Maybe that guy in North Korea decides it's his time, just like his grandfather in 1950
decided it's time, we're going to quote reunify the Korean Peninsula.
Maybe, I don't know, Lex, fill in the blank, something's going to happen, it's not going
to be what I predict, it's not going to be what I'm watching, it's going to be obvious
only after it happens, not before, and then it's going to upend the table.
And all of a sudden, we're going to be in a different environment, different circumstances,
and is Ukraine still as central at that point as it seems to be right now?
I don't know the answer to that question.
Let me ask two rapid-fire questions, you only allow it to have one minute, and it's about
predicting the future.
Question one, Vladimir Putin, when will he no longer be in office, and will he step down
or be overthrown?
What's your prediction and a brief explanation of that prediction?
Now, nobody can predict the future, but what's your sense now?
Some people are saying the pressure is building, he's going to be overthrown or step down at
the end of this year, and some people say surely he's going to outlast Stalin's rule
of 30 plus years.
No evidence of a coup yet, none whatsoever yet.
He's pretty much at life expectancy for a Russian male, those are bad numbers, he's
69, going to be 70.
So he's lived the life of a Russian male already, but he's got better doctors than the majority
of the Russian males in that, let's say, comparison set.
So he could live a very long time with good doctors.
So there could be a coup at some point, but there's none today in evidence.
He could go because he's reached the life expectancy, or he could stay for a long time.
The thing to watch about this is an organization that nobody pays attention to, the FSL, which
is the Praetorian Guard, the self-standing bodyguard directorate, the only one, the only
organization in Russia that has any access to him.
We've seen no disloyalty, no breaking of ranks, no defections, nothing in the public realm
and open sources about any divisions or problems in the FSO, in the Praetorian Guard.
So if you can't break that, change that, elicit defections there, you can't overturn him.
Praetorian regimes, Lex, they're terrible, they fail at everything.
They can't feed their people, they have trouble achieving any goals.
They only have to be good, however, at one thing.
They only have to be good at the complete suppression of political alternatives.
If you can suppress political alternatives, you can fail at everything else, but you can
survive as an authoritarian regime.
So you watch Navalny, he's still alive, okay, Lex, you go for it.
That's my second rapid-fire question, is what happens to Navalny?
What are the possible conclusions of, well, you said quite possibly the second most influential
powerful figure in Russia, is he going to die in jail?
Will he become the next president of Russia?
Well, what are the possible...
I wish I knew, Lex.
I've been surprised that he's still alive.
I've been worried that he will be killed in prison in a staged fight.
Some security officer, prison guard, puts on a prison outfit, takes a lead pipe, goes
into the cell, they have a quote, fight, and Navalny is killed.
I've been afraid of that, but he's still alive, even though he's serving a long sentence.
So that leads me to guess that people inside the Putin regime, and maybe President Putin
himself, understand that Navalny is their ticket to lift sanctions.
That Navalny is even more popular outside of Russia than he is inside of Russia.
He's the leader in many ways of the political opposition in the country, even while still
in prison, his organization's been destroyed, but he doesn't have majority support in the
population by any stretch of the imagination.
But he's a big figure in the West, including here in the US.
And so Navalny could be their ticket, their kind of get out of jail card, meaning they
release him from prison, he gets appointed, I don't know, prime minister, even by the
Putin regime, if he were willing to accept such a position.
And I have my doubts about that.
And then that's how they lobby to remove the sanctions against them.
So he's a card that President Putin could play.
And so maybe that's the reason he's still alive, or maybe there are other reasons that
we don't know.
And so some alternative to Putin is more likely to arise inside his gang, Putin's Shaiqa,
as they say, right inside his gang, where they tire of his mistakes, they tire of his
self-defeating actions, and they say, patriotically for Russia, we need to do something against,
move against this guy, because he's hurting our country and also because I could do better.
I'm ambitious as well as patriotic.
But once again, the problem there, Alex, is Putin is surrounded by this cocoon known
as the FSO.
He meets on Zoom predominantly with the rest of the government, including with the defense
and security officials.
They don't have frequent access to his person.
And as you were looting earlier to the pandemic, they have to quarantine for two weeks before
every meeting with him.
And moreover, you know, Alex, they don't know where he is.
You see, when they're on Zoom with him and the room, it's the Valdai.
His office in the Valdai region looks the same as his office in Sochi, or his office
outside of Moscow and Novogoryov, they're made up to look very similar on Zoom.
And sure, some signs, they're looking where is it, but maybe they don't know.
