What happened during World War II was that once the Germans started to run out of manpower,
they created foreign legion groups.
But because those people were not Aryans, they couldn't be trusted.
So they were put under the command of Henry Himmler, under command of SS,
and became known as SS Waffen Units.
And one of such units was created in Ukraine.
The following is a conversation with Serhii Plohi, a historian at Harvard University
and the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute, also at Harvard.
As a historian, he specializes in the history of Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on Ukraine.
He wrote a lot of great books on Ukraine and Russia, the Soviet Union,
on Slavic peoples in general across centuries, on Chernobyl and nuclear disasters,
and on the current war in Ukraine.
A book titled The Russo-Ukrainian War, The Return of History.
This is the Lex 3 Minute podcast.
To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description.
And now, dear friends, here's Serhii Plohi.
What are the major explanations for the collapse of the Soviet Union?
Maybe ones you agree with and ones you disagree with.
Very often, people confuse three different processes that were taking place in the late 80s and early 90s.
And the one was the collapse of communism as ideology.
Another was the end of the Cold War.
And the third one was the end of the Soviet Union.
All of these processes were interrelated, interconnected.
But when people provide ideology as the explanation for all of these processes, that's where I disagree.
Because ideological collapse happened on the territory of the Soviet Union in general.
The Soviet Union lost the Cold War, whether we are talking about Moscow, Leningrad, or St. Petersburg now, or Vladivostok.
But the fall of the Soviet Union is about a story in which Vladivostok and St. Petersburg ended up in one country.
And Kiev, Minsk, and Dushanbe ended in different countries.
So the theories and explanations about how did that happen, for me, these are really very helpful theories for understanding the Soviet collapse.
So the mobilization from below, the collapse of the center against the background of economic collapse,
against the background of ideological implosion.
That's how I look at the fall of the Soviet Union, and that's how I look at the theories that explain that collapse.
So it's a story of geography, ideology, economics.
Which are the most important to understand of what made the collapse of the Soviet Union happen?
The Soviet collapse was unique, but not more unique than collapse of any other empire.
So what we really witnessed, or the world witnessed back in 1991, and we continue to witness today,
with the Russian aggression against Ukraine, is a collapse of one of the largest world empires.
We talked about the Soviet Union, and now talk about Russia as possessing plus-minus one-sixth of the surface of the Earth.
You don't get in possession of one-sixth of the Earth by being a nation-state.
You get that sort of size as an empire.
And the Soviet collapse is a continuation of the disintegration of the Russian empire that started back in 1917,
that was arrested for some period of time by the Bolsheviks, by the communist ideology, which was internationalist ideology,
and then came back in full force in the late 80s and early 90s.
So the most important story for me, this is the story of the continuing collapse of the Russian empire
and the rise of not just local nationalism, but also rise of Russian nationalism
that turned out to be as a destructive force for the imperial or multi-ethnic, multi-national state,
as was Ukrainian nationalism or Georgian or Estonian, for that matter.
Well, you said a lot of interesting stuff there, 1917, Bolsheviks, internationalists,
how that plays with the idea of Russian empire and so on.
But first, let me ask about U.S. influence on this.
So one of the ideas is that, you know, through the Cold War, that mechanism,
U.S. had major interest to weaken the Soviet Union,
and therefore the collapse could be attributed to pressure and manipulation from the United States.
Is there truth to that?
The pressure from the United States, this is part of the Cold War.
And Cold War, part of that story, but it doesn't explain the Soviet collapse.
And the reason is quite simple.
The United States of America didn't want the Soviet Union to collapse and disintegrate.
They didn't want that at the start of the Cold War in 1948.
We now have the strategic documents.
They were concerned about that.
They didn't want to do that.
And certainly they didn't want to do that in the year 1990-91.
As late as August of 1991, the month of the coup in Moscow, President Bush, Judge H.W. Bush,
travels from Moscow to Kyiv and gives famous or infamous speech called Chicken Kyiv Speech,
basically warning Ukrainians against going for independence.
The Soviet collapse was a huge headache for the administration in the White House for a number
of reasons.
They liked to work with Gorbachev.
The Soviet Union was emerging as a junior partner of the United States on the international
arena.
Collapse was destroying all of that.
And on the top of that, there was a question of the nuclear weapons, unaccounted nuclear weapons.
So the United States was doing everything humanly possible to keep the Soviet Union together in
one piece until really late November of 1991, when it became clear that it was a lost cause
and they had to say goodbye to Gorbachev and to the project that he introduced.
A few months later, or a year later, there was a presidential campaign and Bush was running
for the second term and was looking for achievements.
And there were many achievements.
I basically treat him with great respect.
But destruction of the Soviet Union was not one of those achievements.
He was on the other side of that divide.
But the politics, the political campaign, of course, have their own rules.
And they produce and give birth to mythology, which we still, at least in this country,
we live till now, till today.
So Gorbachev is an interesting figure in all of this.
Is there a possible history where the Soviet Union did not collapse and some of the ideas
that Gorbachev had for the future of the Soviet Union came to life?
Of course, history, on the one hand, there is a statement.
It doesn't allow for what ifs.
On the other hand, in my opinion, history is full of what if.
That's what history is about.
And certainly, certainly, there are scenarios how the Soviet Union would continue.
It would continue beyond, let's say, Gorbachev's tenure.
And the argument has been made that the reforms that he introduced, that they were mismanaged
and they could be managed differently.
Or there could be no reforms and there could be continued stagnation.
So that is all possible.
What I think would happen one way or another is the Soviet collapse in a different form on
somebody else's watch at some later period in time because we're dealing with not just
processes that were happening in the Soviet Union, we're dealing with global processes.
And the 20th century turned out to be the century of the disintegration of the empires.
You look at the globe, at the map of the world in 1914, and you compare it to the map at the
end of the 20th century in 1991, 1992, and suddenly you realize that there are many candidates for
being the most important event, the most important process in the 20th century.
But the biggest global thing that happened was redrawing the map of the world and producing
dozens, if not hundreds, of new states.
That's the outcome of the different processes of the 20th century.
Look, Yugoslavia is falling apart around the same time.
Czechoslovakia goes through what can be called a civilized divorce, a very rare occurrence in
the fall of multinational states.
So, yeah, the writing was on the wall, whether it would happen under Gorbachev or later, whether
it would happen as the result of reforms or as the result of no reforms.
But I think that sooner or later that would happen.
Yeah, it's very possible hundreds of years from now the way the 20th century is written about
as the century defined by the collapse of empires.
You call the Soviet Union the last empire.
The book is called the last empire.
So is there something fundamental about the way the world is that means it's not conducive to
the formation of empires?
The meaning that I was putting in the term of the Soviet Union as the last empire was that
the Soviet collapse was the collapse of the last major European empires, traditional empires.
That was there in the 18th century, 19th century, and through most of the 20th century.
The Austria-Hungary died in the midst of World War I, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, the Brits
were gone and left India.
And there was the successor to the Russian Empire called the Soviet Union was still hanging on there.
And then came 1991.
And what we see, even with today's Russia, it's a very different sort of policies.
The Russian leadership tried to learn a lesson from 1991.
So there is no national republics in the Russian Federation that would have more rights than
the Russian administrative units.
So the structure is different, the nationality policies are different, the level of russification
is much higher.
So it is in many ways already a post-imperial formation.
And you write about that moment in 1991, the role that Ukraine played in that.
Seems to be a very critical role.
Can you describe just that, what role Ukraine played in the collapse of the Soviet Union?
History is many things.
But it started in a very simple way of making notes about, on the yearly basis, what happened
this year or that.
So it's about chronology.
Chronology in the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union is very important.
You have Ukrainian referendum on December 1st, 1991, and you have dissolution of the Soviet
Union by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus one week later.
And the question is, why?
Ukrainian referendum is the answer.
But Ukrainians didn't answer their referendum question of whether they want the Soviet Union
to be dissolved or not.
They answered very limited in terms of, it's been in question, whether you support the decision
of Verhovna Rada, of your parliament, for Ukraine to go independent.
And the rest was not on the ballot.
So why then, one week later, the Soviet Union is gone?
And President Yeltsin explained to President Bush around that time the reason why Ukraine
was so important.
He said that, well, if Ukraine is gone, Russia is not interested in this Soviet project because
Russia would be outnumbered and outvoted by the Muslim republics.
So there was a cultural element.
But there was also another one.
Ukraine happened to be the second largest Soviet republic and then post-Soviet state in terms
of population, in terms of the economy, economic potential, and so on and so forth.
And as Yeltsin suggested, close culturally, linguistically, and otherwise, to Russia.
So with the second largest republic gone, Russia didn't think that it was in Russia's interest
to continue with the Soviet Union.
And around that time, Igor Gaidar, who was the chief economic advisor of Yeltsin, was telling
him, well, we just don't have money anymore to support other republics.
We have to focus on Russia.
We have to use oil and gas money within the Russian Federation.
So the state was bankrupt.
Imperial projects, at least in the context of the late 20th century, they costed money.
It wasn't a money-making machine as it was back in the 18th or 19th century.
And the combination of all these factors led to the processes in which Ukraine's decision
to go independent spelled the end to the Soviet Union.
And if today anybody wants to restore, not the Soviet Union, but some form of Russian control
over the post-Soviet space, Ukraine is as important today as it was back in December of 1991.
Let me ask you about Vladimir Putin's statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of
the great tragedies of history.
His formulation was that this is the greatest geopolitical catastrophe or tragedy of the
20th century.
And I specifically went and looked at the text and put it in specific time when it was happening.
And it was interesting that the statement was made a few weeks before the May 9 parade and
celebrations of the victory, a key part of the mythology of the current Russian state.
So why say things about the Soviet collapse being the largest geopolitical strategy and not in that
particular context, the Second World War, my explanation at least is that the World War II, the price was
enormous, but the Soviet Union emerged as a great victor and captured half of Europe.
1991, in terms of the lives lost at that point, the price was actually very, very low.
But for Putin, what was important that the state was lost, and he in particular was concerned
about the division of the Russian people, which he understood back then, like he understands
now, in very, very broad terms.
So for him, the biggest tragedy is not the loss of life.
The biggest tragedy is the loss of the great power status or the unity of those whom he considered
to be a Russian nation.
So at least this is my reading.
This is my understanding of what is there, what is on the paper, and what is between the lines.
So both the unity of the, sort of, quote, Russian empire and the status of the superpower.
That's how I read it.
You wrote a book, The Origins of the Slavic Nations.
So let's go back into history.
What is the origin of Slavic nations?
We can look at that from different perspectives.
And we are now making major breakthroughs in answering this question with the very interesting
innovative linguistic analysis, the study of DNA.
So that's really the new frontier.
We are getting into a prehistorical period where there is no historical sources.
And from what we can understand today, and that can, of course, change tomorrow with all
these breakthroughs in sciences, is that the Slavs came into existence somewhere in the area
of Pripyat marshes, northwestern part of Ukraine, southwestern part of Belarus, eastern part of Poland.
And that is considered to be a historical homeland of Slavs.
And then they spread.
And they spread all the way to the Adriatic.
So we have Croats.
We have Russians spreading all the way to the Pacific.
We have Ukrainians.
We have Belarusians, Poles.
Once we had Czechoslovaks, now we have Czechs and Slovaks.
So that's the story of starting with the 8th and 9th century.
We can, even a little bit earlier, we can already follow that story with the help of the written sources,
mostly from Byzantine, then later from Western Europe.
But what I was trying to do, not being a scientist, not being an expert in linguistics, or not being an expert in DNA analysis,
I was trying to see what was happening in the minds of those peoples, and the elites in particular,
whom we call today not Slavs, but Eastern Slavs, which means Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians.
How they imagined themselves, how they imagined their world, and eventually I look at the so-called nation-building projects.
So trying to answer the question of how we arrived to the situation in which we are today,
where there are not just three East Slavic nations, but there are also three East Slavic states,
Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian.
So this is the focus of my book.
I end, admittedly, in that particular book, I end on the 18th century, before the era of nationalism.
But then there are other books, like Lost Kingdom, where I bring the story all the way up to today.
So what aspect of the 8th and 9th century the East Slavic states permeates to today that we should understand?
Well, the most important one is that the existence of the state of Kiev and Rus' back during the medieval period
created foundations for historical mythology, and there are just wars and battles over who has the right or more right for Kiev and Rus'.
The legal code that was created at that time existed for a long period of time.
The acceptance of Christianity from Byzantium, that became a big issue that separated then Eastern Slavs
from their Western neighbors, including Czechs and Poles,
but united in that way to, let's say, Bulgarians or Serbs,
and the beginning of the written literature, beginning in Kiev.
So all of that is considered to be part of heritage.
All of that is being contested.
And these debates that were academic for a long period of time, what we see now, tragically,
are being continued on the battlefield.
What is Kiev?
What is Rus' that you mentioned?
What's the importance of these?
You mentioned them as the sort of defining places and terms, labels, at the beginning of all this.
So what is Kiev?
Kiev became a capital or the outpost of the Vikings who were trying to establish control over the trade route
between what is today's Western Russia and Belarus and Northern Ukraine,
so the forest areas, and the biggest and the richest market in the world that existed at that time,
which was in Constantinople in Byzantium.
So the idea was to get whatever goods you can get in that part of Eastern Europe,
and most of those goods were slaves, local population.
Put them on the ships in Kiev, because Kiev was on the border with the steppe zones.
Steppe zones were controlled by other groups, Scythians, Armatians, Polovtians, Pechenegs, and so on,
and so on, you name it.
And then staying on the river, being protected from attacks of the nomads to come to the Black Sea
and sell these products in Constantinople.
That was the idea.
That was the model.
Vikings tried to practice that sort of business model also in other parts of Europe.
And like in other parts of Europe, they turned out to be, by default, creators of new polities, of new states.
And that was the story of the first Kievan dynasty.
And Kiev, as the capital of that huge empire that was going from the Baltics to today's central Ukraine,
and then was trying to get through the southern Ukraine to the Black Sea,
that was a major, major European state, kingdom, if you want to call it, of medieval Europe,
with creating a lot of tradition in terms of dynasty, in terms of language, in terms of religion,
in terms of, again, historical mythology.
So Kiev is central for the nation-building myth of a number of groups in the region.
So in one perspective and narrative, Kiev is at the center of this Russian empire.
At which point does Moscow come to prominence as the center of the Russian empire?
Well, the Russian empire is a term and really creation of the 18th century.
What we have for the Kievan, we call it Kievan Rusy.
Again, this is a term of the 19th century.
They call themselves Rusy.
Rusy.
And there was metropolitan of Rusy, and there was Rusy's principalities.
So very important to keep in mind that Rusy is not Russia,
because that was a self-name for all multiple groups on that territory.
And Moscow doesn't exist at the time when Kiev emerges as the capital.
The first reference to Moscow comes from the 12th century,
when it was founded by one of the Kievan princes.
And Moscow comes to prominence really in a very different context
and with a very different empire running the show in the region.
The story of Moscow and the rise of Moscow,
so this is the story of the Mongol rule over former Rusy lands
and former Rusy territories.
The part of the former Rusy eventually overthrows the Mongol control
with the help of the small group of people called Lithuanians,
which had a young state and young dynasty and united this lands,
which were mostly in today's terms Ukrainian and Belarusian.
So they separate early.
And what is today's Russia, mostly Western Russia, Central Russia,
stays under the Mongol control up until late 15th century.
And that was the story when Moscow rises as the new capital of that realm,
replacing the city of Vladimir as that capital.
For those who ever went to Russia,
they're familiar with, of course, Vladimir as the place
of the oldest architectural monuments,
the so-called Golden Ring of Russia, and so on and so forth.
Vladimir is central, and there are so many architectural monuments there
because before there was Moscow, there was Vladimir.
Eventually, in this struggle over control of the territory,
struggle for favors from the Mongols and the Tatar horde,
Moscow emerges as the center of that particular realm under Mongols.
After the Mongol rule is removed,
Moscow embarks on the project that historians,
Russian historians of the 19th century called
the Gathering of the Russian Lands.
Using Russian now for Rus' and trying to bring back
the lands of former Kiev and Rus',
but also the lands of the former Mongol Empire.
The Russians got to the Pacific before they got to Kiev historically.
And really, the quote-unquote gathering of the quote-unquote Russian lands
ends only in 1945 when the Soviet Union bullies the Czechoslovak government
into turning what is today's Trans-Karpetian Ukraine
to the Soviet Union.
It is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
So that's the moment when that destiny,
the way how it was imagined by the 19th century Russian historian,
was eventually fulfilled.
Moscow was in control of all this lands.
So to what degree are the Slavic people one people,
and this is a theme that will continue throughout, I think,
versus a collection of multiple peoples,
whether we're talking about the Kievan Rus',
or we're talking about the 19th century Russian Empire conception?
Well, a number of ways to look at that.
One, the most obvious, the most clear is language.
And there is no question that Poles speak a separate language
and they're Slavs.
And there is no question for anyone going to Ukraine
and hearing Ukrainian realizing that this is not Russian.
The level of comprehension can be different.
You can understand certain words,
and you don't understand others.
And the same would be with Polish and the same would be with Czech.
So there is this linguistic history that is in common.
But languages very clearly indicate
that you're dealing with different peoples.
We know that language is not everything.
Americans speak a particular way of English.
Australians speak a particular variant of English.
But for reasons of geography, history,
we pretty much believe that despite linguistic unity,
these are different nations and different peoples.
And there are some parts of political tradition are in common.
Others are quite different.
So the same when it comes to language,
the same when it comes to political tradition,
to the loyalty to the political institution applies to Slavic nations.
So that's, again, there is nothing particularly unique about the Slavs in that regard.
You wrote the book,
The Cossack Myth, History and Nationhood in the Age of Empires.
It tells the story of an anonymous manuscript called The History of the Rus.
It started being circulated in the 1820s.
I would love it if you can tell the story of this.
This is supposedly one of the most impactful texts in history, modern history.
So what's the importance of this text?
What did it contain?
How did it define the future of the region?
In the first decades of the 19th century,
after Napoleonic Wars,
a mysterious text emerged
that was attributed to an Orthodox archbishop
that was long dead,
which was claiming that the Cossacks of Ukraine
were, in fact, the original Rus people
and that they had the right for a particular place,
for a central place in the Russian Empire.
And it tells the history of the Cossacks.
It's the era of Romanticism,
full of all sorts of drama.
There are heroes, there are villains.
And the text captivates the attention
of some key figures
in the Russian intellectual elite in St. Petersburg.
People like Konraty Arelyev,
who was executed for his participation in 1825 Uprising.
writes poetry on the basis of this text.
Pushkin pays attention to it as well.
And then comes along the key figure
in Ukrainian national revival
of the 19th century,
Ukrainian national project,
Taras Shevchenko,
and reads it as well.
And they all read it very differently.
Eventually, by the beginning of the mid-20th century,
some of the Russian,
mostly nationalist writers,
call this text
the Quran of Ukrainian nationalism.
So what is there?
The story, it's very important in a sense
is that what the authors,
and that's what I claim in the book,
what the authors of the text
were trying to say,
they were trying to say
that the Cossack elite
should have the same rights
as the Russian nobility.
And brings the long historical record
to prove how cool the Cossacks
were over the period of time.
But at the beginning of the 19th century,
they put this claim already,
they used new arguments.
And these arguments are about
nation and nationalism.
And they're saying that the Cossacks
are a separate nation.
And that's a big, big, big claim.
The Russian Empire,
and this is a very, very good argument
in historiography,
that Russian Empire grew
and acquired this one-sixth of the earth
by using one very specific way
of integrating those lands.
It integrated elites.
It was making deals with the elites,
whether the elites were Muslim
or the elites were Roman Catholic,
as the case with the Poles.
They would be,
elites would be integrated.
And the empire was based on that estate,
the estate loyalty
and the state integration.
But once you bring in
the factor of nation and nationalism
and language,
then once in a sudden,
the whole model of the integration
of the elites,
irrespective of their language,
religion,
and culture,
starts falling apart.
And the Poles were the first
who really produced
this sort of a challenge
to the Russian Empire
by uprisings,
to uprisings in the 19th century.
And Ukrainians then followed
in their footsteps.
So the text,
the importance of the text
is that it was making claim
on the part of a particular estate,
the Cossack officer class,
which was that empire could survive.
But it turned it,
given the conditions of the time,
into the claim
for the special role
of Cossacks as a nation,
creating that this is a separate nation,
a Rus' nation.
And that is the challenge
of nationalism,
that no empire really survived,
and the Russian Empire
was not an exception.
So there's a turning point
when the discourse switches
from loyalty based
on the integration
of the elites
to the loyalty based
on attachment
to your nation,
to your language,
and to your culture,
and to your history.
So that was like
the initial spark,
the flame
that led to
nationalist movements.
That was the beginning
and the beginning
that was building a bridge
between the existence
of the Cossack state
in the 17th and 18th century
that was used
as a foundation
for the Cossack mythology,
Ukrainian national mythology,
went into
the Ukrainian national anthem,
and the new age
and the new stage
where the Cossacks
were not there anymore,
where there were professors,
intellectuals,
students,
members of the
national
and organizations.
And it started,
of course,
with romantic poetry.
It was started
with collecting folklore
and then later
goes to the political stage
and eventually
the stage
of mass politics.
So to you,
even throughout
the 20th century
under Stalin,
there was always
a force
within Ukraine
that wanted
to be independent.
There were five attempts
for Ukraine
to declare
its independence
and to maintain it
in the 20th century.
Only one succeeded
in 1991,
but there were
four different attempts
before.
And you see
the Ukrainian
national identity
manifesting itself
in two different ways.
In the form
of national communism,
after the Bolshevik
victory
in Bolshevik-controlled
Ukraine
and in the form
of radical nationalism
in the parts
of Ukraine
that were controlled
by Poland
and Romania
and part of that
was also controlled
by Czechoslovakia
and later Hungary.
So in those parts
outside
of the Soviet Union,
the form
of the national mobilization,
the key form
of national mobilization
became radical nationalism.
In Soviet Ukraine,
it was national communism
that came back
in the 1960s
and 1970s.
And then
in 1991,
the majority
of the members
of the Ukrainian parliament
who voted
for independence
were members
of the Communist Party.
So that spirit
on a certain level
never died.
So there's
national communism
and radical nationalism.
Well,
let me ask you
about the radical nationalism
because that
is a topic
that comes up
in the discussion
of the war
in Ukraine today.
Can you tell me
about
Stepan Bandera?
Who was he,
this controversial
far-right
Ukrainian revolutionary?
There are
at least
two
Stepan
Banderas.
One
is the real
person
and another
is mythology
that
really
comes
with this
name.
And
the real
person
was
a young
student,
nationalistically
oriented student
in the late 1920s
and early
1930s
in the part
of Ukraine
that was
controlled
by Poland
who
belonged to
the generation
who regretted
that they were
not born
in time
for the big
struggles
of the
World War I
and
revolution
at that time.
They believed
that their
fathers
lost
opportunity
for Ukraine
to become
independent
and that
a new
ideology
was needed
and that
ideology
was
radical
nationalism
and
new
tactics
were needed.
So
Banderas
becomes
the leader
of the
organization
of Ukrainian
nationalists
in Ukraine
at the
young age
and
organizes
a number
of
assassinations
of the
Polish
officials
or
members
of the
Ukrainian
community
who
these
young
people
in
their
17,
18,
19
considered
to be
collaborators.
He is
arrested,
put on
trial,
and that's
where the
myth of
Pandera
starts to
emerge
because
he uses
the trial
to
make
statements
about
the
Ukrainian
nationalism,
radical
nationalism
and its
goals.
and suddenly
becomes a
hero
among
the
Ukrainian
youth
at that
time.
He is
sentenced
for
execution
for
death,
so when
he delivers
his speech
he knows
that he
probably
would die
soon.
And
then
the
sentence
was
commuted
to life
in prison.
Then
World War
II
happens,
the
Polish
state
collapses
and
the
pressure
coming
of course
from
Nazi
Germany
and
the
Soviet
Union.
Bandera
walks
away
and
presides
over the
act of the
split of the
organization of
Ukrainian
nationalists
into two
groups.
the most
radical
one
you
used
to
call
revolutionary
is led
by
Bandera.
They
worked
together
with
the
Nazi
Germany
at that
time
with
the
hope
that
Nazi
Germany
would
deliver
them
independent
Ukraine.
First
days
of the
German
attack,
Nazi
attack
on the
Soviet
Union,
the
units
formed
on the
basis
of
the
organization
of
Ukrainian
nationalists
march
into
the
city
of
Lviv
and
declare
Ukrainian
independence.
That
was not
sanctioned
by the
German
authorities.
That
was not
in
German
plans.
So
they
arrest
Bandera,
members
of his
family,
his
brothers,
leaders
of the
organization.
So
his
two
brothers
go to
Auschwitz,
die
there.
He
was sent
to
Sachsenhausen
for
most
duration
of
the
war
until
1944,
refusing
to
revoke
the
declaration
of
Ukrainian
independence,
which
again
contributes
further
to his
mythology.
After
the war,
he never
comes back
to Ukraine.
He
lives
in
exile
in
Munich.
So
between
1930
and
his
death
in
1959,
he
spent
in
Ukraine
maybe
up to
two
years,
maybe a
little bit
more,
but most
of the
time was
either in
the
Polish
prison
or in
the
German
concentration
camp
or in
exile.
But
the
myth
of
Bandera
lived,
and all
the
members of
the
organization
of Ukrainian
nationalists
and then
the
Ukrainian
insurgent
army
that
fought
against
the
Soviets
all the
way into
the early
1950s,
they were
called
banderites.
They were
called banderites
by the
Soviet
authorities.
They were
known also
in that way
to the
local
population.
So there
was a
faraway
leader
that barely
was there
on the
spot,
but whose
name was
attached to
this
movement
for
really
liberation
of Ukraine
at that
time.
Again,
the battle
that failed.
The fact
that he
collaborated
with the
Nazis
sticks.
From one
perspective,
he's considered
by many
to be a
hero
of Ukraine
for fighting
for the
independence
of Ukraine.
From another
perspective,
coupled
with the
fact that
there's this
radical
revolutionary
extremist
flavor to
the way
he sees
the world,
that label
just stays
that he's
a fascist,
he's a
Nazi.
To what
degrees
is it
true,
to what
degrees
is it
not?
This
label is
certainly
promoted
first by
the Soviet
propaganda
and then
by Russian
propaganda.
It works
very nicely.
If you
focus on
the years
of
collaboration,
those were
the same
years when
Joseph Stalin
collaborated
with Hitler.
So we
have the
same reason
to call
Stalin
Nazi
collaborator
as we
have the
reason to
call Bandera
Nazi
collaborator.
We look
at the
situation in
the Pacific,
in Indonesia,
in other
places.
The leaders
who worked
together with
Japanese with
the idea of
promoting
independence of
their countries
after the
Japanese
collapse
become
leaders of
the empire.
So the
difference
with Bandera
is that he
never becomes
the leader
of empire
and immunity
that comes
with that
position
certainly
doesn't
apply to
him.
But there
are other
parts of
his life
which certainly
put this
whole thing
in question.
The fate
of his
family,
his own
time in
the German
concentration
camp,
certainly
don't fit
the propaganda
one-sided
image of
Bandera.
In terms
of him
being a
hero,
that's a
very interesting
question because
he is
perceived in
Ukraine today
not by
all and
probably not
by the
majority but
by many
people in
Ukraine as
a symbol
of fighting
against
the Soviet
Union and
by extension
against Russia
and Russian
occupation.
So his
popularity
grew after
February 24th
2022 as
a symbol of
that resistance.
Again, we are
talking here about
myth and
mythology because
Bandera was
not leading
the fight
against the
Soviet occupation
in Ukraine
because at that
time he was
just simply not
in Ukraine.
He was in
Germany and
you can
imagine that
geography mattered
at that time
much more than
it matters
today.
There's a million
questions to ask
here.
I think it's an
important topic
because it is
at the center
of the
claimed
reason that
the war
continues in
Ukraine.
So I would
like to explore
that from
different angles.
But just to
clarify, was
there a moment
where Bandera
chose
Nazi Germany
over the
Red Army
when the war
already began?
So in the
list of
allegiances,
is Ukraine's
independence
more important
than fighting
Nazi Germany
essentially?
The Ukrainian
independence was
their goal
and they were
there to
work with
anybody
who would
support and
in one way
or at least
allow the
Ukrainian
independence.
So there is
no question
that they
are just
classic
nationalists.
So the
goal is
nationalism
is the
principle
according to
which the
cultural
boundaries
coincide
with political
boundaries.
So their
goal was to
create
political
boundaries
that would
coincide with
the geographic
boundaries in
the conditions
of the
World War
II and
certainly
making
deals
with
whoever
would
either
support,
as I said,
or tolerate
that project
of this.
So I would
love to find
the line
between
nationalism,
even extreme
nationalism,
and fascism,
and Nazism.
So for
Bandera the
myth and
Bandera the
person,
to what
degree,
let's look at
some of the
ideology of
Nazism.
To which
degree did
he hate
Jews?
Was he
anti-Semitic?
We know
that basically
in his
circle there
were people
who were
anti-Semites
in a sense
that, okay,
we have the
texts, right?
We know
that.
We don't
have that
information
about that
sort of
text or
that sort
of evidence
with regard
to Bandera
himself.
In terms
of fascism,
there is
very clear
and there
is research
done that
in particular
Italian fascism
had influence
on the
thinking of
people in
that organization,
including people
at the top.
But it is
also very
important to
keep in
mind that
they call
themselves
nationalists
and revolutionaries.
And despite
the fact
that in
1939,
in 1940,
in 1941,
it was
very beneficial
for them
to declare
themselves to
be Ukrainian
fascists
and establish
this bond
with,
not just
with Italy,
but with
Nazi Germany,
they refused
to do that.
And then
they refused
to recall
their independence.
So
influences,
yes,
but clearly
it's a
different type
of a
political
project.
So let me
fast forward
into the future
and see to which
degree the myth
permeates.
Does Ukraine
have a
neo-Nazi
problem?
My understanding
is there are
Nazis in
Ukraine.
And there
are supporters
white supremacy
theories.
But also
my understanding
is that
they are
extremely
marginal
and they
are more
marginal
than the
same sort
of groups
are in
Central Europe,
maybe in the
U.S.
as well.
And for
me,
the question
is not
whether
Ukraine has
it,
but why
even in the
conditions of
the war,
the radical
nationalism
and
extremism
and white
supremacist
is such a
marginal force.
When in the
countries that
are not at
the war,
you look at
France,
you look at
again,
it's not
exactly
Nazis,
but really
right,
radical right
is becoming
so important.
Why Ukraine
in the
conditions of
the war
is the
country that
manages
relations
between
different
ethnic
groups and
languages
in the
way that
strengthens
political
nation.
So for
me as a
scholar and
a researcher,
what I
see is
that in
Ukraine,
the influence
of the
far right
in different
variations
is much
lower than
it is
among some
of Ukraine's
neighbors and
in Europe
in general.
And the
question is
why.
I don't
know.
I have
guesses.
I don't
know answer,
but that's
the question
that I
think is
interesting to
answer.
How
Ukraine
ended up
to be
the only
country in
the world
outside of
Israel who
has a
Jewish
president who
is,
my at least
understanding,
is the
most popular
president in
history in
terms of how
long his
popularity goes
after the
election.
So this
are really,
from my
point of
view,
interesting
questions.
And again,
we can certainly
debate that.
So just
for context,
the most
popular
far-right
party won
2.15% of
the vote in
2019.
This is before
the war.
So that's
where things
stood.
It's unclear
where they
stand now.
It'd be an
interesting
question whether
it escalated
and how
much.
What you're
saying is
that war in
general can
serve as a
catalyst for
expansion of
extremist
groups,
of extremist
nationalistic
groups,
especially,
like the
far-right.
And it's
interesting to
see to
what degree
they have or
have not
risen to
power in
the shadows.
So no
nationalist or
nationalistic
party actually
crossed the
barrier to
get into the
parliament.
So Ukraine is
the country
where there
is no
right or
far-right in
the parliament.
We can't say
that about
Germany, we
can't say
that about
France, so
that's just
one more
way to
stress this
unique place
of Ukraine
in that
sense.