And so you're going to move on him and you're going to jump him in his dacha outside Moscow.
And it turns out he's in Sochi, or vice versa.
And it turns out the FSO is loyal to him and won't let you anyway.
So, Alex, we don't know, but we watch this FSO really closely.
And we think that the elites, if not Putin, but maybe Putin too, understand Navalny as
a really big potential political card that they could play.
And one last question, the biggest question.
You studied some of the darkest aspects of human history, human nature.
Let me ask the why question.
What are we doing here?
What's the meaning of our existence, our life here on Earth?
What are we humans trying to get at here?
I can't answer that question either, but I can say that having a purposeful life is
actually not that hard.
You can't, you're not Gandhi, you're not President Roosevelt, you're not going to transform
a country or a civilization or become immortal because of your courage and your insight and
your genius at critical moments.
But you live in an environment, you're in a school, you're in a workplace, you're somewhere
where you can affect other people in a positive way.
It can be not just about yourself, but it can be about them.
And you can have a positive impact on other people's lives through the work that you do,
whether that's your employment or your charity or your spare time or your work time.
It can be by modeling proper behavior, admitting your mistakes, hard to do but necessary, remembering
that you don't know everything, you can't predict the future, but you don't even know
everything in your areas of expertise, painfully reminded of that humility at times, but remind
yourself to.
So you can lead a life that can show others what good values are.
And you can lead a life that dedicates yourself not only to your own material well-being,
but to the well-being and to the development of others around you.
And it can be on a humble scale, it can be in a small classroom or a small workplace,
a small work team, but it can be done.
And you can be reminded that having a positive impact even on one other person gives far
greater meaning to your own life and is profoundly satisfying, much more satisfying than the attention
you might get, let's say on social media or awards you might receive.
There's nothing wrong with pursuing those, people pursue them and it's a free society.
But leading a purposeful life intentionally is possible.
Even just one person, I love the expression, say one life, save the world, just focusing
on the local, on the tiny little difference you can make in the world can somehow ripple.
Every day.
If you think about that every single day, you're a better person, we're a better society.
And maybe you get to add a bit of love to the world after all.
Stephen, this is a huge honor for many reasons, one of which is I can just tell how much care
you put into this conversation and how much, I use the word love a lot, but I just feel
the love that just even the respect you give me, which I can't tell you how energizing
that is, how much that gives me strength for my own silly little pursuits.
Thank you so much for doing that.
Thank you for not just talking today, but giving me so much respect just with everything
you're doing, I really appreciate that, it makes me feel special.
So thank you so much for sitting down and talking today.
Mutual Lex, thank you as well, and thank you for the respect that you've shown me.
These are really difficult issues that don't have simple answers, but that doesn't mean
we give up.
We have to keep thinking and learning and trying and finding solutions in everything
we do, including on these big global tragedies that we live through.
And it's heartbreaking what's going on.
It just breaks my heart every day.
A person who studies this, I've been studying this for decades, and it keeps happening.
And you think again, and yes, it is again, but we still have to keep trying, and we have
to be inspired by those people who are more courageous than we are and sacrifice more
than we sacrifice.
For me, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the war on Ukraine, is experienced in my study
at home and in my office at Princeton or my coming office at Stanford when I moved full
time to Stanford in September, or it's experienced far away in safety and in comfort.
And we have to remember that too when we talk about these things, when we answer your questions,
right?
That as we speak and as we comment and think we're experts on these things from the comfort
of our existence, that there are people in those tragedies right now.
With no power, with no food, with full uncertainty about the future of the health of their children.
And I've also seen because I have family in both places, homes that were home for, buildings
that were homes for generations now in rubble.
So yes, Lex, it just, it hurts.
And it's Syria, where 350,000 at least by UN estimates died and Russia participated
in that, and it's Yemen, and it's so many other places that don't have the same degree
of attention that a European country like Ukraine has.
But yeah, we have to remember also that in addition to Ukraine, and then there's things
right home here in New York City, where children are without food, which is just inexcusable
in a country this rich.
So we shouldn't forget in our study of leaders, in our study of geopolitics that ultimately
it's about the humanity, it's about the human beings and human suffering.
Thank you so much.
Thank you.
This is amazing conversation.
Talk to you again soon.
My pleasure.
Thanks for listening to this conversation with Steven Kotkin.
To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description.
And now, let me leave you with some words from Mahatma Gandhi.
When I despair, I remember that all through history, the way of truth and love have always
won.
There have been tyrants and murderers, and for time, they can seem invincible, but in
the end, they always fall.
Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.