And the
year 2018
is the
year already
of the
war.
The war
started in
2014 with
the annexation
of the
Crimea.
The front
line was
near Donbass.
All these
groups were
fighting there.
So Ukraine,
maybe not to
a degree that
it is now,
was already
on the war
footing, and
yet the
right party
couldn't get
more than
2%.
So that's
the question
that I have
in mind.
And yes,
the war
historically,
of course,
puts forward
and makes
from the
more nationalist
views and
forces, turn
them from
marginal forces
into more
central ones.
We talked
about Bandera,
and we talked
about Organization
of Ukrainian
Nationalists.
They were
the most
marginal group
in the
political
spectrum in
Ukraine in
the 1930s
that one
can only
imagine.
But World
War II
comes, and
they become
the most
central group
because they
also were
from the
start ago,
they knew
that they
had their
organization,
the violence
was basically
one of their
means, they
knew how
to fight.
So historically,
historically,
wars indeed
produced those
results.
So we are
looking at
Ukraine, we
are trying to
see what is
happening there.
So, Vladimir
Putin, in
his interview
with Taka
Carlson, but
many times
before, said
that the
current goal
for the
war in
Ukraine is
denazification,
that the
purpose of
the war is
denazification.
Can you
explain this
concept of
denazification as
Putin sees
it?
Denazification
is the
trope that
is accepted
quite well by
the former
Soviet population
and Russian
population in
particular.
The most
powerful
mythology,
Soviet
mythology,
that then
was basically
passed as
part of
heritage to
the Russian
Federation was
World War II,
was fighting
against fascism.
So once you
use terms
fascism and
Nazi and
denazification,
suddenly people
not just start
listening, they
just stop
analyzing.
And as a
propaganda tool,
this is of
course a very
powerful tool.
In terms of
to what degree
this is the
real goal or
not, we
discussed the
importance of
the far right
in Europe
and in
Ukraine.
So if that's
the real goal
of the war,
probably the
war would have
to start not
against Ukraine,
but probably
against France
or some other
country, if you
take this at
face value.
Well, there's
something really
interesting here,
as you mentioned,
because I've
spoken to a lot
of people in
Russia, and
you said
analysis stops.
In the West,
people look at
the word
denazification and
look at the
things we've just
discussed and
kind of almost
think this is
absurd.
But when you
talk to people
in Russia, maybe
it's deep in
there somewhere.
The history of
World War II
still reverberates
through maybe
the fears,
maybe the
pride, whatever
the deep
emotional history
is there.
It seems that
the goal of
denazification
appears to be
reasonable for
people in
Russia.
They don't
seem to see
the absurdity
or the
complexity or
even the
need for
analysis, I
guess, in
this kind of
statement, word
denazification.
I would say
this is
broader.
This is
broader.
The war that
started under
the banner
that Russians
and Ukrainians
were one and
the same
people and
produces that
sort of
casualty really
goes against
also any
sort of
logical thinking.
But Russia
is a place
where the
free press
doesn't
exist already
for a
long period
of time.
Russia is
the place
where there
is an
echo chamber
to a
degree.
And as
war started
first in
2014 and
then all
out war
in
2022,
I came
across a
lot of
people on
the personal
level but
also in the
media reporting
that they
really can't
find common
language with
their close
relatives in
Russia.
People who
visited Ukraine
who know
that it is
not taken
over by
nationalists
and is not
taken over
by Nazis.
But the
media around
them, the
neighbors around
them, the
people at
their work
basically say
one and the
same thing.
And we as
humans in
general,
whatever our
background,
we are very,
very, our
mind is
really, it's
relatively easy
to manipulate
it.
And to
a degree
that even
family
connections and
even family
ties don't
sometimes help
to maintain
that ability
to think
and to
analyze on
your own,
to look at
the facts.
So Putin
has alluded
to the
Yaroslav
Hanka
incident in
the Canadian
Parliament
September
2023.
this man
is a
veteran of
World War
II on
the Ukrainian
side and
he got two
standing
ovations in
the Canadian
Parliament.
But they
later found
out that he
was part of
the SS.
So can you
explain on
this?
What are your
thoughts on
this?
This had a
very big
effect on
the narrative,
I guess,
propagated
throughout the
region.
Yes.
What happened
during World
War II was
that once
the Germans
started to
run out
of manpower,
they created
sort of
foreign
legion
groups.
But because
those people
were not
Aryans,
they were
created for
fighting on
the battle
ground.
Because they
were not
Aryans,
they couldn't
be trusted.
So they
were put
under the
command of
Henry Himmler,
under command
of SS,
and became
known as
SS Waffen
units.
And one
of such
units was
created in
Ukraine,
with great
difficulties
because Nazis
didn't consider
Slavs to be
generally worthy
of even that
sort of
foreign legion
formations.
But they
made an
exception because
those people
were coming
from Galicia,
which was
part of
Austria-Hungary,
which means
part of
Austria,
which means
somehow were
open to the
benevolent influence
of the
Germanic race,
and called
the division
Galitsyn,
or Galicia.
part of
Ukrainian youth
joined the
division.
One of the
explanations was
that they were
looking at the
experience of
World War I,
and seeing
that the
units, the
Ukrainian units
in the
Austrian army
then played a
very important
role in the
fight for
independence.
So that is
one of the
explanations.
You can't
just use
one explanation
to describe
motivations of
everyone and
every single
person who was
joining there.
So they were
sent to the
front.
They were
defeated within
a few short
days by the
Red Army,
and then were
retreating
through
Slovakia,
where they
were used
to fight
with the
partisan
movement
there,
and eventually
surrendered to
the British.
So that's
the story.
You can
personally
maybe understand
what the
good motivations
were of this
person or that
person,
but that is
one of the
best, one of
the very tragic
and unfortunate
pages in
Ukrainian history.
you can't
justify that
as a
phenomenon.
So from
that point
of view,
the celebration
of that
experience,
as opposed to
looking at
that, okay,
that happened
and we
wish that
those young
men who
were idealistic
or joined
the division
for idealistic
purposes had
better understanding
of things or
made other
choices, but
you can't
certainly
celebrate it.
And once that
happened, that
of course became
a big propaganda
item in the
current war.
We are
talking about
10,000 to
20,000 people
in the division
and we are
talking about
2 to 3
million Ukrainians
fighting in the
Red Army.
And again,
it's not like
Red Army is
completely
blameless in
the way how
it behaved in
Prussia or in
Germany and so
on and so
forth.
But it's
basically,
again, we are
going back to
the story of
Bandera.
So there is a
period of
collaboration and
that's what
propaganda tries
to define him
by.
Or there is a
division,
Galitsyn, by
20,000 people
and somehow it
makes irrelevant
the experience of
2 to 3
million people.
I mean, just
to clarify, I
think there is
just a blunder
on the Canadian
Parliament side,
the Canadian
side of not
doing research.
Maybe correct me
if I'm wrong,
but from my
understanding,
they were just
doing stupid,
shallow political
stuff.
Let's applaud.
When Zelensky
shows up, let's
have a Ukrainian
veteran, let's
applaud a veteran
of World War II,
and then all of a
sudden you realize,
well, there's
actually complexities
to wars.
We can talk
about, for
example, a lot
of dark aspects
on all sides
of World War II,
the mass rape
at the end
of World War II
by the Red
Army, when they
say Marshall
was German.
There's a lot
of really dark
complexity on
all sides.
So, you know,
that could be an
opportunity to
explore the dark
complexity that
some of the
Ukrainians were
in the SS or
Bandera, the
complexities there,
but I think
they were doing
not a complex
thing.
They were doing
a very shallow
applaud, and
we should
applaud
veterans, of
course, but
in that case
they were doing
it for show
for Zelensky
and so on.
So we should
clarify that
the applause
wasn't knowing,
it wasn't for
the SS, it
was for a
Ukrainian, it
was for World
War II
veterans, but
the propaganda
or at least
an interpretation
from the
Russian side,
from whatever
side, is that
they were
applauding the
full person
standing before
them, which
wasn't just a
Ukrainian veteran,
but a Ukrainian
veteran that
fought for the
SS.
I don't have
any particular
insights, but I
would be very
much surprised if
even one person
in the
parliament, I
mean the
members of the
parliament, actually
knew the whole
story.
I would be very
surprised.
Yeah, the
whole story of
this person, and
frankly the whole
story of Ukraine
and Russia in
World War II,
period.
Yes, yes.
Nevertheless, it
had a lot of
power and really
reverberated in
support of the
narrative that
there is a
neo-Nazi, a
Nazi problem in
Ukraine.
This is the
narrative that is
out there, and
it's especially
powerful in
Russia.
It's especially
powerful in
Russia given
that there
are really
the atmosphere
that is created
really is not
conducive to any
independent analysis.
Well, I wonder
what is the most
effective way to
respond to that
particular claim.
Because there
could be a
discussion about
nationalism and
extreme nationalism
and the fight for
independence and
whether it is,
like Putin wrote,
one people, but
the question of
are there Nazis in
Ukraine seems to
be a question that
could be analyzed
rigorously with
data.
That is being
done on the
academic level.
But in terms of
the public response
and public
discourse, the
only response that
I see is not
to focus on the
questions raised
and put by the
propaganda because
you already become
victim of that
propaganda by
definition.
But talk about
that much
broadly and
talk about
different aspects
of, if it is
World War II,
about different
aspects of
World War II.
If it's about
issue of the
far right in
Ukraine, let's
talk about
US, let's talk
about Russia,
let's talk about
France, let's
compare.
That's the
only way how
you deal with
propaganda because
propaganda is not
necessarily something
that is an
outright lie.
It can be just
one factor that's
taken out of the
context and is
blown out of
proportion.
And that is good
enough.
And the way to
defend against that
is to bring in
the context.
context, let us
move gracefully
throughout, back
and forth through
history, back to
Bandera.
You wrote a book
on the KGB
spy, Bogdan
Stashinsky.
Can you tell his
story?
This is a story of
the history of the
organization of
Ukrainian
nationalists and
Bandera as well,
already after the
end of the
Second World War.
because what you
got after the
Second World War,
so imagine May of
1945, the red
banner is all over
Riksdag, the red
army is in control
of half of Europe,
but the units of the
red army are still
fighting the war,
and not just behind
the Soviet lines,
but within the
borders of the
Soviet Union.
And this war
continues all the
way into the
early 1950s,
almost up to
Stalin's death.
The war is
conducted by the
Organization of
Ukrainian
Nationalists,
which have a
Ukrainian insurgent
army, and the
government tries to
crush that
resistance.
So what it
does is basically
recruits local
people to
spy on the
partisans, on
the underground,
and Bohdan
Stashinsky is
one of those
people.
His family is
supporting the
resistance, they
provide food, his
sister is engaged
with one of the
local commanders
of this underground
unit, and
they know
everything about
Stashinsky's family,
and they know
everything about
him, because he
is also collecting
funds for the
underground.
So they have a
conversation with
him, saying
that, okay, that's
what we got, and
you and your
family can go to
prison, or you
help us a little
bit.
We are
interested in the
fiance of your
sister, and we
want to get him.
And Stashinsky says
yes.
And once they
round up the
fiance, he
basically betrayed a
member, or almost
member of his
family, he is
done.
He can't go back
to his village, he
can't go back to
his study.
He was studying in
Lviv at that
time.
So he becomes, as I
write in my book,
the secret police
becomes his
family.
And he is sent
to Kiev, he is
trained for two
years, sent to
East Germany, into
Berlin, and
becomes an
assassin.
So they sent
him across the
border to
Western Germany,
to Munich, which
was the
headquarter of
different
organizations,
anti-Soviet
organizations,
Ukrainian and
Russian, and
Georgia, and so
on and so
forth.
And he
kills two
leaders of
the organization
of Ukrainian
nationalists, one
editor of the
newspaper, and
eventually he
kills Bandera.
He does that
with the new
weapon, a
spray pistol, that
eventually makes
it into the
Bond novel,
The Man with
the Golden
Gun.
And that
whole episode
is a little
bit reshaped,
but it is not
in the film,
but it is in
the novel
itself.
And then
later has a
change of
mind, under
the influence
of his
German
fiancée and
then wife,
they decide
to escape
to the
West.
And while
they're doing
that, they
discover that
their apartment
was bugged
and probably
the KGB
knows all
of that.
So, a
long story
short, his
son dies
in Berlin.
The KGB
doesn't allow
him to go
there, but
his wife has
a nervous
breakdown, so
they allow
him to go
there to
just calm
her so
that there
would be
no scandal.
And two
of them,
one day
before their
son's
burial,
because
after that
they would
be sent
to Moscow.
They jump
the ship
and go
to West
Berlin two
hours before
the Berlin
wall was
being built.
So, if
they would
stay for
the funeral,
probably the
KGB would
not let
them go.
But also,
if they
would stay,
the border
would be
there.
And he
goes to
the American
intelligence
and says,
okay,
that's who
I am and
that's what
I did.
And they
look at
him and
they say,
I don't
trust you.
We don't
know who
you are.
You have
documents and
five names.
You say
you killed
Bandera.
Well, we
have a
different
information.
He was
poisoned
and probably
by someone
in his
close
circle.
A
spray
pistol?
did you
reach
too much
Ian
Fleming?
Where does
this come
from?
He insists.
They say,
okay, you
insist.
If you
committed all
those crimes,
we're giving you
to the German
police and
German police
will be
investigating you.
And then the
trial
comes and
if he
says, if
he takes
back his
testimony,
the whole
case against
him collapses.
He can go
free.
But he
knows that if
he goes
free, he
is a
target of
his
colleagues
from the
same
department.
So his
task at
the trial
is to
prove that
he is
guilty,
that he
did that.
And then
he disappears
and nobody
knows where
he goes and
there are all
sorts of
cover stories
and I
was lucky
to interview
a commander
for former
chief of
the South
African police
who confirmed
to me that
Stashinsky
was in
South Africa.
The West
German
intelligence
thought that
it was too
dangerous for
him to stay
in Germany.
They sent
him under
a different
name to
South
Africa.
So that's
the story
of Stashinsky
himself,
but going
back to
Bandera,
of course,
the fact
that he
confessed and
it became
known that
KGB
assassinated
Bandera,
that added
to the
image and
to general
mythology
about Bandera.
What a
fascinating story
of a village
boy becoming
an assassin
who killed
one of the
most influential
revolutionaries
of the region
in the
20th century.
So what,
just zooming
out broadly
on the
KGB,
how powerful
was the
KGB?
What role
did it play
in this
whole story
of the
Soviet Union?
It depends
on the
period.
At the
time that
we just
described,
late 50s
and early
60s,
they were
not powerful
at all.
And the
reasons for
that was
that people
like Khrushchev
were really
concerned about
the secret
police becoming
too powerful.
It became
too powerful
in their
mind under
Stalin and
Beria.
And it
was concern
about Beria's
power as
a secret
police chief
that led
to the
coup against
Beria.
And Khrushchev
came into
power and
Beria was
arrested and
executed.
And what
Khrushchev was
trying to do
after that
was trying
to put,
since 54,
the name
was already
KGB,
KGB under
his control.
So he
was appointing
the former
Komsomol
leaders as
the heads
of the KGB,
so the
people who
really
owned
everything to
him,
that sort
of position.
And the
heads of
the KGB
were not
members of
Politburo.
It changed
in the
70s with
Andropov,
where KGB
started to
play again
a very
important role
in the
Soviet
history.
And let's
say decisions
on Afghanistan
and the
Soviet troops
marching into
Afghanistan
were made
by the,
apart from
Brezhnev,
by the trio
of the
people who
would be
called today
Sileviki,
maybe,
or not all
of them
were Sileviki,
but one,
of course,
was Andropov,
the head of
the KGB,
another was
the Minister
of Defense,
and then
there was
Secretary
in charge
of the
Military
Industrial
Complex,
the Minister
of Foreign
Affairs.
But the
head of
the KGB
became
really not
just the
member of
Politburo,
but the
member of
that inner
circle.
And then
the fact
that Andropov
succeeds
Brezhnev
is also
a manifestation
of the
power that
KGB
acquired
really after
Khrushchev
in the
1970s
and then
going into
the 1980s.
Who was
more powerful,
the KGB
or the
CIA during
the Soviet
Union?
The CIA,
it's the
organization
that is
charged with
the information
gathering and
all sorts of
operations,
including
assassinations
in the
50s and
60s abroad.
The KGB
was the
organization
that really
had both
the surveillance
surveillance
over the
population
within the
Soviet Union
and also
the operations
abroad.
And its
leaders
were members
of the
inner circle
for making
decisions.
from what I
understand about
the way
how politics
work and
decisions are
made in the
United States,
the CIA,
the chief of
the CIA is
not one of
the decision
making group
providing
information.
So I would
say it's
not day and
night, but
their power,
political influence,
political significance,
very different.
Is it
understood how
big the
KGB was?
How widespread
it was, given
its secretive and
distributed nature?
Certain things we
know, others we
don't, because
the Stasi
archives are
open and
most of the
KGB, especially
in Moscow,
they're not.
But we know
that the
KGB combined
not only
the internal
sort of
secret police
functions at
home and
counter
intelligence
branch and
intelligence
branch abroad,
but also the
border troops,
for example.
So really
institutionally,
it was a
huge, huge
mammoth.
And another
thing that we
know, we can
sort of extrapolate
from what we
know from the
Stasi archives,
that the
surveillance at
home, the
surveillance was
really massive.
The guess is
the Soviets
were not as
effective and
as meticulous
and as
scrupulous and
as methodical as
probably as
Germans were,
but that gives
you a basic
idea of how
penetrated the
entire society
was.
What do you
think is
important to
understand about
the KGB if
we want to
also understand
Vladimir Putin,
since he was a
KGB foreign
intelligence
officer for
16 years?
From my
research,
including on
the Stashinsky,
what I
understand is
that in
KGB, and
it was a
powerful
organization,
again, less
powerful in
the 50s and
60s, but
still a very
powerful
organization,
there was,
on the one
hand, the
understanding of
the situation
in the country
and abroad
that probably
other organizations
didn't have.
They had also
first peak in
terms of the
selecting cadres,
the work in the
KGB was well
paid and
considered to be
very prestigious,
so that was
part to a degree
of the Soviet
elite in terms of
whom they
recruited, and
they had a
resentment
toward the
party leadership
that didn't
allow them to
do James
Bond kind of
things that
they would want
to do because
there were
political risks.
After this
scandal with
Stashinsky,
at least on
many levels,
the KGB
stopped the
practice of
the assassinations,
political
assassinations
abroad because
it was considered
politically to
be extremely
dangerous.
The person
who was in
charge of
the KGB
at the
time of
Bandera
assassination,
Shalepin was
one of the
candidates to
replace
Khrushchev,
and Brezhnev
used against
him that
scandal abroad
eventually to
remove him
from Politburo.
So the KGB
was really
looking at
the party
leadership as
to a degree
ineffective,
corrupt,
and who was
on their
way.
And from
what I
understand,
that's exactly
the attitudes
that people
like Putin
and people
of his
circle
brought to
power in
Kremlin.
So the
methods that
KGB
used,
they can
use now,
and there
is no
party or
no other
institution
actually stopping
them from
doing that.
and they
think about
my understanding
the operations
abroad,
about foreign
policy in
general in
terms of the
KGB mindset
of planning
operations and
executing particular
operations and
so on and so
forth.
So I think
a lot of
culture that
came into
existence in
the Soviet
KGB now
became part of
the culture
of the
Russian
establishment.
You wrote
the book
The Russo-Ukrainian
War,
The Return
of History,
that gives
the full
context
leading up
to the
invasion
of Ukraine
by Russia
in February
2022.
So can
you take
me through
the key
moments in
history that
led up to
this war?
So we
mentioned
the collapse
of the
Soviet Union.
We could
probably go
much farther
back, but
the collapse
of the
Soviet Union
mentioned
2014.
Maybe you
can highlight
key moments
that led
up to
2022.
The key
moments would
be first
the year
204,
known for
Orange
Revolution
in Ukraine,
and then
the year
2013,
known as
the Revolution
of Dignity.
Both
were the
revolts
against
something
that by
significant
part of
Ukrainian
population
was
considered
to be
completely,
completely
unacceptable
actions on
the part
of the
government
and people
in the
government
at that
time.
So the
Orange
Revolution
election of
204 was
a protest
against
falsified
presidential
elections
and
rejection
of a
candidate
that was
supported
by Russia,
publicly
supported by
Russia.
I remember
being in
Moscow at
that time
and couldn't
believe my
eyes when
in the
center of
Russia I
saw a
billboard
with
Yanukovych.
the trick
was that
there were
a lot of
Ukrainians
in Russia
and in
Moscow in
particular
and they
had the
right to
vote.
And it
led to
the election
of
Ukrainian
president
Viktor
Yushenko
who put
on the
agenda
the issue
of Ukraine's
membership
in NATO.
So it
was very
clear pro-Western
orientation.
And the
second case
was the
Revolution of
Dignity
2013
with some
of the
same
characters
including
Yanukovych
who at
that time
was already
president
of Ukraine.
And there
the question
was of
the
government
promising
the people
for
one year
at least
to sign
association
agreement
with
European
Union.
and then
turning
over
almost
overnight
and saying
that they
were not
going to
do that.
And that's
how things
started.
But then
when they
became really
massive
and why
something that
was called
Euro-Revolution
became
Revolution of
Dignity
was when
the government
police
beat up
students
in downtown
Kiev
who
judging
by the
reports
were basically
already
almost ready
to disperse,
almost ready
to go
home.
And that's
when
roughly half
of Kiev
showed up
on the
streets.
That
sort of
the police
behavior,
that sort
of the
was absolutely
unacceptable in
Ukraine.
The
still in
elections and
falsification of
elections was
unacceptable.
That's where
around that
time and
around 204,
the president
of Ukraine
at that
time,
Lenit
Kuchma,
writes a
book called
Ukraine is
not Russia.
And
apparently
the term
comes from
his
discussion
with
Putin
when
Putin
was
suggesting
to him
quite
strongly
to use
force
against
people
on the
Maidan
on the
square
in Kiev.
And
Kuchma
allegedly
said to
him,
you don't
understand,
Ukraine is
not Russia.
You can't
do things
like that.
You get
pushed back.
And
these two
events,
204 and
then 2013,
became a
really crucial
point in
terms of
the Ukraine
direction,
the survival
of Ukrainian
democracy,
which is
one of
very few
countries in
the post-Soviet
space where
democracy
survived the
original
flirt between
the leaders
and democracy
of the
1990s.
It was
the old
Soviet story
in Russia,
everywhere else,
there was
high
democratic
expectations,
but they
came pretty
much to an
end by the
end of the
decade.
Ukraine
preserved the
democracy.
And the
orientation of
Ukraine toward
integration in
some form
into Western
and European
structures,
that Ukrainian
democracy plus
Western
orientation was
something.
And in
Russia, we see
the strengthening
of the autocratic
regime under
Vladimir Putin.
That, if you
look deeper,
these are the
processes that put
the two countries
on the collision
course.
So there's a
division, a
push and pull
inside Ukraine
on identity
of whether
they're part of
Russia or
part of
Europe.
And you
highlighted two
moments in
Ukrainian history
that there's a
big flare-up
where the
statement was
first, Ukraine
is not Russia,
and essentially
Ukraine is part
of Europe.
But there's
other moments.
What were the
defining moments
that began an
actual war?
The war
started in
February of
2014 with
the Russian
takeover of
Crimea by
military force,
the so-called
Green Man.
And the
big question
is why?
And it's
very important
to go back
to the year
2013, and
the start
of the
protests, and
the story of
the Ukraine
signing
association
agreement with
the European
Union.
So from
what we
understand
today, the
Ukrainian
government
under
President
Yanukovych
did this
suicidal,
sharp turn
after one
year of
promising
association
agreement
saying that
okay, we
changed our
mind under
pressure from
Moscow.
and Moscow
applied that
pressure for
one reason,
at least in
my opinion.
The Ukraine
signing
association
agreement with
the European
Union would
mean that
Ukraine would
not be able
to sign
association
agreement with
any Eurasian
Union in
any shape or
form that
was at that
time in the
process of
making.
And for
Vladimir
Putin, that
was the
beginning of
his third
term.
One of
his agenda
items for
the third
term was
really a
consolidation
of the
post-Soviet
space and
Eurasian
space.
And not
membership in
NATO, not
membership in
European Union.
But association
agreement with
European Union
meant that
that post-Soviet
space,
would have to
exist under
Moscow's
control, but
without
Ukraine, the
second largest
post-Soviet
republic.
The republic
on whose
vote depended
the continuing
existence of the
Soviet Union and
whose vote
ended in many
ways the
existence of the
Soviet Union.
So that is
broadly
background, but
also there
are of course
personalities,
there are also
their beliefs,
their readings of
history, and
all of that
became part
of the story.
But if you
look at that
geopolitically,
the association
agreement is
putting Ukraine
outside of the
Russian sphere of
influence,
and the
response was
an attempt
to topple
the government
in Kiev that
clearly was
going to
sign that
agreement,
to take
over Crimea
and to
help to deal
with a lot
of issues
within Russia
itself and
boost the
popularity of
the president
and it
certainly
worked in
that way
as well.
And once
Ukraine,
still after
Crimea,
continued on
its path,
then the
next step
started the
so-called
hybrid warfare
in Donbass.
But again,
unlike
Crimea,
from what I
understand,
Russia was
not really
looking forward
to taking
possession of
Donbass.
Donbass was
viewed as
the way
to influence
Ukraine,
to stop
it from
drift toward
the West.
Maybe you
can tell me
about the
region of
Donbass.
I mentioned
that nationalism
and principle
of nationalism
is the
principle of
making the
political
borders to
coincide with
ethnic and
cultural
borders.
And that's
how the
maps of
many East
European countries
had been
drawn in the
19th and
20th
century.
On that
principle,
Donbass,
where the
majority
constituted by
the beginning
of the
20th century
were Ukrainians,
was considered
to be
Ukrainian,
and was
claimed in
the middle
of this
revolution and
revolutionary wars
and civil wars
by Ukrainian
government.
Donbass became
one of the
key sites in
the Russian
empire of
early industrialization
with its mining
industry,
with its
mythological
industry.
So what that
meant was that
people from
other parts of
not Ukraine,
but other parts of
the Russian
empire congregated
there.
That's where
jobs were.
That's how
Khrushchev and
his family
came to
Donbass.
The family
of Brezhnev
overshoot a
little bit.
They got to
the industrial
enterprises in
the city of
Kamensk near
Dnipro, the
city that was
called Dnipropetrovsk.
So those were
Russian peasants
moving into the
area in
looking for
the job.
And the
population
became quite
mixed.
Ukrainians
still constituted
the majority
of the
population,
but not
necessarily in
the towns
and in the
cities.
And culturally,
the place was
becoming more
and more Russian
as the result
of that
moment.
So apart
from the
Crimea,
Donbass was
the part of
Ukraine where
the ethnic
Russians were
the biggest
group.
They were not
the majority,
but they were
a very, very
big and
significant
group.
For example,
in the city
of Mariupol
that was
all but
destroyed in
the course
of the last
two years,
the ethnic
Russians
constituted
over 40%
of the
population.
So that's
not exactly
part of
Donbass,
but that
gives you
general idea.
Now,
the story of
Donbass and
what happened
now is
multidimensional,
and this
ethnic
composition
is just
one part
of the
story.
Another
very important
part of
the story
is
economy.
And
Donbass is
a classical
rust belt.
And we
know what
happens with
the cities
that were
part of the
first or
second wave
of industrialization
in the United
States.
And globally,
we know about
social problems
that exist in
those places.
So Donbass is
probably the
most dramatic
and tragic
case of
implosion of
the rust
belt,
with the
mines not
anymore
producing
the sort
of the
and at
the
acceptable
price,
the coal
that they
used to
produce,
with people
losing jobs,
with the
politicians
looking for
subsidies as
opposed to
trying very
unpopular
measures of
dealing
something and
bringing new
money and
new investment
into the
region.
So all of
that become
part of
the story
that made
it easy
for Russia,
for the
Russian
Federation,
to destabilize
the situation.
We have
interviews with
Mr. Gierkin,
who is saying
that he was
the first who
pulled the
trigger and
fired the
shot in
that war.
he became
the minister
of defense
in the
Donetsk
People's
Republic.
You look
at the
prime
minister,
he is
another
person with
Moscow
residency
permit.
So you
see key
figures in
those positions
at the
start and
the beginning,
not being
Russians from
Ukraine,
but being
Russians from
Russia and
Russians from
Moscow closely
connected to
the government
structure and
intelligence
structure and
so on.
So that is
the start and
the beginning,
but the
way how it
exploded,
the way it
did, was
also a
combination of
the economic
and
ethnocultural
and linguistic
factors.
So for
Putin, the
war in
Donbass and
even in
2022 is a
defensive war
against what
the Ukrainian
government is
doing against
ethnically Russian
people of
Donbass.
Is that fair
to say,
how he
describes it?
what we
see, this
is certainly
the argument,
right?
This is
certainly the
argument and
a pretext
because what
we see
there is
that there
would be
no, and
there was
no independent
mobilization in
Crimea either,
in Crimea or
in Donbass,
without Russian
presence,
without Russian
occupation
de facto of
the Crimea,
there would
be no,
and there
was no
before,
at least in
the previous
five to six
years, any
mass mobilizations
of Russians.
There was
none of
such mobilizations
in Donbass
before Gherkin
and other
people with
military,
with parts
of military
units showed
up there.
So it is
an excuse.
because you've
been to
Ukraine,
you know
that Russian
language is
not persecuted
in Ukraine,
and if you've
not been to
Donbass,
or to the
Crimea,
it would be
difficult to
find one
single Ukrainian
school.
Not that they
didn't exist at
all, but it
would take quite
an effort for
you to find it,
or sometimes
even to hear
Ukrainian language
outside either
of the
institutions
or the
farmer's
market.
So that's
the reality.
That's the
reality that is
clear, that is
visible.
So imagine
under those
conditions and
contexts that
someone is
persecuting
ethnic Russians
or Russian
speakers want
to believe in
something like
that.
one important
precondition is
never to
step your
foot in
Ukraine.
I should
mention,
maybe this is a
good moment to
mention, when I
traveled to
Ukraine, this
is after the
start of the
war, I
mentioned
farmer's market,
which is funny.
Basically, every
single person I
talked to,
including the
leadership, we
spoke in
Russian.
For many of
them, Russian is
the more
comfortable language
even.
And the
people who
spoke Ukrainian
are more on
the western
side of
Ukraine.
And, you
know, young
people that
are kind of
willing to
show that
in an
activist way
that they
want to
fight for
the independence
of their
country.
So I
take your
point.
I wonder if
you want to
comment about
language and
maybe about
the future of
language in
Ukraine.
is the
future of
language going
to stabilize
on Ukrainian
or is it
going to
return to
its
traditional
base of
Russian
language?
very roughly
before the
start of the
war in
2014, we
can talk
about parity
between
Russian and
Ukrainian and
also with, as
you said,
clearly Ukraine
being a
dominant language
in the
West and
Russian being
a dominant
language on
the streets
certainly in
the east of
the country.
And then
in between
of that,
to pause
a number
of these
transitional
areas.
And Ukraine
in my
experience,
and I
visited a lot
of countries,
not all of
them and
probably maybe
I will be
still surprised,
but in my
experience,
this is the
only truly
bilingual country
that I ever
visited.
I lived in
Canada for a
long period
of time.
There is
Quebec and
the rest.
And in
Ukraine, you
can talk in
either Russian
or Ukrainian
in any part
of the country
and you would
be understood
and you would
be responded
in a different
language with
the expectation
that you would
understand.
And if you
don't understand,
that means you
don't come from
Ukraine.
That's the
reality.
The war and
loss of the
Crimea and
partial loss
of Donbass
if it's
major industrial
areas really
shifted the
balance toward
mostly Ukrainian
speaking
regions.
And
also
what you
see and
you clearly
pointed to
that starting
with 2014,
even a little
bit earlier.
The younger
generation
chooses Ukrainian
as a marker
of its identity.
And that
started in
2014, but
we have a
dramatic,
dramatic shift
after 2022.
And on the
anecdotal level,
I can tell you
that I
speak to
people who
be in
Chernihiv at
the time,
this is
east of
Crimea,
at the time
of the
Russian aggression
and bombardment
and so on
and so forth,
who had
passive knowledge
of Ukrainian
but spoke
all their life
Russian.
And they
would speak
Ukrainian to
me, and
when I say,
okay, why
are you doing
that?
We know
each other
for decades
and you
used Russian.
And he
said, well,
I don't
want to
have anything
in common
with people
who did
that to
us.
So there
is a
big, big
push, of
course, with
this current
war.
Now the
question is
whether this
change is
something that
will stay
or not,
what is
the future?
Linguistic
practices are
very, very
conservative
ones.
And we
at the
Harvard
Ukrainian
Research
Institute
have a
project
called
Mapa
Digital
Atlas
of
Ukraine
and we
were
documenting
and mapping
different
data in
time.
And what
we noticed
a spike
in the
people's
self-reporting
of use
of Ukrainian
in 2014
and 2015
at the
time of
the start
of the
war when
the threat
was the
most clear
one.
This is
self-reporting.
That doesn't
mean that
people exactly
do what
they believe
that they
are
supposed to
do.
And then
return back
to where
it was
by the
year 2016
and 2017.
So this
dynamic
can repeat
itself.
But given
how long
the war
is going
on,
how big
the impact
is,
how big
the stress
is,
and that
the wave
of the
future
is probably
associated
with younger
people who
are switching
to Ukrainian.
So I
would,
my bet
would be
on Ukrainian
language rising
in prominence.
So as we
get closer
to February
of 2022,
there's a
few other
key moments.
Maybe let's
talk about
in July
2021,
Putin
publishing
an essay
titled
On the
Historical
Unity of
Russians
and Ukrainians.
Can you
describe
the ideas
expressed
in this
essay?
The idea
is very
conveniently
presented
already in
the first
paragraph,
in the
first
sentences
really of
the article
where
Putin says
that for
a long
time I
was saying
that Russians
and Ukrainians
were one
and the
same people
and here
is the
proof.
This is
the historical,
he develops
his historical
argumentation
apparently with
the help
of a lot
of people
around him.
And he
started to
talk about
Russians and
Ukrainians being
one and the
same people
one year
before the
start of
the war
in 2014.
So in
2013,
he was
together with
patriarch
Kirill on
visit to
Kiev,
and there
was a
conference
specifically
organized for
him in
the
Kievan
monastery,
and that's
where he
stated that.
The fact
that he
was with
patriarch
Kirill is
a very
important
factor for
understanding
where the
idea is
coming from.
This is
the idea
that was
dominant in
the Russian
empire of
the 19th
and the
beginning of
the 20th
century,
that Russians,
Ukrainians,
and Belarusians
are really
great Russians,
little Russians,
and white
Russians,
and that
they constitute
one people.
Yes,
there are
some
dialectical
differences.
Yes,
Ukrainians
sing well.
Yes,
they dance
funny.
But overall,
that doesn't
matter.
was really
destroyed,
mostly destroyed
by the
revolution of
1917.
Because it
wasn't just
social revolution,
that's how it
is understood
in the U.S.,
in good part of
the world,
it was also
national revolution,
it was an
empire,
it was a
revolution in
the Russian
empire.
And to
bring these
pieces of
empire back
within the
Soviet Union,
the Bolsheviks
had to make
concessions.
And one of
those concessions
was to
recognition of
the existence
of Ukrainians
as a separate
nation,
Belarusians as
a separate
nation,
Russians as
a separate
nation,
endowing them
with their
own
territorial,
with borders,
with institutions,
and so on
and so forth.
But there
was one
institution that
was not
reformed.
That institution
was called the
Russian Orthodox
Church.
Because one of
the ways that
Bolsheviks dealt
with it, they
couldn't eradicate
religion completely,
but they
arrested the
development of
the religion
and thinking
and theology
on the
level as
it existed
before the
revolution of
1917.
So the
Russian Orthodox
Church of
1917
continued to
be the
Russian Orthodox
Church in
1991,
and in
2013,
continuing
the same
imperial mantra
of the
existence of
one big
Russian nation,
one unified
people.
And when
you see
the formation
of the
ideas about
nations,
foreign policy
in the
Russian Empire
after 1991,
they're going
back to the
pre-Bolshevik
times.
Ukrainians do
that as well,
Estonians do
that as well.
The difference
is that when
Ukrainians go
back, they go
back to the
pre-1917,
their intellectual
fathers and
writings of
basically liberal
nationalism.
nationalism, or
sometimes they
go to the
radical nationalism
of Bandera,
which would be
not pre-1917,
but pre-1945.
When the
Russians go to
pre-Bolshevik
past, looking
for the ideas,
looking for
inspiration,
looking for the
narratives, what
they find there is
empire.
What they find
there are
imperial projects.
And that's
certainly the
story of
Putin's
claim, that's
the story of
the argument.
And to
conclude, the
argument that he
lays out there,
historical argument,
comes also almost
directly from the
narratives of the
late 19th and the
beginning of the
20th century.
So it's not only
the argument is
coming from that
era, but also
the argumentation
is coming from
that era as
well.
But those
arguments are
all in the
flavor of
empire.
It's empire on
the one hand,
but also there is
imperial understanding
of what Russian
nation is.
That doesn't
allow for
independence of
its little
Russian and
white Russian
branches, alleged
branches, right?
So what you
see with the
concept of the
big Russian
nation, that's
late 19th,
beginning 20th
century, empire
sees the writing
on the wall.
That nationalism
is on the
rise.
And it
tries to
survive by
mobilizing the
nationalism of
the largest group
in the empire,
which happens to
be Russian.
Stalin is a big
promoter of
some form of
Russian nationalism,
especially during
the war and
after war.
And he started
his career as a
very promising
Georgian writer,
writing in
Georgian.
So he's not
doing that for
some personal
affinity or
cultural,
intellectual roots
within Russian
nation or
Russian people.
He is doing
that for the
sake of the
success of
his Soviet and
communist project.
and he has
to get the
largest ethnic
group on
board, which
are Russians.
But Stalin and
Putin have
different
understanding who
Russians are.
Stalin already
accepted Ukrainians
and Belarusians,
their existence.
Putin goes back
to pre-Stalin and
pre-Lenin times.
So if we
step back from
the historical
context of
this and
maybe the
geopolitical
purpose of
writing such
an essay and
forget about the
essay altogether.
You know, I
have family in
Ukraine and
Russia.
I know a lot
of people in
Ukraine and
Russia.
Forget the
war, forget
all of this.
There's a
kind of,
they all kind
of sound the
same.
like if I
go to
France, they
sound different
than in
Ukraine and
Russia.
Like if you
lay out the
cultural map
of the world,
there's just a
different beat
and music and
flavor to a
people.
I guess what
I'm trying to
say is there
seems to be a
closeness between
the cultures of
Ukraine and
Russia.
Like how do we
describe that?
Do we
acknowledge that
and how does
that,
add tension
with the
national
independence?
First of
all, especially
when it comes
to eastern
Ukraine or
to big
cities, many
people in
Ukraine spoke
Russian,
right?
Generally, it's
the same
language.
On the top
of that, we
started our
discussion with
talking about
the Slavs,
right?
So both
Ukrainian and
Russian language
are Slavic
languages.
So there is
proximity there
as well.
On the top
of that, there
is a history
of existence
in the
Soviet Union
and before
that in one
empire for a
long period of
time.
So you see a
lot of before
the war, a
lot of
Ukrainian
singers and
entertainers
performing in
Russia and
vice versa.
biography of
President Zelensky
is certainly
one of the
fits that
particular
model as
well.
That all
talks about
similarities.
But these
similarities also
very often
obscure
things that
became so
important in
the course of
this war.
Russia and
I already
mentioned the
book titled
by President
Kuchma of
Ukraine,
Ukraine is
not Russia.
So that's
the argument.
Despite the
fact that you
think that we
are the same,
we behave
differently.
And it
turned out that
they behave
differently.
You have
Bolotny in
Moscow and
police violence
and that's the
end of it.
You have
the Maidan
in Ukraine
and you have
police violence
and that's
the beginning.
That's not
the end.
History really
matters in
the way
why sometimes
people speaking
the same
language with
different accents
behave very
differently.
Russia and
Russian identity
was formed
around the
state and
has difficulty
imagining itself
outside of
the state.
And that
state happened
to be imperial
for most of
Russian history.
Ukrainian
project came
into existence
in revolt
against the
state.
Ukraine came
into existence
out of the
parts of
different
empires which
means they
left different
cultural impact
on them.
And for
Ukrainians to
stay together
out the
cratic regime
so far
didn't work.
It's like the
colonies of the
United States.
You have to
find common
language.
You have to
talk to each
other.
And that
became part
of the
Ukrainian
political DNA.
And that
became a
huge factor
in the
war.
And very
few people
in Ukraine
believed what
Vladimir Putin
was saying that
Russians and
Ukrainians were
one and the
same people.
But the
majority
believed
that they
are certainly
close
culturally and
historically
nations.
And from
that point
of view
the
bombardment
of the
Ukrainian
cities
became such
a shock
to the
Ukrainians.
Because deep
down they
maybe looked
at Syria,
they looked
at Chechnya
and were
explaining that
through the
fact that there
was basically
such a big
cultural gap
and difference
between Russians
and those
countries and
those nations.
countries.
But my
understanding
at least most
of them had
difficulty imagining
the war of that
proportion and
that sort of
ferocity and
that sort of
war crimes
and on that
level.
It's interesting
that you say
that in the
DNA of
Ukraine versus
Russia,
so maybe
Russia is
more
conducive to
authoritarian
regimes and
Ukraine is
more conducive
to defining
itself by
rebelling against
authoritarian
regimes.
By rebellion,
absolutely.
And that
was the story
pretty much
before 1991.
So what
you see
since 1991
and what
you see
today is
I would
say a new
factor certainly
in Ukrainian
modern history.
Because Ukrainians
traditionally were
very successful
rebels.
The largest
peasant army
in the
civil war
in the
Russian Empire
was the
Makhno army
in southern
Ukraine.
And one
revolt,
Cossack
revolts and
other
revolts one
after another.
But Ukrainians
had historically
difficulty
actually
maintaining the
sort of freedom
that they
acquired.
had difficulty
associating
themselves
with the
state.
And what
we see,
especially in
the last
two years,
it's a
quite phenomenal
development in
Ukraine when
Ukrainians
associate
themselves with
the state,
where Ukrainians
see a state
not just as
a foreigner,
as historically
it was in
Ukrainian history,
not just someone
who came to
take,
but the
state that
is continuation
of them,
that helps
to provide
security for
them,
that the
Ukrainian
armed forces
even before
the start
of this
war had
the highest
support
and popularity
in Ukraine.
The state
today functions
unbelievably
effectively
under attacks
and missile
attacks,
and again
city government
and local
government.
And we
are witnessing
when it
comes to
Ukraine,
we are
witnessing a
very important
historical
development
where Ukrainians
found their
state for
the first
time through
most of
their history
and try
to make
a transition
from successful
rebels to
successful
managers and
state builders.
Yeah.
I talked
to John
Mersheimer
recently.
There's a
lot of
people that
believe NATO
had a big
contribution
to the
Russian invasion
of Ukraine
in 2022.
So what
role did
NATO play
in this
full history
from
Bucharest in
2008
to today?
NATO
was a
big part
certainly
of the
Russian
justification
for the
war.
That was
the theme
that was
up there
in the
months
leading to
the
aggression.
The truth
is that
and
Vladimir Putin
went on
records
saying that
that the
Western
leaders
were telling
him again
and again
that there
is no
chance for
Ukraine to
become a
member of
NATO
anytime
soon.
Russia was
very effective
back in the
year 2008
in stopping
Ukraine and
Georgia on
the path of
joining
NATO.
There was a
Bucharest
summit
at which
the US
president at
that time
George W.
Bush was
pushing for
the membership
and Putin
convinced
leaders of
France and
Germany to
block that
membership.
After that
membership for
Ukraine and
for Georgia
was really
removed from
the realistic
agenda for
NATO.
That's what
the leaders
of the
Western world
in the
month leading
to the
February
2022
aggression
were trying
to convey
to Vladimir
Putin.
What he
wanted there
was an
ultimatum
that really
was there
not to
start
negotiations
but really
to stop
negotiations.
He demanded
the withdrawal
of NATO
to the
borders of
1997
if I'm
not mistaken.
So completely
something that
neither leaders
would accept
nor the
country's
members of
NATO would
accept.
But for
me it's
very clear
that that
was an
excuse,
that that
was a
justification.
And what
happened later
in the year
2022 and
2023 certainly
confirms me in
that belief.
Finland
joined
NATO and
Sweden is on
the way to
joining NATO.
So Finland
joining NATO
increased
border between
Russia and
NATO twofold
and probably
more than
that.
So if
NATO is
the real
concern,
it would
be probably
not completely
unreasonable
to expect
that if not
every single
soldier,
but at least
half of the
Russian army
fighting in
Ukraine,
would be
moved to
protect the
new border
with NATO
in Finland.
So I
have no
doubt that
no one in
Kremlin,
either in the
past or
today,
looks favorably
or is
excited about
NATO
moving or
the countries
of Eastern
Europe joining
NATO.
NATO, but
I have
very difficult
time imagining
that that was
the primary
cause of
the war.
And what
we see also,
we talked
about Tucker's
interview.
He was
surprised, but
he believed
that Putin
was completely
honest when
the first 25
minutes of
interview, he
was talking
about relations
between Russia
and Ukraine,
was talking
about history.
And that
was also
the main
focus of
his essay.
Essay was
not on
NATO and
Russia.
Essay was
on Russia
and Ukraine.
So that
is where
the real
causes are.
The broader
context is
the fall of
empire and
process of
disintegration of
empire, not
the story of
NATO.
What was
to clarify
the reason
Putin, Russia
invaded Ukraine
in 2022?
The immediate
goal in
2014 when
the war
started was
to stop
the drift
of Ukraine
toward the
west and
outside of
the Russian
sphere of
influence.
The invasion
of 2022
perceived the
same goals.
keeping
Ukraine in
the Russian
sphere of
influence.
Once we
have the
resistance,
quite effective
resistance on
the part of
Ukraine,
the
Rammstein
and
international
coalition in
support of
Ukraine,
then we see
the realization
of Plan B
where parts
of Ukrainian
territory are
being annexed
and included
in the
constitution of
the Russian
Federation.
So the
two scenarios
don't exclude
each other,
but if
scenario number
one doesn't
work, then
scenario number
two goes
into play.
In the
Gates of Kiev
chapter, you
write about
Volodymyr Zelensky
in the early
days of the
war.
What are
most important
moments to you
about this
time?
The first
hours and
days of the
invasion?
The first
hours and
the first
days were
the most
difficult
psychologically.
The rest of
the world
really didn't
expect Kiev to
last for more
than a few
days, didn't
expect Ukraine
to last for
more than a
few weeks.
And all the
data suggested
that that's what
would happen,
Ukraine would
collapse, would
be taken over.
Putin called
his war a
special military
operation, which
suggests you
also expectations
about the
scope,
expectations
about the
time.
So, semi-military,
semi-police
operation.
So, every
reasonable person
in the world
believed that
that would
happen.
And it's the
heroism of
quote-unquote
unreasonable
people, like
Zelensky, like
the commander of
Ukrainian armed
forces, like
mayors of the
cities, Klitschko
and others.
I'm just
naming names
that are
familiar to
almost all of
us now.
But there are
thousands of
those people,
unreasonable
people, who
decided that it
was unreasonable
to attack their
country.
And that
was the
most difficult
times and
days.
And speaking
about Zelensky,
every
I understand
reasonable
leader in
the West
was trying
to convince
him to
leave Ukraine
and to
set a
government
in exile
in Poland
or in
London.
And it
was reasonable
to accept
one of his
predecessors,
Mr. Yanukovych,
fled Kiev.
A few
months before
that, in
Afghanistan, the
president of
Afghanistan fled
Afghanistan, that
was a
reasonable thing
to expect.
And he
turned out to
be very, very
unreasonable in
that sense.
That comes with
the guts, his
guts and guts
people around
him and
Ukrainians in
general.
Why do you
think he
stayed in
Kiev, this
former comedian
who played
a president
on TV, when
Kiev is being
invaded by the
second most
powerful military
in the world?
Because I
think he
believes in
things.
And one
of those
things was
that if
he, a
president, and
he is in the
presidential
office, he
is there to
play his role
to the end.
And another
thing, my
personal, again
I never met
William
Zelensky, my
personal
understanding of
him, is
that he
has talent
that helped
him in his
career before
the presidency
and then
helps now.
He fills the
audience.
And then
channels the
attitude of
the audience
and amplifies
it.
And I
think that
another reason
why he
didn't leave
Kiev was
that he
fell the
audience.
The audience
in that
particular
context
were the
Ukrainians.
So he
had a
sense that
the
Ukrainians
would
unify.
Because he
was quite,
if you look
at the
polls before
the war,
quite unpopular.
And there
was still
divisions and
factions and
the government
is divided.
I mean,
there's the
East and the
West and
all this kind
of stuff.
You think he
had a sense
that this
could unite
people?
the East
and the
West was
not already
such an
issue after
Crimea and
part of
Donbass
being gone.
So Ukraine
was much
more united
than it
was before.
He
brought to
power his,
before that,
really non-existent
party of
regions on
his personal
popularity.
But the
important thing
is that he
created a
majority in
the parliament
which really
reflected the
unity that
existed among
Ukrainians that
was not there
before.
He won with
73% of the
population of
those who
took part in
the elections.
His predecessor,
Petro Poroshenko,
also carried
90% of the
precincts.
And the same
happened with
Zelensky.
So the
country unified
after 2014,
to a degree it
was impossible
to imagine
before, and
Zelensky felt
that.
Zelensky knew
that.
And that's
where the
talent of
politician really
matters.
That's
something that
you can see
beyond just
data, and
you can feel
that.
Apparently,
Yeltsin had
that ability.
Why did the
peace talks
fail?
There was a
lot of peace
talks.
The main
reason is
that the
conditions that
Russia was
trying to
impose on
Ukraine were
basically
unacceptable for
Ukraine.
because one
of the
conditions,
apart from
this strange
thing called
denazification,
was, of
course,
de facto
loss of
the
territory,
and for
the future,
really
staying
outside either
of NATO or
any Western
support, which
was very
clear, you
can buy a
couple of
weeks, you
can buy a
couple of
months, but
in the
conditions like
that Russia
will come
back tomorrow
and will
take over
everything.
And once
Ukrainians
realized that
they can win
on the
battlefield,
once the
Russians were
defeated and
withdrew from
Kiev,
the
opportunity
emerged to
get out of
the
negotiations,
which was
very clear
leading, if
not today,
then tomorrow,
to the
complete
destruction of
Ukraine.
And then, of
course, once
the territory
started to be
liberated,
things like
Butcher and
massacres of
the civilian
population came
to the fore,
which made
also quite
difficult, if
not impossible,
to conduct
negotiations from
this moral and
emotional point
of view.
What about the
claims that
Boris Johnson
and the
West compromised
the ability of
these peace
talks to be
successful,
basically kind
of manipulated
the talks?
I asked
people who
accompanied
Boris Johnson
to Kiev that
question.
The answer
was no,
and I
believed this
answer, and
I'll tell
you why.
Because it
is very
difficult for
me to
imagine
President
Zelensky
to take
orders from
anybody in
the world,
either Boris
Johnson or
Joe Biden
or anybody
else, and
basically doing
things that
Zelensky believes
are not in
his interest
or in the
interest of
his country.
I just
can't imagine
that anybody
in the world
telling
Zelensky what
to do and
actually following
it against
his own
wishes and
desires, at
least if that
is possible,
what is in the
public sphere
doesn't allow us
to suggest
that it is.
That said,
Zelensky is a
smart man, and
he knows that
the war can
only continue
with the West
support.
That is a
different supposition
to know that it
can continue with
the West support,
but if we are
talking about
withdrawing from
the negotiations,
that's not about
the continuation of
the war.
For that, you
don't need
Western support.
Well, what I
mean is, if
he started to
sense that the
West will
support no
matter what,
then maybe the
space of
decisions you're
making is
different.
We can
interpret that
that way, but
Boris Johnson
represented at
that point
Britain, not
the United
States, and
really what the
war showed, and
it was clear
already at that
time.
that what
was needed
was massive
support from
the West as
a whole, and
the promise of
that support
came only after
the West
realized that
Ukraine can
win, and
came only in
late April
with the
Rammstein, so
at least a few
weeks later.
So I don't
know how much
Boris Johnson
could promise.
He probably
could promise
to try to
help and
try to
convince and
try to work
on that.
If Zelensky
acted on that
promise, he
certainly was
taking a risk.
But the key
issue, again, I'm
going back where
I started, it's
principle and
acceptance for
Ukraine, the
conditions that
were offered, and
Ukraine was
the moment they
saw the
possibility that
they could
fight back,
with Johnson's
support, without
Johnson's support,
but they took
the chance.
So what are
the ways this
work can end,
do you think?
What are the
different possible
trajectories, whether
it's peace
talks, what does
winning look like
for either side,
what is the role
of U.S.?
What trajectories do
you see that are
possible?
it's a question
on the one
level, very
easy to answer,
on the other,
very difficult.
The level on
which it is
very easy, it's
a broad
historical
perspective.
If you really
believe, and I
believe in that,
that this is the
war of the
Soviet succession,
that this is the
war of the
disintegration of
empire, we
know how the
story ends.
And they
end with
disintegration of
empire.
They end with
the rise of
the new
states and
appearance of
the new
colored sports
on the map.
That's the
story that
started with
the American
Revolution.
So that's
long-term
perspective.
The difficult
part is, of
course, what
will happen
tomorrow.
The difficult
part is what
there will be
in two days
or even in
two years.
And in
very broad
terms, the
war can end
in one of
three scenarios.
The victory
of one side,
the victory
of another
side, and
a sort of
stalemate and
compromise,
especially when
it comes to
the territories.
This war is
already
approaching the
end of the
second year.
I follow the
news and
look analysis.
I don't
remember one
single piece
suggesting that
the next
year will
bring peace
or will
bring peace
for sure.
And we
are in a
situation where
both sides
still believe
that they can
achieve something
or improve
their position
on the
battlefield.
Certainly, that
was the
expectations of
Ukrainian side
back in the
summer and
early fall
of 2023.
And from
what I
understand now,
this is
certainly the
expectations of
the Russian
side today.
this is the
largest war in
Europe since
World War II,
the largest war
in the world
since Korean
War.
And we
know that
the Korean
War ended
in this
division of
Korea, but
the negotiations
were going on
for more than
two years.
While those
negotiations were
going on,
both sides were
trying to improve
their position
there.
And until
there was a
political change,
death of
Stalin,
arrival of
Eisenhower in
the United
States, and
the realization
that the
chances of
succeeding on
the battlefield
are huge,
the peace
talks didn't
come.
So, at
this point,
all three
scenarios are
possible.
I don't
really discount
any of them.
It's early
to say what
will happen.
So, without
any political
change, let's
try to
imagine what
are the
possibilities that
the war ends
this year.
Is it
possible that
it can end
with compromise
basically at the
place it
started?
Meaning back
to the borders
of 2022?
Yeah, back to
the borders of
2022 with
some security
guarantees that
aren't really
guarantees but
are hopeful
guarantees.
no, it is not
just virtual
impossibility.
It is impossible
without political
change in
Moscow.
The reason
is that back
in the fall
of 2022,
Vladimir Putin
included five
of Ukrainian
region
sublists,
even those
that he
didn't control
or didn't
control fully
into the
Russian
constitution,
which basically
in simple
language is
that the
hands are
tied up
not only
for Putin
himself but
also for
his possible
successors.
So that
means that
no return
to the
borders of
2022
without
political
change in
Moscow
are possible.
A few
days after
that decision
in Moscow,
Zelensky
issued a
decree
saying that
no one
negotiations
with Russia.
What that
really meant
in plain
language is
that basically
we are not
prepared to
negotiate a
stable agreement
with five
of our
obelists,
not just
annexed but
also included
into the
Russian
constitution.
So that's
where we
are.
So that
scenario is
again,
everything is
possible,
of course,
but it's
highly,
highly unlikely.
So the
Russian
constitution is
a thing
that makes
this all
very
difficult.
Yes,
and not
only as
a negotiation
tactic for
Putin or
whoever would
negotiate on
the Russian
side,
but also as
a legal
issue.
So the
practical aspect
of it even
is difficult.
you really
have to
change the
constitution
before the
peace
agreement
takes hold
or immediately
after that.
And with
the Minsk
agreements,
that was
one of
things that
Russia wanted
from Ukraine,
change of the
constitution,
and it turned
out to be
really impossible.
So that's
one of the
backstories of
the Minsk
and collapse
of the Minsk
agreements.
Is there
something like
Minsk
agreements that
are possible
now to,
maybe this is
a legal
question,
but to
override the
constitution to
sort of
shake everything
up?
So see the
constitutional
amendment as
just a
negotiation
tactic to
come to the
table to
something like
Minsk
agreement?
given how
fast those
amendments to
the constitution
were adopted,
that suggests
that really
executive power
in Russia has
enormous power
over the
legislative branch.
So it's
again difficult
to imagine,
but technically
this is possible
again,
but possible
if there is a
political change
in Moscow.
I don't
understand why
assuming political
change in Moscow
is not possible
this year.
So I'm trying
to see if
there's a way
to end this
war this year.
There is a
possibility of
armistice,
right?
But armistice
more along
the, like
any armistice,
along the
lines of the
current front
lines.
But withdrawal
of the Russian
troops to the
borders of
2022 at this
point, whether
it's reasonable
or unreasonable,
can be achieved
only as the
result of the
defeat of the
Russian army,
like it
happened near
a cave.
Is it
possible?
Possible.
Is it
likely, especially
given what is
happening with
the Western
support, military
support for
Ukraine?
Probably not.
But if Putin, the
executive branch, has
a lot of
power, why
can't the
United States
president, the
Russian president,
the Ukrainian
president come to
the table and
draw up something
like the Minsk
agreements, and
then rapid
constitutional changes
made, and you
go back to the
borders in
2022, before
2022, through
agreements, through
compromise,
impossible for
you?
Certainly not
this year.
I look at this
year as the
time when at
least one
side, Russian
side, will try
to get as
much as it
can through
military means.
But that's
been happening
last year, too.
There's been a
counteroffensive,
there's been
attempts, there's
been...
It doesn't
mean that
every...
That New
Year somehow
is supposed to
bring new
tactics.
That...
The last
year was
pretty much
a lot of
fighting, a
lot of
suffering, very
little movement
of the
front line.
The biggest
change of the
last year was
Ukraine victory
on the Black
Sea, where
they pushed
the Russian
Navy into
the western
part of
the pond
and restored
the grain
corridor and
export from
Odessa, apparently
up to 75% of
what it used to
be before the
war.
So that's the
only major
change, but
again, the
price is
enormous in
terms of
wealth, especially
in terms of
lives.
So thinking
about what
2024 brings,
Zelensky just
fired Ukraine's
head of the
army, a
man you've
mentioned, General
Valery Zaluzhny.
What do you
make of this
development?
This is a
very, very
dangerous moment
in the war.
The reason for
that is that
Zelensky is
someone who is
very popular with
the army and
with people in
general.
So if you
look at that
through American
prism, that
would be
something
analogous to
President
Truman
firing
General
McCauley.
Given that
stakes for
U.S. at
that time were
very high, but
probably not as
high as they
are for
Ukraine today.
In both
cases, what
is at stake
is certainly
the idea
that the
political
leadership and
military
leadership have
to be on
the same
page.
And the
question is
whether on
the part of
Zelensky, this
is just the
change of the
leadership, or
this is also
the change of
his approach
to the war.
And that
can mean
many things.
One can
mean him
taking more
active part
in planning
operations.
It can
mean also
possible change
of the
tactic in
the war,
given that
counter-offensive
didn't work
out.
We don't
know yet.
I don't
know whether
President
Zelensky at
this point
knows exactly
what will
come next.
But this
is the
time when
the change
of the
leadership in
the country
and in
the army
that is
at war,
it's one
of the
most dangerous
moments.
So the
thing that
President
Zelensky
expressed is
that this
is going
to be a
change of
tactics,
making the
approach more
technologically
advanced,
this kind
of things.
But as
you said,
I believe
he is
less popular
than the
chief of
the army,
Zolushni,
80% to
60% depending
on the
polls.
Do you
think it's
possible that
Zelensky's days
are numbered
as the
president,
that somebody
like Zolushni
comes to
power?
What we
know is
that in
this war,
Ukrainian
people really
united around
their
president.
And the
armed forces
were always,
even before the
start of the
war, more
popular than
was the
presidential
office.
So the
change, if
happened in
that realm,
was not so
dramatic.
And from
what I can
see from
social media
in Ukraine,
there is a
lot of
unhappiness,
a lot of
questions,
but there
is also
realization,
a very
strong
realization,
that the
country has
to stay
united.
And
certainly
the behavior
of
Zolushni
himself is
there,
basically not
suggesting any
sort of a
pre-Goshen
type of
scenario.
That gives
me some
hope,
actually a lot
of hope.
And in
terms of
whether Zelensky's
days are
numbered or
not, I
don't think
they're
numbered.
But if
Ukraine stays
a democracy,
and I
believe it
will stay,
what comes
to my
mind is
the story
of
Churchill,
the story
of De Gaulle,
in Poland
the story
of Pilsudski.
So once
the war
is over,
really the
electorate in
the democratic
elections,
they want
to change
the political
leadership,
they want
to move
forward.
But
Pilsudski came
back to
power,
and De Gaulle
came back
to power,
and Churchill
came back
to power.
So no,
whatever happens
in the
short run
or medium
term run,
I think
that
Zelensky's
days in
politics are
not numbered.
So what
to you
is interesting,
for example,
if I get a
chance to
interview
Zelensky,
what to
you is
interesting
about the
person that
would be
good to
ask about,
to explore,
about the
state of
his mind,
his thinking,
his view
of the
world as
it stands
today?
Next
month
were supposed
to take
place
Ukrainian
elections.
They're not
taking place
because the
majority of
Ukrainians
don't think
this is the
right thing
to do,
to change
the president,
to have
the elections,
to have a
political struggle
in the middle
of the war.
So Zelensky
refused to
call those
elections despite
the fact that
he is and
continues to
be the most
popular politician
in Ukraine,
so it would
be to his
benefit,
but that's
clearly not
what the
Ukrainians
want.
But the
question of
continuing as
the president
beyond five
years also
one way or
another would
raise questions
about the
legitimacy.
And certainly
Russia will be
playing this
card like
there is no
tomorrow.
And what I
would be
interested in
asking Zelensky
about,
whether he
sees that
his second
term,
which comes
on those
conditions,
would suggest
a different
attitude toward
the opposition,
maybe some
form of
the coalition
government like
it was the
case in
Britain with
Churchill,
under different
circumstances of
course, or
this is basically
in his opinion
something that
would be
destructive and
something that
would really be
an impediment
for the
issue, for the
question of
unity and
war effort.
And I
would ask
this question
not to
basically suggest
that that's
the way to
go, but I
would be very
much interested
to hear what
his thinking
about that is.
Do you think
there's a degree
during wartime
that the power
that comes with
being a war
president can
corrupt the
person, sort
of push you
away from
the democratic
mindset, towards
an authoritarian
one?
I think that
there is a
possibility of
that, right?
In the
conditions of
any emergency,
war, in the
case of the
Soviet Union,
there was a
Chernobyl
disaster and
so on and
so forth, you
make decisions
much faster,
you create
this vertical
and then
it's very
easy to
get really
used to
that way,
dealing with
the issues
in the
conditions of
emergency,
right?
And then
they continue
emergency or
with no
emergency,
they are
continuing the
emergency mode.
I think,
again, that
would be a
very natural
thing for any
human being
to do to
make it
easier.
Should I do
that easier
and in a
more effective
way or should
I do it the
right way?
That's a
challenge.
Sometimes it's
difficult to
answer this
question.
Let me stay in
power for just a
little longer to
do it the
efficient way.
And then time
flies away and
all of a sudden
you're going for
the third term
and the fourth
term.
And suddenly it's
easy to realize
that actually you
can't rule in
any other
way.
You just
whatever skills
you had or
people around
that can help
is that already
gone.
Exactly.
The people that
surround you are
not providing
the kind of
critical feedback
necessary for
a democratic
system.
One of the
things that
Tucker said
after his
interview with
Putin,
he was just
in his hotel
just chatting
on video,
and he
said that
he felt
like Putin
was not
very good
at explaining
himself,
like a
coherent
whole
narrative
of why
the invasion
happened
and it's just
this big
picture.
And he said
that's not
because he
doesn't have
one,
but it's
been a long
time since
he's had
somebody around
him where he
has to explain
himself to.
so he's
out of
practice,
which is
very
interesting.
It's a
very
interesting
point.
And that's
what war
and being
in power
for a
prolonged
period of
time can
do.
So on
that topic,
if you had
a chance
to talk
to Putin,
what kind
of questions
would you
ask him?
What would
you like
to find
out about
the man
as he
stands
today?
As a
historian,
I have
a lot
of
questions,
and I
have
questions
about
when the
decision
was made
to attack
Ukraine,
and what
went into
this decision,
because we
are thinking
about that,
we are
trying.
So as a
historian,
I have
this big
question,
a question
about the
Crimea,
when those
decisions
were made.
So that
sort of
questions,
that interest
me, but
the rest,
either I think
that I
understand what
is going
on with him,
or I don't
expect the
answer that
can help.
for example,
a good
question,
whether you
regret or
not the
start of
the war
in 2022,
given the
enormous,
enormous
casualties
on both
sides,
but you
can't expect
from a
politician
an honest
answer to
this question,
right?
So there
are questions
to which I
know he
can't answer,
honestly,
and then there
are other
questions to
which I think
he already
provided all
answers that
he could.
So what
for me is
of interest
are basically
questions for
a historian
about the
timing and
the logic of
particular
decisions.
Well, I do
wonder how
different what
he says
publicly is from
what he thinks
privately.
So a question
about when
the decision
to invade
Ukraine happens
is a very
good question.
to give
insight to
the difference
between how
he thinks
about the
world
privately
versus what
he says
publicly.
And same
about
other,
you know,
about empire.
Because if you
ask Putin,
he will say
he has no
interest in
empire and
he finds
the notion
silly.
But at
the same
time,
perhaps
privately,
there's a
sense in
which he
does seek
the
reunification
of the
Russian
empire.
Not in
the form
of the
Russian
empire,
not in
the form
of the
Soviet
Union,
but certainly
in some
form of
the Russian
control.
That's,
for me at
least,
it's quite
clear.
otherwise
there would
be no
bursts
to the
Russian
emperors
and Catherine
and Peter
and others.
You wrote
in your
book titled
The Frontline
Essays on
Ukraine's
Past and
Present
about the
Russian
question.
I guess
articulated by
Solzhenitsyn
first in
1994.
Solzhenitsyn,
of course,
is the
author of
Gulag
Archipelago.
He's
half
Ukrainian.
What is
the Russian
question?
Solzhenitsyn
clearly
identifies
himself as
Russian.
And his
opposition to
the communist
regime was
a position
of a
Russian
nationalist.
So his
argument was
that
communism
was bad
for Russia.
And for
him,
Russian
question is
about the
Russians,
ethnic
Russians,
but also
he was
thinking
about
Russians
in
Putin's
terms,
or Putin
thinks in
Solzhenitsyn's
terms,
about
Ukrainians and
Belarusians
constituting part
of that.
So the
Russian
question is
the biggest
tragedy of
the 20th
century,
the division
of the
Russians,
the loss
of the
statehood
and division
of the
Russians
between
different
states.
This is
for Solzhenitsyn's
Russian
question.
And his
original idea
and plan
was presented
in the
essay that
he published
in 1990,
which was
called
How We
Should
Restructure
Russia.
And
restructure
Russia meant
getting rid
of the
Baltics,
Central
Asia,
and
Caucasus,
and have
Russians,
Ukrainians,
and Belarusians,
including
those who
live in
northern
Kazakhstan,
to create
one
nation
state.
So he
was a
Russian
nationalist,
but he
was thinking
about
Russian
nation
state as
the state
of Russians,
Ukrainians,
and Belarusians.
And once
the Soviet
Union collapsed
and his
idea was
not
implemented,
in the
1990s he
formulated
Plan B,
taken over
by Russia
of Donbass,
Crimea,
and southern
Ukraine,
the areas
that now
are included
in the
Russian
Constitution.
So in
terms,
in historical
terms and
intellectual
terms,
what is
happening
today in
the war
between
Russia and
Ukraine
is the
vision,
on one
level or
another
level,
that was
formulated
by the
Nobel
laureate,
Alexander
Solzhenitsyn,
half Russian,
half Ukrainian.
If there
is such a
thing,
what would
you say
is the
Ukrainian
question,
as we
stand today?
The Ukrainian
question is
very simple.
Now,
it's not
any more
acquisition of
the nation
state,
but actually
a sovereign
state.
but it's
maintained.
So the
Ukrainian
question is
like dozens
of other
questions in
the 20th and
21st century,
the rise of
the new
state.
And that's
what is the
Ukrainian
question,
whether Ukraine
will continue
its existence
as a nation,
as an
independent
state,
because that
existence is
being questioned
by stating
that Russians
and Ukrainians
are one
and the
same
people,
which de
fact is
saying
your guy
is
Russian,
and also
trying to
destroy the
state.
Is it
possible that
if the
war in
Ukraine
continues
for many
more years,
that the
next leader
that follows
Zelensky
would take
Ukraine away
from a
sort of
democratic
western
style
nation,
towards a
more
authoritarian
one,
maybe even
with a
far-right
influence,
this kind
of direction,
because of
the war,
the influence
of war?
Everything
is possible,
and the
longer the
war continues,
the more
likely scenario
like that
becomes.
But
realization
of that
scenario
would go
against the
grain of
largest part
of Ukrainian
history.
where
Ukraine
really
emerged as
a pluralistic
state on
which the
elements of
democracy
were built
in the last
30 years,
would go
against the
grain of
the Ukrainian
society,
where, as
one author
formulated in
the 1990s,
he wrote a
book,
Ukrainian
Nationalism,
a Minority
Faith,
where the
nationalism was
a minority
faith, and
radical
nationalism
continues to
be, or at
least continued
to be, in
2019, a
minority
faith, during
the last
elections.
So, possible
but unlikely
given the
historical
realities of
the last
30-plus
years.
I could
talk to
you for
many more
hours on
Chernobyl
alone, since
you've written
a book on
Chernobyl and
nuclear disaster,
there's just a
million possible
conversations here,
but let me just
jump around
history a
little bit.
Back to
World War II,
back before
World War II,
my grandmother
lived through
Holodomor in
World War II,
Nazi-occupied
Ukraine.
Holodomor,
what do you
learn, let's
say, about
human nature,
and about
governments and
nations, from
the fact that
Holodomor
happened?
And maybe you
could say what
it is and why
it happened.
Holodomor is a
massive famine in
Ukraine, between
the years
1932 and
1934, and
it happened
as the
result of
forceful
collectivization
of the
agriculture.
And
attempt on
the part of
Stalin also
really
rolled Ukraine
into the
Soviet Union
with
basically no
potential
opposition from
Ukraine,
now national
communists.
So two
things came
together in
December of
1932, when
in the same
decree, Stalin
and Molotov
signed a
decree on
the requisition
of the
grain, which
led eventually
to the
mass
starvation,
and on
the banning
of Ukrainian
language
publications and
education in
other Soviet
republics outside
of Ukraine,
and introducing
limitations on
the so-called
Ukrainization
policies, so
on the use
of Ukrainian
language in
Ukraine itself.
And the
numbers are
debated.
The numbers
that most
of the
scholars work
today are
4 million, but
again, there
are larger
numbers as
well that
circulate.
the famine
of 1932,
1933 was
not exclusive
Ukrainian
phenomenon, but
most of
Ukraine in the
Soviet Union
died in
Ukraine, and
Ukraine was
the only place
where the
policy on
collecting
grain were
coming together
with the
policy of the
cleansing of
the political
leadership,
sending people
from Moscow
to take
over the
leadership, and
attack on
Ukrainian culture.
So, in
terms of what
I learn about
human nature,
it's more me
learning about
the ideologies
of the 20th
century, because
it's not the
only famine in
the communist
lands, the
famine in
China, which
was, in
terms of the
numbers, much
more devastating
than that.
it's in a
different category
and for a
good reason, but
you have
Holocaust.
What unites
these things
is the
time, this
is 20th
century, what
unites them
are the
dominance in
the societies
that are doing
that, really
ideologies,
that not just
devalued human
life, but
considered that
actually the
way forward
is by
destroying a
large group
of populations
defined ethnically,
religiously,
socially, or
otherwise, which
tells about the
time, but tells
also about
humanity, because
for centuries
before that,
human life was
valued.
There were
enemies, but
the idea was
that human
life can put
and you can,
at the end
of the day,
they can be
slaves, you
can use
them for
productive
force.
Countries in
the 18th
century with
southern Ukraine,
they were
looking for
settlers, for
people to
bring and
live on
land.
You move
into the
20th century
and there
is mass
destruction of
the population
in the name
of ideologies,
which basically
are, by
definition,
destroy human
lives.
And that's
what's really
so shocking
and striking
because that's
the break
with, not
just with
issues of
morale, not
just with
issues of
humanity, with
any common
sense, what
is happening.
And I'm
absolutely
convinced that
we didn't
learn the
lesson.
I'm absolutely
convinced that
we didn't
learn the
lesson.
With turning
our page on
fascism and
communism, we
somehow decided
that we are
free of
that.
That at
least in
those terms,
history came
to an end.
That what is
ahead is the
future and
nothing of
that sort
would happen,
would take
place to a
degree that
people would
get in
trouble for
comparing any
statements or
events that
are happening
today with
either communism
or fascism.
And so I
feel responsibility
of myself and
as a historian
in particular
for not
doing a
better job
about telling
people that
well, we
are who we
are and we
have as
humans our
dark side and
we have to
be very
careful.
So there is a
human capacity
to be captured
by an idea,
an ideology
that claims to
bring up a
better world as
the Nazis did,
as Soviet
Union did,
and on the
path of doing
that, devaluing
human life.
That we will
bring a better
world and if
millions of
people have to
be tortured,
on the way
to that,
all right,
but at least
we have a
better world
and human
beings are
able to,
if not
accept that,
look the
other way.
Yes,
and in the
name of a
particular
nation or
race,
like with the
Third Reich
or in the
name of the
humanity of
the future.
So not
just devalue
human life,
destroy human
life.
Is there
something
fundamental about
communism and
centralized planning
that's part of
the problem
here?
Maybe this
also connects
the story of
Chernobyl,
where the
Chernobyl
disaster is
not just a
story of
failure of a
nuclear power
plant, but
it's an
entire
institution of
the scientific
and nuclear
institution, but
the entirety of
the government.
There is,
and there is a
number of
factors of
political and
social character
that produce
Chernobyl.
and one
of them
is generally
the atmosphere
of secrecy in
the Soviet
Union in
the conditions
of the Cold
War.
Chernobyl
reactor was a
dual-purpose
reactor.
It could boil
water today and
produce enriched
uranium tomorrow,
right?
So it was top
secret.
And if there
were problems
with that
reactor, those
problems were
kept secret
even at
people who
operated.
That's what
happened in
Chernobyl.
Another big,
big part of
the story,
which is
specifically
Soviet,
that's the
nature of
the managerial
culture and
administrative
culture in
which people
had no right
to make their
own decisions
in their place,
in their
position.
a few years
before that
Three Mile
Island happened,
which was a
big, big
nuclear disaster,
but in terms
of consequences,
nothing like
Chernobyl.
And there,
in the context
of the American
legal culture
and managerial
culture,
people who
were operators
who were
in managerial
positions,
that was their
responsibility to
take decisions.
President Carter
came there,
but he was
not calling
shots on
none of
those issues.
What you see
with Chernobyl
and people
who saw
HBO series
know that
very well,
the moment
the high
official arrives,
everyone
actually falls
in line,
it's the
official who
calls the
shot.
And to
move population
from the
city of
Pripyat,
you needed
the okay
coming from
Moscow from
the very
top.
So that
is Soviet
story.
And there
is a
global story
of cutting
corners to
meet the
deadlines,
like it
was with
that test
that they
were running
at that
time,
or to
meet
production
quarters.
This is
not just
socialist
thing.
You can
replace
production
quarters
with profit
and you
get the
same
story.
So some
parts in
that story
are generally
reflective of
our today's
world in
general.
Others are
very specific
for Soviet
Union,
for Soviet
experience.
part of
that story
is that
on the
one hand
the
government
in
Moscow
and
Kiev
mobilize
all
resources
to deal
with
that.
But
they
keep
information
about
what is
happening
and the
radiation
clouds
secret
from the
rest of
the population,
something
that completely
would be
impossible
and was
impossible
in the
U.S.,
in the
U.K.,
where other
accidents
happened.
And then
guess what?
A few
years later,
the Soviet
Union
collapses
very much
also thanks
to the
mobilization
of people
over the
issue of
Chernobyl
and nuclear
energy.
People
writing about
that subject
call it
eco-nationalism,
ecological
nationalism,
which comes
at least
in part
from
withholding
information
from
people.
And
in Ukraine,
mobilization
didn't
start over
the issues
that led
to
independence,
didn't
start over
the issue
of language,
or didn't
start over
the issue
of
national
autonomy.
It
started under
the slogans
tell us
the truth
about
Chernobyl.
people.
We want
to know
whether we
live in
contaminated
areas or
not.
And that
was a
very,
very strong
factor that
crossed the
not just
ethnic,
religious,
linguistic
lines,
lines between
members of
the party,
and not
members of
the party,
of the top
leadership,
and not in
military and
civilian,
because it
turned out
that the
party car
didn't protect
you from
being affected
by radiation.
So all
national
mobilization
happens.
The first
mass
manifestations
are about
Chernobyl,
not about
anything else.
That's
fascinating.
I mean,
for people
who might
not know,
Chernobyl
is located
in Ukraine.
It's a
fascinating
view that
Chernobyl
might be
one of
the critical
threshold
catalysts
for the
collapse
of the
Soviet
Union.
That's
very
interesting.
Just as
a small
side,
I guess
this is a
good moment
to give
some love
to the
HBO series.
It made
me,
even though
it's
British
accents
and so
on,
it made
me realize
that some
of these
stories in
Eastern
Europe
could be
told very
effectively
through film,
through series.
It was
so incredibly
well done.
Maybe I
can ask
you,
historically
speaking,
were you
impressed?
I was.
and I
think that
the
miniseries
are very
truthful on
a number
of levels
and very
untruthful
on some
others.
and they
got excellent
very well
the macro
and micro
levels.
So the
macro
level is
the issue
of the
big truth
and the
story there
is very
much built
around the
theme that I
just discussed
now.
It's about
the cost
of lies,
right?
And the
Soviet Union
line to
the people
and that's
what the
film explores.
So that's,
I call it,
a big truth
about Chernobyl.
And they
got a lot
of minor
things really,
really very
well,
like the
curtains on
the windows,
like how the
houses looked
from inside
and outside.
I didn't
see any
post-Soviet
film or
any Western
film that
would be so
good at
capturing those
everyday
details.
But then
there is a
huge gray
area in
between big
truth and
small truth
of the
recreating
the environment.
And that's
how you get
from one
to another.
And then
you see
the KGB
officers coming
and taking
someone out
of the
meeting and
arresting,
which was
not
necessary.
You see
the Soviet
boss
threatening
someone to
throw the
person from
the helicopter.
So you
get this
Hollywood sort
of things,
despite the
fact that
it's HBO
series.
And they're
the best
really in
terms of
as a
film in
the fourth
episode,
where they
completely
decided just
to hell
with the
reality and
let's make
a film.
So they
bring
Legasov
to one
of the
key
characters
to the
court
meetings
that they
bring
the
key
Soviet
party
boss
Shcherbina.
He wasn't
there.
They create
a drama
there.
So they
got the
main thing,
the big
truth,
right?
And that's
why I like
this production.
Sometimes
you have
to show
what something
felt like,
you have to
go bigger
than it
actually was.
I mean,
if you,
I don't
know,
if you
experience
heartbreak
and you
see a
film about
it,
you want
there to
be
explosions.
You want
to see
this in
images,
visible,
right?
But the
question,
again,
I just
mentioned
KGB
marching
in and
some
party
leader
giving a
speech.
They were
not given
that speech,
but the
sense was
there and
it was in
the air.
And I,
as people
of my
generation
who were
there,
knew that
and recognized
that.
But for
new
generation,
whether they
are in
Ukraine,
in Russia,
in US,
in Britain,
in Zimbabwe,
anywhere,
you have
to do
this little
untruths
and introduce
them.
And I had
a very
interesting
on-air
conversation
with the
author of
the script,
amazing,
and I
asked him
the question
of,
the film
declared
really the
importance of
the truth,
but how
do you
square that
with the
need in
the film
to really
put it
mildly,
to go
beyond the
measures of
truth,
whatever
understanding
of that
term is.
Well,
I suppose
it is a bit
terrifying that
some of the
most dramatic
moments in
history are
probably quite
mundane.
The decisions
to begin
wars,
invasions,
they're probably
something like
a Zoom
meeting on
a random
Tuesday in
today's
workplace.
It's not like
there's dramatic
music playing.
These are just
human decisions
and they
command armies
and they
command
destruction.
I personally
because of
that believe
in the
power of
individuals to
be able to
stop wars,
not just
start wars,
individual
leaders.
So let me
just ask about
nuclear safety
because there's
an interesting
point you make.
You wrote in
the book
In Atoms and
Ashes,
A Global
History of
Nuclear
Disaster.
So technically
nuclear energy
is extremely
safe.
There's a number
of people died
per energy
generated.
It's much
safer than coal
and oil,
for example,
as far as I
understand.
But the case
you also make
is you write
quote,
Many of the
political,
economic,
social,
and cultural
factors that
led to the
accidents of
the past
are still
with us
today,
making the
nuclear industry
vulnerable to
repeating old
mistakes in
new and
unexpected ways.
And any new
accidents are
certain to
create new
anti-nuclear
mobilization.
And then you
continue with,
This makes the
nuclear industry
not only risky
to operate,
but also
impossible to
count on as
a long-term
solution to
an overwhelming
problem.
So can you
explain that
perspective?
It's an
interesting one.
So speaking to
the psychology
of when an
accident does
happen,
it has a
dramatic effect.
And also
speaking to the
fact that
accidents can
happen not
because of
the safety of
the nuclear
power plant
but of
the underlying
structure of
government that
oversees it.
Yes, I
wrote a book
on Chernobyl
and then
tried to
understand
Chernobyl
better but
placing it in
the context of
other disasters
as a historian
and was looking
at the political
factors and
social factors
and cultural
factors, not
the physics
or engineering
part of the
story.
And the
factors that
are still
with us are
the, like
it was the
case in
Chernobyl, the
authoritarian
regimes, right,
and high
centralization of
the decision
making and
desire to
cut corners
and also the
issues associated
with secrecy.
So that's
that is
with us.
If you
look at
where the
future of
the nuclear
industry is
now at
this point,
it's the
regimes and
parts in
the Middle
East.
That's a
big new
frontier.
The countries
that are not
particularly known
for the
history of
democratic
existence,
where we
also have
the situation
that we
had at
Three Mile
Island,
that we
had at
Chernobyl,
this is the
first generation
engineers,
nuclear engineers,
right?
So people
who are,
where the
country doesn't
have a lot of
experience in
generations,
after generations
working in that
particular industry,
where it's all
new,
that is certainly
additional risk.
war, and
what we got
now is this
current war,
is something
that, not
that people
completely didn't
expect, but
didn't happen in
the past.
You see the
war coming to
the nuclear
sides.
Chernobyl was
taken over by
the Russian
Army, or
National Guard
rather, on the
first day of the
invasion.
Then there was
Zaporizhia, the
largest nuclear
power plant in
Europe, where
the battle was
waged on the
territory of the
nuclear power
plant, the
missiles being
fired, buildings
catching fire,
and the
situation that
brought the
Fukushima disaster
was there at
Zaporizhia more
than once.
And Fukushima
came because the
reactors were shut
down as they are
at Zaporizhia, but
they still needed
electricity to
bring water and
to cool them
down.
And in Fukushima
case, it was the
tsunami that cut
off the supply of
electricity.
In the case of
Zaporizhia, there
was the warfare
that was happening
in the area around
Zaporizhia that
did the same
effect.
So we have
440 reactors in
the world today,
plus, minus.
None of them
was designed to
withstand the
direct missile
attack or to
function in the
conditions of
the warfare.
If operators,
they're human,
they make
mistakes like
they did at
Three Mile
Island or
Chernobyl, but
think also if
the war is
happening around
them, if
they're not
sure what is
happening with
their families,
if they don't
know whether
they will be
next missile,
whether they
will hit the
control room
or not,
that multiplies
also.
So we are
in a situation
where we are
not done yet
with the
nuclear accidents.
Each time,
it's not like
we don't pay
attention or we
don't learn.
Smart people
work on that
and after every
accident, try to
figure the way
how not to
step into the
same trap.
But next
accident would
actually expose
a new
vulnerability.
You deal with
Chernobyl and
then tsunami
comes.
You deal with
tsunami and
then war
comes.
And we
really, in
that sense,
we have
sometimes wild
imagination, but
sometimes it's
difficult to
imagine what
can happen
next.
So we are
not done.
There will be
nuclear accidents
unfortunately in
the future.
And that
makes nuclear
energy so
problematic when
you count on
it to fight
climate change.
I'll explain
why.
You gave the
figures how
many people
die from
burning coal,
from how
many people
die from
radiation.
And it's
a good
argument.
Some people
would question
them because
it's also the
issue of not
just dying,
but impact
of radiation
on cancer,
on our
health, which
is not
completely
understood yet.
So still
there is a
lot of
question marks.
But let's
assume what
you are
saying.
That's the
figures.
That's how
it is.
But we
as people,
we for
whatever reason
are not
afraid of
coal, but
we are very
much afraid of
radiation.
It's
invisible.
it's
COVID.
It's
everywhere.
And you
can't see
it.
And then
you start
having issues.
And then
you have
problems.
And
during the
COVID,
the governments
closed the
borders.
Maybe a good
idea, maybe
not so good
ideas.
isolation.
So that
was the
way.
Governments
started to
fight for
access to
Pfizer, to
Moderna, to
Sputnik, to
whatever it
is, to
vaccine.
So now
back to
the radiation.
What is
happening once
Chernobyl
happens?
That's the
highest point
in the
development of
nuclear industry
so far in
terms of
how many
new reactors
were
commissioned
or the
licenses were
issued.
The next
reactor after
Three Mile
Island in
the U.S.,
go ahead, was
given, it
seems to me,
10 years ago
or something
like that.
The Fukushima
happens, the
reaction is in
China to that
as well.
They're very
much concerned.
So there is a
saying in the
field,
Chernobyl
anywhere is
Chernobyl
everywhere.
After Fukushima,
Germany decides
to go
nuclear-free
and gets
there at the
expense of
burning coal.
So that's
how we
react.
And each
major
accident,
that means
global
freeze on
the nuclear
reactor production
for at least
another 10
years.
So that's
what I mean
that nuclear
industry is
not just
in terms of
technology,
not just in
terms of
radiation,
impact on
health, but
also politically
a very, very
unreliable
option.
And to
you, you
suspect that
that's an
irreparable
aspect of
human nature
and the
human mind,
that there
are certain
things that
just create
a kind of
panic,
invisible
threats of
this kind,
whether it's
a virus or
radiation.
There's
something about
the mind,
if I get a
stomach ache in
the United
States after
Fukushima, I
kind of think
it's probably
radiation,
this kind of
irrational type
of thinking.
And that's
not possible
to repair?
I think we
can be trained,
right?
We can be
Pretty smart,
aren't we?
Education.
But generally,
we are afraid
of things that
we see,
but even more
we are afraid
of things that
we don't see.
And radiation
is one of
those.
Let's zoom
out on the
world.
We talked
about the
war in
Ukraine.
How does
the war in
Ukraine change
the world
order?
Let me just
look at
everything that's
going on.
Zoom out a
bit.
China, the
Israel-Gaza
war, the
Middle East,
India.
What is
interesting to
you, important
to think about
in the coming
years and
decades?
As a historian,
and I'm
trained that
way, I have
a feeling of
deja vu.
I see the
Cold War
is coming
back in
many of
its features.
And the
war started,
and we
discussed that,
in 2014,
at least in
my interpretation,
with Russia
trying to
really re-establish
its control
over the
post-Soviet space,
and Ukraine
was crucial
for that
project.
And the
more global
Russian vision
since 1990s
was that
they didn't
like the
American
monopolar world.
world, they
knew and
realized that
they couldn't
go back to
the bipolar
world of
the Cold
War era.
So the
vision was
multipolar
world, in
which, again,
it wasn't just
academic exercise,
it was a
political exercise
in which Russia
would be one
of the
centers, one
of the
poles, on
par with
China, on
par with
European Union,
on par with
the United
States.
that's
very broadly
speaking the
context in
which the
war starts
in 2014.
Where we
are now?
Well, we
are now in
Russia certainly
trying to
regain its
military
strength, but
no one
actually believes
that Russia
is the sort
of a superpower
it was
imagined
before
2022.
we see
certainly
Russia
finding the
way to
deal with
the sanctions,
but we
don't see
certainly
Russia as
an economic
power with
any sort of
a future.
So it is
not an
implosion of
the Russian
military,
economic, and
political power,
but it's
significantly
actually, it is
diminished.
So today,
very difficult
to imagine
Russia emerging
as another
pole of the
multipolar world.
Not impossible,
but the war
certainly made
that very
problematic and
much more
difficult.
On the other
hand, what the
war did, it
basically awakened
the West,
the Old
West, United
States and
Western Europe,
transatlantic
alliance.
And on
the top of
that, there
are East
European
countries that
are even
much stronger
proponents of
assistance for
Ukraine than
is Germany
or the
United States
of America.
So it
is the
replay of
the Cold
War story,
the return of
the West.
One of the
chapters in
my book,
The Russo-Ukrainian
War, is
called that
way.
We also
can see the
elements of
the rebuilding
of the
Beijing-Moscow
alliance of
the 1950s,
which was a
very important
part of the
Cold War.
It was an
extremely
important part
of the
Korean War
that in
many ways
launched
also the
Cold War
globally.
So I see
a lot of
parallels of
going back to
the time of
the Cold War,
and the
bipolar world
that emerges,
it's not
anymore the
world focused
on Washington
and Moscow.
It's more
like the
world focused
on Washington
and Beijing.
And then there
are countries
in between.
There are
countries in
between that
join one
block or
another block
that is
emerging that
is not
fully formed.
and this
is, in my
opinion, makes
the task
of us
historians
to really
go back to
the Cold
War and
look for
a new
perspective
on the
history of
that conflict
because there
is a lot
of things
that we
can learn.
So, in
some ways,
history does
repeat itself
here.
So, now
it's a Cold
War with
China and
the United
States.
What's a
hopeful trajectory
for the
21st century,
for the rest
of it?
The hopeful
trajectory is
really
trying to
be as
wise and
as lucky
as our
predecessors
during the
Cold War
were.
Because the
dominant
discourse so
far about
the Cold
War was
what a
horrible
thing that
Cold War
was.
What did
we do
wrong?
How did
we end
up in
the Cold
War?
And I
think,
especially
today,
this is a
wrong
question to
ask.
The right
question to
ask is,
how did
it happen?
What did
we do so
right that
for now
more than
70 years
we don't
have a
World War?
How come
that after
World War I,
World War II
came within
20 years?
How come
that what
helped us?
to keep
the world
on the
brink but
still away
from the
global war
for such
a long
period of
time?
How to
keep the
Cold War
cold?
That's the
biggest lesson
that the
history of the
Cold War can
give us.
And I
don't think
we ask
the question
quite often
enough,
ask the
question that
way.
And if you
don't ask
right questions,
we don't get
right answers.
Yeah,
you've
written a
book,
a great book
on the
Cuban
missile
crisis.
And we
came very
close,
not to
just another
world war,
but to a
nuclear war
and the
destruction of
human civilization
as we know
it.
so I
guess it's a
good question
to ask,
what do we
do so
right?
And maybe
one of the
answers could
be that we
just got
lucky.
And the
question is,
how do we
keep getting
lucky?
Luck is
clearly one
of the
factors in
the Cuban
missile crisis
because what
happened there,
and there is
one of the
lessons,
is that
eventually the
commanders at
the top,
they believe
that they
have all
the cards.
They negotiate
with each
other.
They try to
see who
blinks
first in
the game
of nuclear
blinkmanship.
The trick
is that
they don't
control
fully people
on the
ground.
The most
dangerous
moment,
or one of
the most
dangerous
moments of
the Cuban
missile
crisis was
the Soviet
missile
shooting down
the American
airplane,
killing the
pilot.
An act of
war.
So technically
we're already
in war.
And the
order to
shoot the
missile was
given with
Moscow having
no clue what
was going on
the ground.
Moscow never
gave approval
for that.
And again,
I described
that in
a book many
times about
Kennedy bringing
back his
wisdom from
World War II
years.
There always
will be
SOB who
didn't get
the order
or miss
things.
And that was
happening on
the American
side as well.
people who
believe that
they're in
control really
are not in
control.
And that
can escalate
whether they
very often
against their
issues.
So that is
one lesson.
But going
back to
why we're
still here
and why
the world
didn't end
up in
1962 is
that the
leadership,
I come
to the
issue that
you strongly
believe in
that people,
personalities
matter,
leaders
matter.
They were
very different,
right?
Age,
education,
political
careers,
understanding
what politics
are and so
on and so
forth.
You mean
Khrushchev?
Khrushchev
and Kennedy,
yes.
But they
had one
thing in
common,
that in
one way
they belong
to the
same
generation.
That was
generation
of the
Bikini
Atoll.
That was
the generation
of the
hydrogen
bomb.
The bomb
that,
unlike the
atomic
bomb,
they knew
could destroy
the world.
And they
were scared.
They were
scared of
the nuclear
weapons.
And they
tried to
do whatever
they could,
pushing
against
their
advisors
or
trying to
deal
with
their
anxieties.
The first
is true
for Kennedy,
later maybe
for Khrushchev,
to make
sure that
the war
between the
United States
and the
Soviet Union
doesn't start
because they
knew that
that war
would be
a nuclear
war.
So we
have a
paradoxical
sort of
situation.
The crisis
occurred because
of the
nuclear weapons,
because Khrushchev
put them
on Cuba.
But the
crisis was
resolved and
we didn't
end in the
Third World
War because
of the
nuclear weapons,
because
people,
leaders,
were afraid
of them.
And that's
where I want
to put
emphasis.
It's not
that the
nuclear weapons
created crisis
or solved the
crisis.
It's basically
our perception
of them.
And we
are now in
the age
after the
Cold War
era.
It's a new
generation of
voters.
It's a new
generation of
politicians.
We don't
belong to the
generation of
bikini at all.
You maybe
know what
bikini is,
but we
think that
this is
something else.
And it's
very important.
It's so
fascinating how
that fades
into memory,
that the
power and
the respect
and fear of
the power
of nuclear
weapons just
fades into
memory.
And then we
may very well
make the same
mistakes again.
Yes, we
can.
Another leader
said that, I
believe.
But about a
totally different
topic.
Well, like you
said, I'm also
glad that we're
here as a
civilization, that
we still seem
to be going on.
There's several
billion of us,
and I'm also
glad that the
two of us are
here.
I've read a lot
of your books.
I've been
recommending it.
Please keep
writing.
Thank you for
talking today.
This is an
honor.
Thank you
very much,
Lex.
It was a
pleasure.
Thanks for
listening to
this conversation
with Serhii
Plohi.
To support
this podcast,
please check
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sponsors in
the description.
And now,
let me leave
you with some
words from
Ernest Hemingway.
Never think
that war,
no matter how
necessary,
nor how
justified,
is not a
crime.
Thank you for
listening, and
hope to see you
next time.
Thank you.
See you next time.